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Abstract 
Violence in Kenya undermines the role of Kenyan higher education in the transition to 
democratic practices. This dissertation analyses democratic citizenship education (DCE) and 
its implications for Kenyan higher education. Higher education as used in this dissertation is 
centred on the university. The dissertation addresses the main research question, namely: 
How does a defensible deliberative conception of democracy help us to think differently 
about higher education in Kenya? This main research question is investigated using the 
following sub-questions: What space might there be for democratic citizenship education to 
help Kenyan higher education institutions address ethnic divisions in the country? How can 
democratic citizenship education in Kenyan higher education reshape ethnic identities and 
overcome ethnic tensions? Philosophy of education, as the approach used in this dissertation, 
enabled this research to reach its goal, which was to establish how DCE can help university 
education in Kenya resolve ethnic violence. In doing so, this dissertation argues that an 
extended view of liberal DCE – DCE in becoming – fits in with deconstruction as a reflexive 
paradox that retains the critical potential of DCE. Deconstruction potentially creates space for 
reimagining the possibilities of the university as a critical and democratic institution. 
Deconstruction as a method enabled this research potentially to claim openness in thinking 
about university education in Kenya to unforeseeable in becoming – being other than it 
currently is, so that it can contend with issues of ethnic violence in whatever singularity. This 
dissertation found that Kenyan higher education is already conceptualised in liberal DCE in a 
predetermined sense of belonging, although in a limited form, and that it is actualised, which 
means that it cannot resist violence. Therefore, a reconceptualised view of DCE in becoming 
is engendered in the potentialities of speech and thought and withholding rash judgment – as 
a way of curbing violence. Further, the findings demonstrate that DCE in becoming 
potentially can enable students and teachers to learn to think autonomously and to respect 
others with whom they co-belong. DCE in becoming potentially can contribute to the 
discourses and pedagogical encounters needed to cultivate responsible, relational, 
emancipative individual agency in becoming humans who respect and co-belong to the 
coming community. 
Key Words: University, Kenya, Re-imagine, Potentialities, Actuality, Deconstruction, 
Philosophy of education, Democratic citizenship education in becoming, Liberal, Pedagogy, 
Ethnic violence. 
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Opsomming 
Geweld in Kenia ondermyn die rol van Keniaanse hoër onderwys in die oorgang na 
demokratiese praktyke. Hierdie proefskrif analiseer demokratiese burgerskapopvoeding 
(democratic citizenship education (DCE)) en die implikasies daarvan vir hoër onderwys in 
Kenia. Hoër onderwys soos in hierdie proefskrif gebruik, verwys na die universiteit. Die 
proefskrif spreek die hoof- navorsingsvraag aan, naamlik: Hoe help ’n verdedigbare 
beraadslagende begrip van demokrasie ons om anders oor hoër onderwys in Kenia te dink? 
Hierdie hoof- navorsingsvraag is ondersoek deur gebruik te maak van die volgende subvrae: 
Watter ruimte kan daar wees vir demokratiese burgerskapopvoeding om 
hoëronderwysinstellings in Kenia te help om die etniese verdeeldheid in die land aan te 
spreek? Hoe kan demokratiese burgerskapopvoeding in hoër onderwys in Kenia bydra tot ’n 
hervorming van etniese identiteite en etniese spanning oorkom? Die filosofie van die 
onderwys, as die benadering wat in hierdie proefskrif gebruik is, het dit vir die navorsing 
moontlik gemaak op sy doel te bereik, naamlik om te bepaal hoe DCE universiteitsopvoeding 
in Kenia kan help om etniese geweld op te los. Sodoende hou hierdie proefskrif voor dat ’n 
uitgebreide siening van liberale DCE – DCE in wording – inpas by dekonstruksie as ’n 
refleksiewe paradoks wat die kritiese potensiaal van DCE behou. Dekonstruksie skep 
potensieel ruimte om die moontlikhede om die universiteit as ’n kritiese en demokratiese 
instansie te herverbeel (re-imagine). Dekonstruksie as ’n metode het hierdie navorsing 
potensieel in staat gestel om aanspraak te maak op oopheid in denke oor 
universiteitsopvoeding in Kenia as onvoorsienbaar in wording – om anders te wees as wat dit 
tans is, sodat dit kan worstel met kwessies van etniese geweld in wat ook al singulariteit. 
Hierdie proefskrif het bevind dat hoër onderwys in Kenia reeds in liberale DCE 
gekonseptualiseer is as ’n voorafbepaalde sin van behoort, hoewel in ’n beperkte mate, en dat 
dit geaktualiseer is, wat beteken dat die nie geweld kan teëstaan nie. ’n Herkonseptualiseerde 
siening van DCE in wording word dus voortgebring in die potensialiteite van spraak en denke 
en die weerhouding van oorhaastige oordeel – as ’n manier om geweld te beteuel. Verder 
demonstreer die bevindinge dat DCE in wording potensieel studente en onderwysers kan help 
om outonoom te dink en om ander met wie hulle saam behoort, te respekteer. DCE in 
wording kan potensieel bydra tot die diskoerse en pedagogiese ontmoetings wat benodig 
word om verantwoordelike, relasionele, emansiperende individuele agentskap te kultiveer in 
wordende mense wat die komende gemeenskap respekteer en gesamentlik daaraan behoort. 
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  Chapter One
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1.1. Introduction 
Kenya faces many challenges as a result of the politicisation of ethnic identities, which led to 
tribal conflicts over land disputes, positions in government, and access to higher institutions 
of learning (see Mwiria, Ngethe, Ngome, Odero, Wawire & Wesonga, 2007; Nyakuri, 1997; 
Oyugi, 2000; Wawire, Chege, Arnot & Wainaina, 2008). The gravity of this challenge is 
made evident in the violence that erupted after at least two national elections in 1992 and 
2007. In 1992, ‘[t]he wave of inter-ethnic conflicts in the Rift Valley, Nyanza, Western and 
some parts of the Coastal Provinces went down in Kenya’s history as the worst since 
independence’ (Nyakuri, 1997:1). In 2007, bloody clashes between ethnic groups took place 
after the December 27th national elections. It was reported that, in these clashes, ‘1 000 
Kenyans were brutally killed, another 3 500 were internally displaced and the image of 
Kenya as a safe and a peaceful destination was instantaneously shattered’1. These conflicts 
should not be perceived as a once-off occurrence. In contrast, most Kenyan districts are 
disturbed by actual or potential ethnic violence, so much so that there is barely a province left 
where the problem has not occurred: Western, Rift Valley, Nyanza, Coast, Central, North 
Eastern, Eastern and Nairobi provinces (Klopp, 2002:269; Nyakuri, 1997:2). This is partly so 
because different communities continue to wilfully or instinctively rely on ethnicity to 
propagate their supremacy and dominance in an atmosphere typified by limited resources, 
fear and intolerance. Unfortunately, there is a tendency to shy away from discussing this 
problem, for, as Nyakuri (1997:1) has observed, 
The issue of ‘ethnic conflict’ [is] a very sensitive, yet important subject for discussion, aimed 
at formulating policy options for conflict management. Indeed, whenever the issue is raised, 
there has often been panic, confusion and scepticism, within the government, opposition as 
well as within the entire public circle. 
                                                 
1
 http://media.lonely planet.com, ‘Destination Kenya’, retrieved on 15 February 2012, indicates that ‘Kenya is a 
thriving multicultural country with a wide cross-section of everything classic in contemporary Africa’ and that 
this has been deterred by the ethnic violence that was experienced in 2007. Inasmuch as the cultural diversity is 
vibrant, it has also resulted in ethnic conflicts that have divided the country. 
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This tendency to shy away from the problem at a discursive level is one of the challenges that 
needs to be confronted if harmony is to be achieved amongst ethnic groups. In this study I 
will argue that higher education can be used as an instrument to reduce ethnic tensions in 
Kenya because, at this level, educational systems impact most significantly on students’ 
political attitudes, behaviours and character. It is also at this level that students are mature 
enough to engage in politics and contribute ideas to policy formulation, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation (Luescher-Mamashela, Kiiru, Mattes, Ntallima, Ngéthe & Romo, 
2011:5). Further, Falola and Atieno-Odhiambo (2002:594) posit that higher institutions of 
learning have a large role to play in fostering national unity. They (institutions) do so, it can 
argued, through producing and propagating ideologies of democratic citizenship education in 
order to lead to the creation of a new political culture that includes the promotion of national 
unity in diversity.  
In this study I examine how and why the notion of liberal democratic citizenship is central to 
higher education in Kenya in the country’s attempt to fight tensions and imbalances resulting 
from ethnic politics and polarisation. My focus on liberal democratic citizenship is informed 
by research that has been carried out on how this concept is instrumental in illuminating the 
link between the politicisation of ethnicity and a country’s education system (policies and 
practices) (see Benhabib, 1996:69; Hansen, 2008:19; Waghid, 2002:26; 2009:24; 2010:19; 
Waghid & Le Grange, 2004:1; Waghid & Smeyers, 2012a). Building on this research, I will 
explore the degree to which we can and should recognise democratic citizenship as a 
progressive concept (see Barry, 1989; Biesta, 2011:141; Enslin & White, 2003; Hirst & 
White, 1998:22 & 38; Mafeje, 1995:6; Matlosa, Elklit & Chiroro, 2006:23-26; Olson, 2011; 
Peters & Biesta, 2009:15) that can assist researchers and policy makers to chart new ways of 
counteracting the manipulation of ethnicity for private political and socio-economic ends.  
A study conducted in three institutions of higher learning, in Kenya, Tanzania and South 
Africa, on the concept of a university in Africa and democratic citizenship revealed that most 
Kenyan university students have a limited understanding of the concept ‘democracy’ 
(Luescher-Mamashela et al., 2011). According to the findings, students from Kenya’s oldest 
and most prestigious institution of higher learning, Nairobi University, understood democracy 
in the following ways: as political rights and civil freedoms (55%); as participation and 
deliberation (23%); as good governance (only 4%); as equality, fairness and justice (only 
4%); and as socioeconomic development (only 1%). Interestingly, 13% of them did not know 
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what democracy is. These findings call for the need to have a closer look at how democracy 
is conceptualised in Kenyan higher education with the view to re-conceptualise it so that it is 
understood in a more compelling way. 
1.2. Aim of the Study 
The aim of this study was to reconceptualise higher education within the Kenyan context so 
that it may deal with ethnic conflicts in a more vibrant way. These conflicts have been part of 
Kenya’s political scene since its colonisation by Great Britain. Using a policy that has come 
to be called ‘divide and rule’, the British colonial government were accused of favouring 
some ethnic groups over others, thereby leading to some anomalies and imbalances. These 
imbalances were blatantly obvious at independence, when the top political offices were held 
by individuals from the two major ethnic groups – Kikuyu (President Jomo Kenyatta) and 
Luo (Vice-President Odinga Oginga). Within a few years, these two leaders had conflictual 
differences that culminated in the resignation of Odinga Oginga as the Vice-President (Ogot, 
1995a). This resignation lays bare the fact that political activity in Kenya is highly ethnicised 
(see Ogude, 2002:202-207; Omolo, 2002:209; Stephen & Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002:223-249). 
Consequently, studies show that loyalty to the one-party state that ruled Kenya from 1963 to 
1990 indicates that Kenyan politics was ethnically driven.  
With the advent of multi-party politics in 1992, national elections were marred by ethnic 
clashes. This meant that, for the first time, tensions that had been repressed by the one-party 
state came out in the open. Ethnic election clashes have remained the trend to date, with each 
subsequent election witnessing increased violence, despite the fact that several institutions of 
higher education are producing thousands of graduates each year who are expected to 
espouse a patriotic, national consciousness as advocated in policy documents guiding 
education in Kenyan universities. These graduates are produced by an education system that 
insists on national unity in diversity, human personality and equality (Eshiwani, 1990:6-7; 
1993); however, there appears to be something in the country’s higher education system that 
has eluded educational experts in relation to how to produce graduates who look beyond 
ethnic loyalties in order to create a multi-ethnic, united Kenya.  
This study has attempted to investigate how Kenyan higher education, in the light of a 
reconceptualised view of liberal democratic citizenship education (DCE) framework, 
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potentially can address ethnic violence. I explore the root of the problems by asking several 
questions: Could it be that the education policies are not well formulated? Are some elements 
wrong in the implementation of these education policies? What is it that has hindered the 
implementation of these education policies? How could a liberal framework of democratic 
citizenship help us to think through the discrepancy between sound education policies and 
poor implementation? 
1.3. Problem Statement and Research Questions 
The ethnic tensions in Kenya may signify undemocratic conceptions of citizenship education. 
According to Luescher-Mamashela et al. (2011), students in Kenyan universities consider 
their country as fully democratic, yet there are several indications that point to the contrary. 
One such indication is politicised ethnicity, which, among other things, determines people’s 
access to goods, employment and public services such as health care and political office. This 
narrow and limited conception of democratic citizenship is further evident in three other 
instances. Firstly, students think that belonging to a particular ethnic group is not important, 
yet in reality, for example, tribal clashes that followed the national elections in 1992, 1997 
and, most importantly in 2007, point to the contrary. Secondly, students reduce democracy to 
political rights and civil freedoms without linking these to good governance, equity, fairness 
and justice. Finally, a sizeable number of university students (77%) do not consider 
participation and deliberation as core attributes of democracy, and 13% do not understand 
what democracy is. Therefore they do not possess the tools with which to judge if 
government is democratic or not. This suggests that there is a need to reconceptualise the 
kind of higher education being offered in Kenya to broaden students’ understanding of what a 
working democracy is in order to develop a defensible conception of democratic citizenship 
that hopefully will improve, transform and reduce the ethnic tensions in the country and, in 
turn, produce more mature and virtuous democratic citizens who will handle conflicts 
democratically. 
In view of the above problem statement, this study focuses on the following main research 
question: How does a defensible deliberative conception of democracy help us to think 
differently about higher education in Kenya?  
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This question is investigated using the following sub-questions: What is democratic 
citizenship education? What space might there be for democratic citizenship education to 
help Kenyan higher education institutions address ethnic divisions in the country? What have 
been the findings/consequences of the implementation of democratic citizenship education 
elsewhere in the world? What are the current and past policies with regard to the equality of 
and access to Kenyan higher education? What role has ethnic identity played in Kenyan 
social, political and economic life? How can democratic citizenship education in Kenyan 
higher education reshape ethnic identities and overcome ethnic tensions?  
1.4. Scope of the Study 
This study focuses mainly on higher education in Kenya and how it can be used to advocate 
for a more plausible conception of democratic citizenship education that can contribute 
towards minimising ethnic violence and political dissension. I focus specifically on higher 
education to understand its contribution to the cultivation of democratic citizens. This 
understanding helps to locate the conceptual ambiguities of democratic citizenship education 
in Kenyan institutions of higher learning in order to buttress a conception that helps to reduce 
ethnic tensions. Moreover, higher learning institutions constitute higher levels of training and, 
at this stage, students are expected to emerge as mature graduates with newly formed 
attitudes and behaviours that point to democratic virtues – that is, virtues that would yield 
positive results towards national development. It has been argued that higher education plays 
a major role in socio-economic development in the country (Assié-Lumumba, 2006:96). For 
this reason it is essential to reconceptualise how the nation’s citizens are prepared for 
economic, social and political development through a nuanced conception of democratic 
citizenship education. Therefore, my focus was on examining Kenyan higher education and 
its formation of democratic citizenship education to address the above problem. 
1.5. Methodology and Theoretical Framework 
I used philosophy of education as research approach that allowed me to: 1) interpret and 
uncover meaning, 2) identifies problems in texts and society and 3) to respond evaluatively 
with judgements (justifications or arguments) that can help to look at the situation – that is, to 
address it. This dissertation is conceptual in the sense that I examine meanings that 
underscore DCE by looking at liberal understandings of the concept.  The study is conceptual 
in the sense that I examine meanings that underscore DCE by looking at liberal 
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understandings of the concept.  It is practical because I envisage that uncovering meanings 
have some implications for both higher education policy texts and the conditions of violence. 
I would classify the dissertation as interpretivist as I search for meanings and explanations of 
events. For instance, the problem I have identified is with violence in Kenyan society and that 
higher education policy texts are in main silent on how such a dire situation should be 
addressed. The critical and the deconstructionist dimension can be highlighted in the sense 
that my own extension of the liberal conception of higher education towards DCE in 
becoming alludes to improvement of the concept. So: this dissertation is about the inadequacy 
of Kenyan higher education to respond to violence. If it aims to do so it has to adopt an 
extended view of liberal DCE. This dissertation is also a combination of policy analysis and 
philosophy of education in the sense that meanings are uncovered that can respond to a 
particular societal problem, which has implications for education – as an engagement of 
human beings. 
Philosophy of education is ‘an analytical pursuit concerned with the clarification of the 
concepts and propositions through which our experiences and activities are intelligible’ 
(Hirst, 1974:1). Philosophy of education approach enabled this research to systematically 
examine, uncover and understand meanings and identify the implications for pedagogy, 
curriculum, learning theory and the purpose of education, and that is justified in 
metaphysical, epistemological and axiological assumptions to reconstruct and deconstruct 
them to attain more nuanced meanings. 
I refer to the work of some African philosophers and Kenyan scholars in particular to 
examine the concept of politicised ethnicity – a context in which higher education in Kenya is 
conceptualised (see Appiah, 1992:170; Barasa, 1997; Falola & Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002; 
Gyekye, 1995; Imbo, 1998; Ogot, 1995b; Oruka, 1983; 1998; Waghid, 2005a; 2011; Waghid 
& Smeyers, 2012b; Wiredu, 1996. I also use the work of western philosophers to examine, 
analyse and clarify the concept of democratic citizenship education (see Benhabib, 1996; 
2011a; Habermas, 1978; 1987a; 1987b; 1996; Hogan & Smith, 2003:165; Rawls, 1971). Such 
endeavours have enriched my view of democratic citizenship education towards 
reconceptualising Kenyan higher education.  
The methodology of this research is located within an interpretive paradigm developed by 
Stanley Cavell. According to Cavell (1979:191), a word gets its meaning in different contexts 
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and within particular interpretive communities. As a consequence of this, there is a need for 
reasonable doubt – what he calls ‘scepticism’ – in investigating meanings of concepts. In 
doing this, he proposes various elements to guide our construction of meanings, namely 
source of authority, authority’s mode of acceptance, epistemic goal, candidate object or 
phenomena, status concept, epistemic means (specification of criteria), and degree of 
certification (Cavell, 1979:9). In this study, each of these elements helps to investigate the 
relationship between democracy and ethnicity as conceptualised in Kenyan higher education. 
They also helped me to examine how democratic citizenship education within a liberal 
framework problematises current conceptions of higher learning, thereby necessitating a re-
conceptualisation.  
In addition, I used conceptual analysis and deconstruction as methods. Conceptual analysis 
looks at the meanings of concepts (see Hirst, 1967:44; Peters: 1967:1) and deconstruction 
searches for meanings that are not there yet (Biesta & Egéa-Kuehne, 2001:8). This research 
examines the meanings of the concepts beyond their current meanings and, in doing so; it 
applies Biesta and Egéa-Kuehne’s interpretation of Derrida’s views on deconstruction as a 
method. Deconstruction as a method has a strong emphasis on differentiations as a possibility 
for meaning and interpretation. According to Biesta and Egéa-Kuehne (2001:4), Derrida’s 
work on deconstruction is crucial to rethinking educational issues through the unravelling of 
inadequacies, contradictions and ambiguities in our education policies and practices. Biesta 
and Egéa-Kuehne’s understanding of Derrida’s work reveals the inadequacies in the current 
conceptualisation of higher education as far as democratic citizenship is concerned. 
Therefore, deconstruction serves as a guide in rethinking why there are persistent and 
recurrent ethnic tensions, despite sound educational policies and the presence of several 
institutions of higher learning in Kenya. The notion of otherness within the theory of 
deconstruction assists in re-examining how the conceptualisation of democratic citizenship in 
Kenya is related to the challenge of ethnic polarisation. As a method that encourages 
reflexivity, deconstruction is used in demonstrating that what was hitherto understood as self-
evident realities – for example what democracy means – are in fact quite ambiguous, as they 
may mean different things to different people, as the research conducted by Luescher-
Mamashela et al. (2011) reveals. In other words, deconstruction enables us to gain a new 
perspective of conceptual formulations in order to address inherent discursive loopholes and 
ambiguities.  
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This study is located within an understanding of democratic citizenship education informed 
by liberal thought. In research, democratic citizenship education has been viewed largely as 
an idea, based on the notion that it is possible to know what good citizenship is, and thus the 
task of citizenship education is that of producing good citizenship (Biesta, 2011:141). In this 
study, the question asked is whether and to what degree we can and should recognise 
democratic citizenship as a progressive identity within higher education. At this level, the 
study explores deliberative approaches of democracy in investigating the concept of 
democratic citizenship education to advance a democratic citizenship education that grows 
from a Kenyan identity.  
Liberal democratic citizenship valorises the individual as the subject of democratic 
governance and fosters freedom by creating spaces in which the voices of marginalised 
people can be heard. I invoke the paradigm’s notion of democratic iterations to examine how 
different perspectives on democratic citizenship education can help understand the 
inadequacies in Kenya’s current conceptualisation of education. Works by several 
philosophers were used to enrich my reconceptualisation of Kenya’s higher education. 
Benhabib’s (2011a) idea of the ‘right to have rights’ speaks to the topic at hand by helping us 
understand the crimes committed against human beings in Kenya’s ethnically-charged post-
election violence, in which innocent people are deprived of their rights to live and to access 
public goods, irrespective of their ethnic identity. Rawls’s (1999) notion of social justice 
throws light when examining how a narrow and limiting conceptualisation of democracy is a 
violation of the principles of social justice, and prevents people from understanding the world 
in which they live, such as the link between poor citizenship education and politicised 
ethnicity. Jürgen Habermas’s (1978) notion of public reason and communicative action, 
which opens up space for dialogue and rational deliberation, is used to examine how current 
conceptualisations of higher education inhibit democracy, since 77% of students in Kenya’s 
institutions of higher learning do not indicate deliberation as a component of democracy 
(Luescher-Mamashela et al., 2011). 
1.6. Motivation for the Study 
Reconceptualising higher education within a liberal framework of democratic citizenship 
generates new ideas on why the problem of politicised ethnicity has continued to be a 
challenge, despite sound educational policies. A research study conducted in three countries – 
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Kenya, Tanzania and South Africa – reveals that 47% of students define democratic 
citizenship from only a political perspective, that is, a rule that is not autocratic. Aside from 
the political, these students were unable to identify features of democratic citizenship such as 
human rights, fairness, equality and justice. Besides, most of the students identified Kenya as 
a democracy, even with so many cases of politicised ethnicity reported in the media, showing 
that they do not fully understand what democracy is. Kenyan students in institutions of higher 
learning feel they already live in a democracy. This means that there is something wrong with 
the way democratic citizenship is conceptualised, hence the need to reconceptualise what 
democratic citizenship is in the hope that students may be able to understand what it is and 
expect better performance by their democracies. 
As an educator in Kenya, my motivation for this study also stems from the prevailing 
inequalities in Kenya that present ethnic discrimination. Such widespread inequalities 
undermine the concept of nationhood and national unity that Kenyan education policy 
advocates (Eshiwani, 1990:7; 1993). The country’s current education policy, which promotes 
equity, access for all and quality in education, creates space for such a study. The past effects 
of ethnic politics in education and the autocracy that reigned in Kenya are some of the 
reasons that triggered this research. These policies (on unity and equity in education) have 
open spaces for discussion on democratic citizenship that seems to be overshadowed by 
ethnic violence. Other factors that led to this study are that I am Kenyan and my concerns 
about the wide-scale inequalities that exist in the country; the loss of innocent lives due to 
tribal violence and political greed during 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007; a concern for social 
justice and political stability; a concern about the growth, quality and well-roundedness of 
higher education institutions in Kenya; the quest for education for all citizens; love; and the 
quest for knowledge.  
1.7. Outline 
Chapter 1: Introduction and Background. This chapter is an introduction and background 
to the study and delineates the context, motivation, problem statement, methodology and 
chapter outlines. This introduction also provides an orientation to the study. 
Chapter 2: Investigating Democratic Citizenship Education within Liberal Thoughts. 
This chapter analyses liberal thoughts on democratic citizenship education from various 
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philosophical perspectives, and will assist in building and enriching a nuanced conception of 
democratic citizenship education. Rawls’s theory of justice is explored to elucidate the 
conception of justice in democratic citizenship education. Benhabib’s (2011a) notions of 
cosmopolitanism without illusions and of the ‘right to have rights’ are explored to unravel 
and develop further the concepts that can assist with ideas of freedoms and rights to 
illuminate meanings of the notion of democratic citizenship. Jürgen Habermas’s (1978; 87a; 
87b) ideas of ‘public reason’ and ‘communicative action’ are used for deliberative and 
dialogical perspectives of democratic citizenship to re-construct the concept further. 
Therefore, this chapter is built upon theoretical impressions of democratic citizenship 
education within a liberal framework.  
Chapter 3: Higher Education in Kenya: Conceptions of Democratic Citizenship 
Education 
This chapter explores Kenya’s education system in its historical context and focuses on the 
development of the country’s system of higher education. This understanding unravels the 
‘undemocratic’ and ‘democratic’ conceptions of citizenship that are embraced in the 
education system, thereby establishing space for the reconceptualisation of higher education 
in Kenya. The interest in higher education springs from the premise that an independent 
scholarly community supported by strong universities would enhance a healthy, stable 
democracy. Such involvement in research, intellectual leadership and the development of 
successive generations of engaged citizens would nourish social, political and economic 
transformation in Africa (Berresford & Rodin, 2007:xvi). Berresford and Rodin also note that 
higher education has experienced challenges related to historical political, economic and 
social instability in Africa. Within this context, I analyse Kenyan higher education policies, 
governance, access, equality and quality to assess the nature of democratic citizenship that is 
conceived in Kenyan higher education. The nature of democratic citizenship education will 
be examined from a wealth of historical, political, economic, demographic and sociocultural 
sources to bring out the progression of democratisation in Kenyan higher education systems 
(Oucho, 2012). This chapter is a review of Kenya’s higher education within its historical 
context and its conception of democratic citizenship education, which is not separated from 
the country’s political democratisation.  
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Chapter 4: On the Nexus between Liberal Democratic Citizenship Education and 
Kenya’s System of Higher Education 
This chapter examines the relationship between the liberal notions of democratic citizenship 
developed in Chapter 2, and how this can strengthen the conceptions of democratic 
citizenship education held by Kenya’s higher education. This understanding will shed 
additional light on the contrast between normative democratic citizenship education as 
depicted in Chapter 2, and that reviewed in Chapter 3. This chapter also identifies the 
differences between the ideal theoretical hybrid of hypothetical understandings of democratic 
citizenship education developed in Chapter 2, and the reality of democratic citizenship 
education that Kenya upholds as in Chapter 3, thereby establishing space for the 
reconceptualisation of Kenya’s higher education. The evidence of democratic citizenship 
education in higher education in Kenya will be constructed through an analysis of the 
political, economic and sociological ideologies and settings in which Kenyan higher 
education is conceptualised. The progressive reforms that have taken place in the system 
from independence to the current democratic dispensation will be examined – these include 
policies, governance, access, notions of equality and quality in higher education. This, I 
argue, will provide me with an understanding of Kenyan higher education in relation to 
democratic citizenship education. The analysis of Kenyan higher education will be assessed 
and examined on the basis of the democratic values depicted in Chapter two, namely 
deliberative action, justice, equality, human rights, communicative action, imaginative action 
and compassionate action, amongst others, and their implications within the Kenyan context. 
Chapter 5: Democratic Citizenship Education against Ethnic Violence in Kenya 
This chapter examines how a reconceptualised view of DCE possibly can countenance ethnic 
violence in Kenya by focusing on issues such as: firstly, to show what a reconceptualised idea 
of DCE involves; secondly, to explain how the ideas surrounding a reconceptualised notion 
of DCE assist in thinking differently about higher education in Kenya; thirdly, to explain the 
implications of a reconceptualised DCE for the conception of the university in Africa; and 
lastly, to provide a different understanding of the African university – one that can be socially 
and intellectually responsive to political and ethnic strife on the continent. This chapter 
addresses the sub-questions: What space might there be for DCE in becoming (a 
reconceptualised one) to help Kenyan higher education institutions address ethnic divisions in 
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the country? How can DCE in Kenyan higher education reshape ethnic identities and 
overcome ethnic tensions?  
Chapter 6: Democratic Citizenship Education and its Implications for Pedagogy in 
Kenyan Higher Education 
This chapter examines the implications of a reconceptualised view of DCE for pedagogy in 
Kenyan higher education – more specifically, teaching and learning.  
Chapter 7: An Extended View of Democratic Citizenship Education: Potential 
Contributions to Kenyan University Academic Programmes 
In this chapter I provide a synopsis of the research process and findings, and then elucidate 
the contributions this research makes to Kenyan universities, and finally offer 
recommendations for further research. Thus, the chapter wraps up how the current curriculum 
potentially can be modified to address issues of an extended conception of DCE and a view 
of a reconsidered Kenyan university.  
1.8. Summary 
In this introductory chapter I have presented the conceptual framework and methodological 
aspects of my research. I explored philosophy of education as an analytical design within the 
boundaries of an interpretive paradigm to examine liberal thought in deliberative democracy. 
I used deconstruction and conceptual analysis as methods to examine the notion of 
democratic citizenship education within the liberal tradition, before I considered the analysis 
of Kenyan higher education to understand the state and nature of democracy found in this 
context. This chapter also contains the historical background to, the motivation for this study, 
the problem and the chapter outline for this study. In the next chapter I analyse the concept of 
democratic citizenship education for a more plausible understanding of the concept. 
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  Chapter Two
LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION  
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter is an investigation of meanings of DCE within the liberal views (Rawls, 1971; 
Habermas, 1987a &b; Benhabib, 2011). The analysis offers this dissertation an opportunity to 
gain insight into liberal thought and then top examine implications for democracy, citizenship 
and education. This chapter begins from the premise that a plausible conception of 
democratic citizenship education could aid in reconceptualising Kenyan higher education. 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate and clarify the concept of democratic citizenship 
education (DCE) using the methods of analytical inquiry, including deconstruction and 
conceptual analysis. This inquiry involves an examination of the meaning of the concept 
DCE. The question asked in this section is: what is democratic citizenship education? This 
chapter will clarify what DCE is before answering the question on the implications it has for 
higher education in Kenya.  
First, the concepts ‘democracy’, ‘citizenship’ and ‘education’ are described to illuminate the 
theory in which a liberal approach is examined. Second, based on the premise generated from 
the first argument, this chapter examines a conception of DCE within a liberal understanding. 
In this regard, Rawls’s public reason is explored to elucidate the concept of justice in 
conceptualising DCE. Benhabib’s (2011a:60) notion of democratic iteration is examined to 
shed additional light on the fundamental ‘right to have rights’ of every human being. I will 
examine Benhabib’s argument of reciprocal recognition of others, and to be recognised in 
return, as a moral aspect that should be granted legal protection in human communities. 
Benhabib (2011a:61) maintains that human rights are basic to the moral principles that 
protect the communicative freedom of individuals. I will examine how she relates the 
connection between the moral and juridical forms of human rights in order to locate how 
public engagement, sense of belonging and human interaction are depicted in her argument. 
Additionally, Habermas’s (1978) idea of communicative rationality is investigated with the 
intention to uncover a deliberative perspective of democratic citizenship. Third, I synthesise 
the understandings from these analyses for DCE.  
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Liberal theories of democratic citizenship education are considered for this analysis because 
they contain prominent ideas that highlight the notions of community, humanity and 
responsibility, and the interrelationships amongst people in the public sphere. These ideas 
promote dialogue, justice, respect, reasonableness, equality and the concern for one another 
in an attempt to co-exist in the public sphere. In addition to this, I examine how these notions 
contribute to democratic citizenship education. Liberal conceptions contain significant values 
in communities that inspire and restrain the choices of their individual members. Such values 
include liberty and equality and the underlying respect for human beings as independent 
choosers who base their entitlement on equal freedoms. These are anchored in a pattern of co-
operation that allows people to live together in peace, despite the diversity of opinions or 
ideas (Charvet & Kaczynska-Nay, 2008:10). I consider liberal democratic citizenship 
education as an important concept that could engender reasonableness and collective dialogue 
in reaching a consensus to reduce ethnic violence and enhance healthy ethnic politics and 
equal distribution of public goods for Kenya as a country to thrive politically and 
educationally. It also is hoped that such a notion of democratic citizenship education would 
stimulate the Kenyan education system to produce critical thinkers and practical reasoners 
who would be politically mature enough to appreciate otherness in considering their 
citizenship, and that of others who might be different from them. 
Furthermore, when the subject of education is examined, the implication is that education is 
meant for humans
2
 and that its democratic nature describes the kind of education that is 
offered to citizens. Before exploring the relationship between democracy, citizenship and 
education, I discuss some of the crucial concepts and ideas connected to these concepts.  
2.2. Building the First Premise for Democratic Citizenship 
Education 
In order to build a premise for the question on what democratic citizenship education is, I will 
examine the individual concepts separately in order to understand them and address the 
question. In keeping with Cahen (2001:13) on Derrida and the question of education, I use 
deconstruction to sharpen my understanding of the construct ‘democratic citizenship 
education’, that is, I will deconstruct ‘education’, ‘democracy’ and ‘citizenship’ to arrive at a 
                                                 
2
 I refer here to citizens, implying that this kind of education is a process that is carried out by and with humans, 
and that it explores humans and not things or other animals. It is done to [with, for, by] people. I want to stress 
this to show that democratic citizenship education is people-oriented education. 
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system of understanding these concepts to exhibit some of their foundations and to 
reconstruct new bases.  
2.2.1. Democracy 
Democracy is a process of public engagement that describes how humans interact with one 
another to reach decisions on a specific issue. Mafeje (1995:7) maintains that the concept of 
‘democracy’ is as old as humankind itself; what has changed are the manifestations and 
conceptions of the various forms of democracy over various periods of time. Some forms of 
democracy enable freedom and equal participation, while others limit how people contribute 
to public decision making. Hoselitz (1956:1) sees democracy from two theoretical 
perspectives: first, the traditional theory, which is characterised by undifferentiating, 
authoritarian and particularistic characteristics, and secondly, the modern theory of 
democracy, as characterised by functionalism, differentiation, meritocracy and 
equalitarianism. He opines that traditional and modern theories of democracy are constructed 
on the basis of the attitudes, values and beliefs of particular cultures. Harber (1997:2) 
expounds that, from its traditional root in Greek, democracy refers to ‘rule by the people’. 
This understanding of democracy has been taken by many to mean autocratic rule that limits 
freedom of speech and religion. For Harber (1997:3), democracy emphasises reason, open-
mindedness and fairness, and the practices of moderation, cooperation, bargaining, 
compromise and accommodation. Education framed by democratic concepts ought to 
contribute to a political culture that upholds the values of tolerance and mutual respect. This 
means treating everyone equally, regardless of their race, gender or ethnic origin, amongst 
other diversities. 
Gutmann (2012:339) describes democracy as an inclusive and deliberate social propagation. 
In education, democracy ought to recognise the value of parental education, which promotes 
the good life and professional authority in enabling students to appreciate and evaluate ways 
of life different from what their parents offer, and also recognises the value of political 
education, which consist of participating in the rights and responsibilities of citizenship in 
democratic society. According to Gutmann (2012:340), democratic states need not 
discriminate; rather, they should allow all citizens who are educable to participate in shaping 
their future society. The democratic facet of education entails the ability of individuals to 
deliberate and participate in public education.  
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In his important works on democracy and education, Dewey (1916:115; 2012:229) maintains 
that a democratic society (education) is one ‘that makes provision for participation in its good 
of all its members on equal terms and which secures flexible readjustment of its institutions 
through interaction of the different forms of associated life’. Dewey uses a democratic 
societal way of life to shed more light on how such paradoxes can be used to innovate 
education in formal settings. Education as a social practice involves humans and the various 
ways in which they communicate in a community of life with one another. This process 
determines the kind of learning that becomes a community (Dewey, 1916:94). Dewey 
explains that education involves participation by participants who belong to a learning 
community of life (who are immature) in how to secure direction and method in learning. In 
other words, education in a democratic sense entails human association in societies with 
modes of associated life to bring to fruition the purposes of that association. That is to say, 
education, in a Deweyan sense, connotes transmission through communication as a process of 
sharing experience until it becomes a common possession. Education therefore will change 
the positions of those who participate in it through the kind of communication that goes on 
between them. The purpose of democratic education depends on the purpose of the 
community that engages in the communicative practice for educative purposes. Democratic 
education as a social process entails educational interactions among the members of a social 
group who share ideas and involve all members. The quality of education in a society 
depends on the participation, freedom and interactions of all members and the worth of the 
contributions they bring in their association with one another in public concerns. Flexibility 
and equality are rudiments that enhance the associated communication in democratic 
education. Democracy frames education in the sense in which it ‘offers individuals a personal 
interest in social relationships and control, and the habits of mind which secures social 
changes without introducing disorder’ (Dewey, 1916:144).  
In the same manner, Waghid (2002:26) affirms Dewey’s (1916) exposition of democracy as a 
mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience to advance current 
understandings of democracy as it relates to education. Elsewhere, Waghid (2009:24) 
expands on Dewey’s democracy as a mode of association with reasoned and moral discussion 
in political life, otherwise they might be rendered meaningless. This means that the 
association or the communication in society that is emphasised by Dewey is noted by Waghid 
as having to be ethical (moral) and thought through before engaging in public society. In the 
same vein, Scheffler (2003:345) agrees that moral education in a democratic sense needs to 
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emphasise the teaching of critical thinking skills that will enable students to participate in 
collectivities that create a sense of belonging in social arrangements determining free 
participation by all in a public review of policies, and also that the judgements be made by all 
who belong to that social organisation. He notes that this process requires the reasoned, 
persuasive and informed consent of the participants. In keeping with Waghid and Scheffler, 
Hansen (2008:19) maintains that democracy is a way of life that entails commitment to 
meaningful communication and necessitates an interest in learning from all one’s contacts in 
life. This suggests that democracy can neither operate nor develop if people remain private 
about their thinking in the public sphere. Scheffler (2003:345) adds that democracy is an 
open and a dynamic ideal – it is prone to critical evaluation in public forums by all 
stakeholders in order to effect change agreed upon by all concerned. In essence, democracy 
imagines extensive modes of communication, interactions and mutual agreements in 
communities through a rational process of argumentation. 
Benhabib (1996:69) locates democracy as a model within institutions of society in a 
cooperative way to exercise power publicly. Benhabib’s notion of deliberative democracy 
describes the equality of individuals within a particular institution in which power is 
exercised in such a way that all stakeholders are participants. Walzer (1983:304) explicates 
democracy as an argumentation by citizens to persuade the largest number of citizens when 
making decisions. Habermas (1996) considers democracy as an emancipatory activity that 
provides spaces for rational deliberation. In this regard, citizens debate common problems, 
focusing on the relationships between economic growth and social culture. In essence, 
democracy is a process of people engaging with one another in matters of public concern for 
the purpose of justice for all. 
2.2.2. Education 
Education is a process of human interaction. It is a social and political process that leads to 
knowledge acquisition. Peters’s (1967:4-7) analysis of the concept of education indicates that 
education is a process of acquiring knowledge. This process involves human interactions that 
aid the understanding of the acquired knowledge and the ability to use it to affect the attitudes 
of individuals, thereby leading to some form of change and restoration that is of value. 
Education is a moral process that is value laden. Education is considered as a social process 
that involves human interaction for the acquisition of knowledge. 
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Peters (1967) argues that the validation of the morals and values of education is a contentious 
task, but that it is always defined by the kind of education, and the educational aims or 
desires that the system poses. In other words, to say one is educated does not depend only on 
the kind of knowledge that one acquires (inasmuch as this also is important), but also on the 
moral processes and the ability of one to transform the knowledge into actual values for 
which education exists, which qualifies the ‘educatedness’.  
In situating education in the capability approach and social justice, Flores-Crespo (2007:45) 
analyses Sen’s (1985) and Martha Nussbaum’s (2000) human capability approaches to 
education as complementary to each other, but notes the inadequacies in each approach. She 
points out that both Sen’s and Nussbaum’s capability approach to education sees rationality 
as central to education in the development of human capabilities. Nussbaum identifies 
practical reasoning as one of the central capabilities of education. Flores-Crespo (2007:49) 
notes the similarity in Freire, Nussbaum and Sen’s conceptions of human beings as 
‘responsible agents who can alter their destiny’. She notes that Paulo Freire’s perception of 
education is that ‘education becomes the means by which people can perceive, interpret, 
criticise and eventually, transform their reality, while Sen and Nussbaum have stressed the 
importance of individual agency and practical reason in the process of enlarging people’s 
freedoms’ (Flores-Crespo, 2007:49).  
This view of education expands our understanding of how the concept of education has 
changed with time. Flores-Crespo (2007) further exposes the weakness of this view of 
education, namely that education appears to be under-theorised if it is considered in terms of 
Sen’s human capability approach. This approach assumes education to be a social 
opportunity, a valuable outcome, and a causality of freedom. Yet, according to Unterhalter 
(2001), education can be viewed as an achievement, as part of a process of an exercising 
agency and the recognition of one’s right to using these capacities. These arguments point to 
the fact that education is a complex process and cannot be explained in simplistic terms. Such 
sentiments fall in line with Banks’s (2008) depiction of the complex processes, such as means 
and ends of education. Understanding the concept ‘education’ in this way helps to situate and 
reconceptualise education as human interaction that encourages public engagement and 
cultivates a sense of belonging. 
From another perspective, education is considered as meaningful human interaction only if it 
enables engagement and success for those who are marginalised and failed by schools 
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(Hattam, Brennan, Zippin & Comber, and 2009:1). In other words, education should embrace 
and address the problems of society, and especially that of injustice. Education needs to equip 
students with knowledge that empowers them to be part of a just society. 
The meaning of education is dynamic and depends on the purpose for which education is 
conceptualised. Egéa-Kuehne (2001:187) advances a definition of education and describes 
the phenomenon of violence in economic, national and minority wars, and also the rampant 
occurrences of racism, xenophobia, ethnic conflicts and conflicts of culture and religion 
pulling apart the ‘democratic waves’ that exist the world over. The proliferation of these 
occurrences signals the need for educational change. In this sense, education is perceived as 
that which helps relinquish these disruptions of the peace, unity and harmony that ought to 
exist amongst people. As such, education is accorded the responsibility to overcome 
prejudice, racism, ethnocentrism and violence. Schools and higher education institutions 
therefore are assigned the responsibility of responding to these dilemmas.  
In essence, Egéa-Kuehne (2001:188), following a Derridian concern, sees education as that 
which responds to the promise of quality education and the human right to quality education 
– as a response to the unprecedented increase in inequality, violence, injustice and violation 
of human rights in our societies – especially in Kenya, I would argue.  
In addition, Standish, Smeyers and Smith (2006) argue that education can be considered as a 
therapeutic process. However, they note that this understanding comes with exceptions, 
namely that it detaches itself with ordinary economic overtones and recognises human 
existence [ethically] and the unforeseeable futures. In their seminal work, The Therapy of 
Education: Philosophy, Happiness and Personal Growth, Standish et al. (2006) put forward 
three considerations for understanding education as therapeutic, namely the enthusiastic 
advocates, the reactionaries and the pragmatists (see Mintz, 2009:642). Standish et al. (2006) 
argue that these three perspectives of viewing education as therapy are partial, since they 
differentiate what is effective from what is ineffective. They note that therapeutic education 
potentially can be viewed as such, if it bears axiology in education and/or looks like 
education. One such example they offer is that a therapist and a patient have an essential 
relationship, that of curing the patient. For therapy to happen, the relationships and 
techniques that can enable curing are necessary. In such a relationship, patients are 
encouraged to make independent and ethically informed choices (Standish et al. 2006:3). It is 
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this understanding of the patient-therapist relationship that they suggest can provide 
education the vocabulary necessary for describing education as therapy. They also note that 
therapeutic education lends education pedagogy – teaching and learning. In this way, 
education can be described as an ethical process that requires pedagogical techniques that 
potentially can steer the learners to acquire knowledge and skills. That is, therapy and 
education can provide a language for conceptualising education. They note that therapeutic 
language can enable attention being paid to the language of human existence, but also can be 
seductive and destructive. So, Standish et al. (2006:225) contend that education can be 
likened to therapy. Accordingly, education can allow learners to recognise the restrictions of 
notable hardships and to think of ways in which to avoid these hardships (Standish et al., 
206:227). In their view, therefore, the understanding of education has to delink ordinary 
purposes of schooling to consider the [im]possibilities of life. In this way, education can be 
considered for futures that avoid the current obsessions of describing education only in 
economic terms (Standish et al., 2006:141). The question remains: how can education assume 
these new responsibilities? I shall address this concern later on. 
2.2.3. Citizenship 
Citizenship depicts a sense of belonging. Yuval-Davis (2011:12) describes belonging as a 
social and a political construct. It entails three analytical aspects: first, social locations; 
second, people’s identification and emotional attachment to various collectivities and 
groupings; and third, the ethical and political value systems with which people judge their 
own and others’ belonging. Belonging in this sense depicts both geographical spaces and 
spaces of socialisation, and the identities and emotional attachment that people develop based 
on their various groups of identification and the morals and values that govern such 
relationships. Yuval-Davis (2011) points out that there is a political construction to the sense 
of belonging, in that the construction of boundaries, inclusion and exclusions are important 
ideas that frame belonging in such a way that power relations become trivial. I will not 
grapple with the details of the politics of belonging at the moment, as my concern is with how 
Yuval-Davis describes citizenship.  
Osler and Starkey (2000:243; 2005:8) note that citizenship is contested in that citizens now 
have greater opportunities to act in new international contexts that are characterised by 
diversity. Citizenship describes the connections between our status and identities as 
individuals, and the lives and concerns of others with whom we share a sense of community. 
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Citizenship has been identified as a site of political struggle, and it has been understood 
essentially based on status and the practice of and entitlement to rights and, more importantly, 
a feeling of belonging (Osler & Starkey, 2005:9).  
Yuval-Davis (2011:46) affirms Osler’s and Starkey’s (2000; 2005:8) view that the concept of 
citizenship has been contested and debated, both in political and sociological theory, and 
especially in feminist debates. The areas of debate entail, first, liberal theory, which claims 
the extent to which citizenship ought to be conceptualised in relation to an individual 
contractual relationship, for instance between the person and the state (Yuval-Davis, 
2011:47). In this regard, citizenship is categorised as an abstract concept or as embodied in 
gender, class, ethnicity, sexuality, ability and stage of life in the life cycle. Second is the 
participatory view of citizenship as a reciprocal relationship – that of ‘rule and being ruled’. 
This kind of citizenship is governed by rights and responsibilities. The third view is the 
current view of citizenship, which recognises humans as belonging to a world republic. This 
understanding of citizenship considers it in relation to global civil society. 
Yuval-Davis (2011:48) provides counterarguments to the idea of citizenship as 
conceptualised in the nation state and refers to Benhabib’s claim that national citizenship is 
an obsolete and misleading ‘closed society’ way of engendering citizenship. She also 
discusses a similar view by Walby, who says that current global trends facilitate citizenship 
as membership in different kinds of polities. Yuval-Davis claims that, despite Walby’s 
contention about global citizenship, nation-state citizenship still plays an important role in 
viewing citizenship as a sense of belonging, since the state provides fundamental entitlements 
and rights.  
Yuval-Davis (2011:46-79) indicates that citizenship has been constructed on a variety of 
notions based on political rights, civil rights and socio-economic rights, cultural rights, spatial 
security rights and citizenship duties and responsibilities. Modern interpretations of 
citizenship are based on active/activist citizenship as a result of the struggle for freedom and 
democracy; and the utilisation of technology, which is prohibited in some states in the Middle 
East. There also is the intimate citizenship that arises from sexual rights brought about by 
porous state borders, consumer citizenship in skirmishing for free markets, multicultural 
citizenship as a result of plural societies, racism or multi-layered citizenship (Yuval-Davis, 
2011:68). The complexity of citizenship is alarming; however, the recognition that 
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citizenship has risen as both an idea and an ontological need for a sense of belonging is my 
major concern in this chapter. 
Education for citizenship should prepare students to deal with both the local and wider global 
political and social realities that face society today. From a pedagogical perspective, 
education ought to create a sense of belonging in the micro-spaces, locations, social 
interactions and contents that students learn. It pictures universities as locations for creating a 
sense of belonging in relation to how students learn, why they learn and what they learn. It 
ought to open spaces and public interactions that can help students deal with societal ills that 
influence their sense of belonging. In essence, universities provide ground for developing 
students’ sense of belonging at the university community level, the regional and macro-
national, and the global level. In this sense, education ought to acknowledge the human need 
for belonging. 
2.2.4. The Advocacy Argument for Democratic Citizenship Education 
Democratic citizenship education describes human interaction, which involves a form of 
engagement that creates a sense of belonging. DCE has been an on-going concern in politics, 
colonialism and history and in cultural and socio-economic circles (Banks, 2008:129). DCE 
has received much attention and has been defined in diverse ways. Harris (2005:46) is of the 
view that democratic citizenship education is not just a matter of learning the basic facts 
about the institutions and procedures of political life, but that it also involves acquiring a 
range of dispositions, virtues and loyalties that are immediately bound up with the practice of 
democratic citizenship. In his examination of what democratic citizenship entails, Harris 
(2005:46), citing the British Advisory Group on Citizenship (1998:11) and Council of Europe 
(2004:3), writes that 
Political literacy and a critical understanding of democracy and democratic political 
institutions and systems are key components of citizenship education. However, in addition to 
strengthening knowledge of political systems, citizenship education should foster respect for 
law, justice, democracy and nurture common good at the same time as encouraging 
independence of thought. It should develop skills of reflection, enquiry and debate … It 
should favour mutual understanding, intercultural dialogue, solidarity, gender equality and 
harmonious relations within and among peoples.  
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The above quotation points to the fact that, to some extent, DCE has the human capability 
elements attributed to education, as depicted previously in Flores-Crespore’s analysis. 
Waghid (2005b:55) concurs with Harris’s depiction above and accentuates that DCE should 
be grounded in compassionate imaginative action that encompasses multicultural dimensions 
of human diversity. This means exposing students to a fundamental perception of the 
histories and cultures of various groups of people, including major religious and cultural 
groups as well as marginalised ethnic, racial, gendered and social majorities. This is 
necessary because it triggers a sense of respect among citizens for others who are different 
from them and yet occupy the same space as they do. In terms of Waghid’s idea, DCE 
enables citizens in a public space to enter the life-world of others, who may be the same or 
different from them, through the stories they tell. This develops imaginative action. The 
action arises when respect develops through listening, understanding and speaking. Waghid 
(2005b) suggests that this imaginative action may help students to delve deeper into the inner 
voices of others’ feelings, experiences, despair, suffering and oppression, and lead to civic 
reconciliation and compassion.  
Waghid (2008:197) argues, from a South African perspective, that DCE is stronger when 
friendship is encompassed within the education system. Waghid notes that democracy and 
citizenship co-exist because democracy supports education. When citizens engage in the 
educational process, the outcome learners exhibit reveals the nature of the learning to which 
they are exposed. One of the outcomes of DCE is the establishment of an environment in 
which people can communicate their opinions freely and in which they are amenable to 
others’ views – without necessarily accepting people’s opinions or imposing theirs on others 
– as a reciprocal act of respect irrespective of differences. This, he asserts, creates ample 
spaces for dialogue. Waghid further notes that DCE should first recognise cultural, linguistic, 
ethnic, race and religious commonalities and then address differences. He emphasises that 
this creates civic space for sharing our commonalities in the face of the differences of others 
who otherwise might be considered threatening to our own. He argues that such 
acknowledgement helps us to create spaces to publicly show these differences and to be able 
to generate cohesion to engage dialogically with others who have opposing cultural views. 
Therefore, from Waghid’s (2005b) viewpoint, the underlying idea is that democratic 
citizenship education ought to acknowledge differences, otherness, dialogism, respect, 
reciprocity and friendship in order for people from diverse backgrounds to co-exist in civic 
spaces – a demonstration of what he calls ‘democratic justice’. Banks (2008), who writes 
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from a Canadian perspective, shares the same concerns as Waghid and insists that, for a 
better theorisation of DCE, democratic justice should be expanded to include and 
accommodate cultural rights for citizens from diverse racial, ethnic and language groups.  
Banks (2008) further calls for group-differentiated rights rather than just individual rights in 
order to accommodate the variety of citizens we find as a result of globalisation and 
migration, and the tenacity of the nationalism that has brought controversies into the 
citizenship education debates. Banks’s study further illustrates the complexity and ambiguity 
that has cropped up in the understanding of citizenship. He recognises how narrowly the 
concept of citizenship has been constructed thus far, especially in the way it is associated 
with the rights, privileges and duties that link one to a nation state, and the demands for 
loyalty and allegiance to the government. He advocates for a more robust, inclusive view of 
citizenship that embraces the civil, political and social
3
 dimensions of citizenship. Thus, he 
argues for a more cultural and multicultural citizenship education that recognises and respects 
cultural democracy and promotes the equality of all citizens. As such, he criticises historical 
and contemporary notions of assimilative liberal democracy that neglect, or eliminate, 
cultural values and identities, such that those citizens who are regarded as different are then 
swallowed up by the mainstream culture. However, he upholds a multicultural liberal DCE 
that has regard for all and builds citizenship based on diversity to enrich the nation state. 
This, he argues, is possible when the commonalities of citizens are used as the starting point 
for deliberations in educational settings in order to enter into dialogue about the differences, 
while learning diversity within the classroom. This is a notion that Banks finds very useful 
for an effective and transformational view of citizenship education.  
Different conceptions of democracy and citizenship frame how democratic citizenship is 
enacted in the education system. According to liberal thought, for instance, democratic 
citizenship is mostly conceptualised within individual liberties, thereby encouraging 
educators to emphasise individual knowledge, skills and values that pertain to the protection 
of both the learners’ and educators’ rights (Ho, Sim & Alviar-Martin, 2011:226). Banks 
                                                 
3
 Banks (2008:129) taps into this notion of Marshall (1965), and it is a concept that he argues has been used by 
many scholars to conceptualise citizenship. The civic aspects of citizenship provide citizens with individual 
rights such as freedom of speech, the right to own property and equality before the law. The political aspects 
give citizens franchise and the opportunity to exercise political power by participating in the political process. 
The social element provides citizens with the health, education and welfare needed to participate fully in their 
cultural communities and in the national civic culture. He notes that these three aspects are interrelated and 
overlap with the ideal of nation states, but are never completely attained. 
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(2008) extends this further to indicate that this knowledge, skills and values being taught 
should allow transformation and effectiveness in enabling citizens to deal with all contexts; 
including the cultural communities they come from, the nation state and the global 
community. This kind of education, according to Banks (2008), enables citizens to think 
beyond cultural boundaries to a more cosmopolitan perspective that enables them to enact 
justice and equality. Ho et al. (2011:226) acknowledge that current democratic citizenship 
models in education tend to concentrate attention on cultural diversity and monetary 
disparities on the basis of social justice. Put differently, education systems today need to 
focus on dealing with the diversity of contexts and also the recognition and redistribution of 
economic resources to citizens toward an equal and just society. 
In keeping with the aforementioned, DCE explicates people’s engagement, sense of 
belonging and human interaction concerning matters of public concern. On the basis of this 
understanding I will analyse Rawls’s public reason, Habermas’s communicative rationality 
and Benhabib’s democratic iteration to examine how they view engagement, belonging and 
interaction in order to develop a liberal understanding of DCE. 
2.3. Analysing Democratic Citizenship Education 
In this section I examine the understandings of Rawls, Benhabib and Habermas to determine 
how they feed into democratic citizenship education. To do this, I build on the previous 
exposition to ask three questions to guide my analysis of the conceptions of DCE within 
public reason, communicative rationality and democratic iteration. These questions are: first, 
how do Rawls, Habermas and Benhabib view engagement, belonging and interaction? 
Second, what is the purpose of DCE obtainable from their ideas? And finally, what is DCE in 
a liberal view? 
2.3.1. Rawls’s Public Reason as Justice  
Rawls’s public reason describes how people engage with one another within the public 
sphere for the purpose of justice. Rawls’s conception of justice is demonstrated in his book, A 
Theory of Justice, published in 1971. Rawls (1971) describes justice as a symmetric moral 
assessment of social circumstances that require public reason. Rawls views engagement as 
public reasoning that is conducted in a community of people who belong together. This 
engagement occurs in a just and fair manner. Rawls’s justice entails equal liberty, equal 
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opportunities and redress as explicated in the principles of justice guiding the basic structure 
of society. He considers engagement as an ethical concern. According to Rawls, DCE should 
help individuals to acknowledge the rights of others and ensure justice for all. 
Democratic citizenship education as a deliberative process 
In Rawlsian terms, deliberation refers to a just and procedural communicative process of 
public decision-making guided by principles of justice. Rawls argues that, for decision 
making to be fair, the principles of justice are to guide the process of deliberation and 
everyone concerned in collective decision making, and requires that the ‘original position’ 
[initial situation] be characterised by stipulations that are widely accepted by all who are 
concerned. However, Rawls (1999:21) says that there is some difficulty in making rational 
choices in reaching a general agreement on an original position. As such, Rawls says that the 
original position should be characterised by equality and redress. Equality is considered in the 
allocation of basic rights and duties; redress is illustrated in the sense in which there is 
compensation for injustices for the benefit of citizens who are economically and socially 
disadvantaged (Rawls, 1999:15). 
Cooperation and community  
Rawls describes communities as cooperative relationships that create a sense of belonging. A 
community is a group of people who belong together and are driven to live for justice for all 
who belong. When communities make laws and decisions that guide them, they do so by 
engaging in a social contract that they all understand through public reasoning. Rawls’s 
theory of justice as fairness is an alternative theory of justice. It is a contract theory that 
claims justice in communities. He depicts a collective view of justice as fairness. In 
developing this theory, Rawls critiques the utilitarian view of justice as individualistic and 
advances the contract theory of justice as pluralistic. In other words, he critiques an 
individualistic perspective of moral justice that reflects complexity in groups, society and in 
public systems so that individual rights are considered just when the good is extended to 
those who co-exist. This process of decision making that Rawls proposes is geared to benefit 
primarily the disadvantaged members of a society for whom justice is considered as fair. This 
is a theory that ethically values the right of maximising the good.  
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Rawls’s (1971) public reason is an ideal and just concept for basic social institutions [higher 
education] that illustrates the core of the democratic values of freedom and equality for all 
citizens. He provides an ideal description of justice that is suitable for educational institutions 
[society]. Rawls’s views on public reason show how people who are free and equal are 
capable of realistically accepting the same conception of justice. The following aspects 
reflect upon the way in which Rawls explicates this possibility to agree based on the 
principles of justice. 
The principles of justice  
Rawls uses the two principles of justice to describe how public reasoning can be conducted to 
facilitate engagement, a sense of belonging and human interaction. The principles of justice 
that Rawls provides are for the basic structure of society that regulates the allotment of rights 
and duties in institutions for both the benefit and burden of human interactions and their 
sense of belonging. The institutions Rawls describes are a community system of rules, which 
distinguishes offices and positions with their rights, duties, powers and immunities. Rawls 
(1971:55) argues that the implementation of institutional policies facilitates public reason, 
and that the results they produce determine whether the policies are just or not. 
The principles of justice proposed by Rawls (1971:56) apply to human interactions that are 
understood to be public. He says that specific principles should be decided upon by all who 
are part of the institutions. This is to be accomplished in such a way that all who engage in 
the institutional decision-making process are aware of the constitution they are part of 
producing. This is made public to all participants, who then will abide by the stipulated rules, 
knowing their consequences or obligations.  
2.3.1.1. The principle of greatest equal liberty 
The principle of greatest equal liberty, also known as the first principle, pronounces 
constitutional limits on democratic government. This principle states that ‘[e]ach person is to 
have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for 
others’ (Rawls, 1971:60). This principle indicates that the social systems that outline and 
secure equal liberties of citizenship and those that establish social and economic inequalities 
are to succumb to the principle of equal liberty. 
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This principle distinguishes aspects of a social system that define and secure the equal 
liberties of citizenship, and those that establish social and economic inequalities. The basic 
structure of liberties within a political context include the right to vote and to be eligible to 
run for public office, freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience and freedom of 
thought, freedom of the person, along with the right to hold (personal) property, and freedom 
from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the rule of law (Rawls, 1971:61). These 
liberties are considered to be equal within a just society. 
Equal liberty can describe a person’s social position and sense of citizenship. This principle 
also creates spaces for individuals to have the confidence and self-worth, as well as the 
opportunity, to develop their abilities, to interact freely in expressing their opinions and to 
live in a desirable egalitarian society. Such liberties also enable individuals not to hold back 
their opinions and ideas because they are accorded the liberty of equal opportunities. These 
forms of liberties that Rawls describes enable one to have a sense of belonging, since one 
decides for the benefit of others. This also suggests that, in a situation in which such rights 
are denied, alienation, division, conflict and even unforgiving attitudes may follow.  
What makes Rawls’s theory imperative is that he capitalises upon liberties he considers 
essential, valuable and fundamental. In a moral sense, Rawls’s starting point in the moral 
state of basic liberties that depict the attributes of those looked upon as democratic citizens is 
a conception of moral good. These principles are essential in enabling individuals to be free 
and fair in the process of developing judgments relating to others with whom they seek 
equality. This principle of equality exemplifies the capacity for a sense of justice and the 
capacity for the conception of good that are envisioned in an egalitarian society. These 
capacities are moral choices that Rawls draws from traditional moral philosophy. Therefore, 
this can enable people to think critically, rationally and reasonably when making ethical 
[moral] judgments in relation to what he argues for in justice as fairness in the original 
position of equality for all. These moral abilities enable individuals to have the capacity to 
make rational and reasonable judgments and to choose the right thing to do (Freeman, 
2003:5). This moral ability, in turn, depicts the reciprocal act of appreciation and respect for 
others in a demonstration of democratic citizenry in their perception of a good life. The 
following is the second principle of justice. 
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2.3.1.2. The principle of equality of opportunity and difference  
The principle of equality of opportunity and difference is also referred to as the second 
principle of justice and deals with distributive justice and redress. It states, ‘[s]ocial and 
economic inequalities are arranged so that they a) reasonably expected to be everyone’s 
advantage, and b) attached to positions and offices open to all’ (Rawls, 1971:61). This 
principle applies to wealth and income and to the design of organisations that utilise 
differences in authority and responsibility, or chains of command. Rawls notes that the 
distribution of wealth and income needs not be equal, but must be to everyone’s advantage 
(Rawls, 1971:61). At the same time, positions of authority and offices must be accessible to 
all. This second principle can be applied by holding a position open and yet subject to this 
constraint, which arranges social and economic inequalities so that everyone benefits. 
Rawls (1971:61) maintains that the application of these principles must be arranged in a serial 
order, with the first principle coming before the second principle. Thus, the distribution of 
income, wealth and authority must be consistent with both the liberties of equal citizenship 
and equality of opportunity. Rawls (1971:62) rationalises that ‘all social values as liberty, 
opportunity, income and wealth are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of 
any or all of these values is to everyone’s advantage’. In this statement, he suggests that there 
is an amount of permissible inequality if it is geared to benefit all. In understanding what 
Rawls is saying, I suggest that equality is a difficult target for implementing justice; however, 
it minimises opportunities for extreme injustice. If a situation presents itself in which an 
unequal distribution of social values is to be made, and in doing this everyone will benefit, 
then justice can be counted as fairness. 
Rawls argues that injustice is inequality and not beneficial to all. Therefore, a conception of 
justice does not necessarily impose restrictions on the type of inequalities permissible – it 
only requires that everyone’s position be improved.  
2.3.1.3. Democratic equality 
Democratic equality refers to equal opportunities in public engagement. Rawls’s (1971:73) 
principles of justice illustrate democratic equality in the sense in which he advocates that 
those with similar abilities and skills should have similar opportunities in life. Therefore, the 
distribution of natural assets to those with the same level of talents and ability and the same 
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willingness to use them should have the same prospects of success, regardless of their initial 
place in the social system, and regardless of income and the class into which they were born 
(Rawls, 1971:73). Democratic equality also suggests that equal liberty and equality of 
opportunity occur when those who are better situated are just if and only if they work as part 
of the scheme that improves the expectations of the least advantaged members of society 
(Rawls, 1971:75). As such, ‘social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they 
are both a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and b) attached to offices, positions 
open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity’ (Rawls, 1971:83). 
The second principle, nonetheless, denotes democratic equality as a remedy for a society in 
which injustices reign, and for an egalitarian society to be created. In other words, when those 
in more favourable positions operate in such a way that they can improve the situations of 
those who are in disadvantaged situations, the second principle of justice makes sense. This 
also means that any social and economic inequalities need to be addressed in such a way that 
the least advantaged can have various positions open to them. Therefore, equal opportunities 
benefit all members of society. 
Rawls (1971) argues that steps such as investing in education and resources at an early stage 
may be a good start to rejuvenate societies with the intention of restoring justice. He notes 
that such acts will require cooperation and collaboration in order to put together a set of 
public rules and expectations to help restore such justice in education. Rawls (1971:92) 
maintains that primary social goods [education] are all that a rational person wants in order to 
advance the greater good to a greater end. Rawls explains that equal citizenship is a relevant 
social position defined by rights and liberties. Within this context, this may mean that 
society’s social policies should depict equal citizenship.  
The inequalities found in societies prompt an egalitarian understanding of justice. For Rawls, 
the principle of equality also depicts redress. As such, inequalities at birth and natural 
endowment are undeserved and are to be compensated. However, in order to provide genuine 
equality of opportunity, all persons need to be treated equally, despite the state in which they 
are born. Society must pay more attention to those with fewer natural assets and those born 
into less favourable social positions (Rawls, 1971:100). To this end, it may mean that more 
resources have to be allocated to the education of the less intelligent than to that of the more 
intelligent for a period of time until there is balance and an attainment of a sense of self-
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worth (Rawls, 1971:101). Therefore, different principles express a conception of reciprocity. 
Social order can be justified to everyone, and in particular those least favoured. This process 
requires collaboration, and cooperation as a set of public rules and expectations ensures that 
those with prospects of improving their lives do what the system dictates and are rewarded 
(Rawls, 1971:103). 
Rawls therefore suggests that a particular conception of justice interferes with the way in 
which freedoms, duties and rights are accorded in societies. He observes that, even though 
societies are accompanied by social cooperation and similar interests and identities, 
destabilising conflicts may follow if there are no basic guiding rules. In such a situation, 
Rawls offers a set of principles that he contends are necessary to provide ‘a way of assigning 
rights and duties in basic institutions of society’ (Rawls, 1971:124), which he calls ‘justice as 
fairness’. 
Rawls again emphasises that, for societies to be just in their social cooperation, they need to 
be aware of just systems by which the principles guiding their understanding of the concept 
are constructed, and that everyone in such a society should be aware of the system and the 
principles that define just decisions. Therefore, any distribution of duties, freedoms and rights 
is acknowledged and guided by these principles of justice for the benefit of every member of 
society. However, it is clear that Rawls is aware that no society that is as well ordered as the 
one he proposes indeed exists, despite the fact that the principles of justice in their serial 
order as he proposes are able to guide society to this end, even in its differences and diversity 
of opinions.
4
 Thus, every member needs to acknowledge, or be aware of, the principles of 
justice that define his/her society/community. As such, the principles of justice agreed upon 
by everyone in the original position
5
 guide the distribution of rights, duties and freedoms. 
                                                 
4
 Rawls notes that a basic feature of democracy is the fact of reasonable pluralism – the fact that a plurality of 
conflicting reasonable comprehensive doctrines – (religious, philosophical and moral) are the normal result of 
its culture and free institutions; as long as we live in a free society we should expect the diversity of conflicting 
and irreconcilable doctrines, yet he still believes that there can be some common ground between these different 
comprehensive doctrines that he calls an ‘overlapping consensus’, a notion closely related to his theory of public 
reason. In addition, what unites people should be sensitivity about political justice (Gencoglu-Onbasi, 
2011:441). 
5
 Rawls (1971:120) defines original position as ‘a purely hypothetical situation’. He explains that the conception 
of original position is not intended to explain human conduct except in so far as it tries to account for our moral 
judgments and helps to explain our having a sense of justice. Thus, he affirms that justice as fairness is a theory 
of our moral sentiments and is manifested in our considered judgments in reflective equilibrium. Rawls notes 
that, even though this conception is part of the theory of conduct, it does not follow at all that there are actual 
situations that resemble it. He also terms original position as ‘the most favoured, or standard, interpretation’. 
Rawls depicts original position as one in which people are ignorant of social status, inability, fortunes and even 
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Rawls further identifies that agreeing to the concepts of justice is not enough for a viable 
human community in which other problems might hinder this process of agreement, vis-à-vis 
coordination, efficiency and stability.  
2.3.1.4. Respect and reciprocity 
Respect and reciprocity refer to moral ethical principles that guide the deliberation and justice 
process in the public sphere. Rawls understands justice as a moral good when it is fair – that 
is, fairness in the distribution of liberty, freedom, duty and equality. In addition, Rawls 
(1971:388) stresses the good of self-respect over income and wealth. For Rawls, to give 
respect to oneself is to give all persons their inherently due respect, not because of what they 
offer or what they have done, but by virtue of being human. Therefore, Rawls recognises the 
value and dignity of human beings as worthy of respect, regardless of their social, political or 
economic status. Zink (2011:331) notes that there is substantial agreement among scholars 
and critics of Rawls’s theory that self-respect plays an important role in maintaining stability 
in any liberal democratic society. It is when one recognises a sense of self-worth that one is 
able to transfer the same respect in communication with others. As such, respect becomes a 
reciprocal act of justice from one’s ability to recognise autonomously the need for respect 
that one can then offer others. 
In essence, Rawls’s (1971) theory of justice, from the perspective of moral philosophy, 
embraces justice in communities. For such justice to be experienced, Rawls suggests an 
egalitarian notion of justice as fairness by using two guiding principles. He notes that, for 
justice to occur in society, there is a need for deliberation, reciprocity and mutual self-respect 
among those who live in the public sphere. Another thing that makes Rawls’s theory 
plausible is its deviation from the traditional understanding of justice that does not consider 
human interaction, sense of belonging and engagement as a collective concern for society’s 
responsibility. 
                                                                                                                                                        
intelligence. He identifies it as the ‘veil of ignorance’ in which the principles of justice are preferred. From the 
foregoing, therefore, Rawls argues for the original position 1) as equality in the assigning of basic rights and 
duties, that it 2) holds that social economic injustices are just if they result in compensating benefits for 
everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged in the society. Liberties have to be distributed equally and, 
3) as good political order, it entails injustices as fairness – in the equal distribution of settings necessary for all 
this good (also see www.bookrags.com.biography/john-rawls/). 
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2.3.2. Habermas’s Communicative Rationality 
The concept of communicative rationality refers to the interaction of two or more competent 
speakers and actors who can initiate interpersonal relations (Habermas, 1987b:86). These 
actors pursue an understanding of the particular situation; they do this by negotiating with 
one another by way of providing valid reasons in order to reach an agreement. Important to 
this is the interpretation of the central concept of action. The negotiations that take place 
during this process are crucial because they will determine the model in which a consensus is 
determined. Habermas maintains that this process gives language a prominent role. In 
keeping with Habermas’s notion (1987b:4), Pusey (1987:70) affirms that Habermas’s 
intention with the theory of communicative action is to develop ‘a model that will show how 
rationality manifests in ordinary social interaction, communication between speaking and 
acting subjects’. 
Habermas (1987a) is of the opinion that only teleological concepts developed in the tradition 
of Mead, Garfinkel, Parson and Durkheim offer spaces for a concept of rationality of action. 
This means that communicative action is understood on the assumption that language as a 
medium of speech can be used to show how people relate to and reflect on the world in which 
they live (Habermas, 1987b:94). He notes that communicative action presupposes language 
as a medium of unconstrained communication, whereby speakers and listeners alike can 
interpret and understand one another in the context of their reinterpreted life world. This 
refers simultaneously to things in their objective, social and subjective world in order to 
negotiate common definitions of the situation. 
Given the centrality of communicative action, Habermas’s proposition for communicative 
rationality addresses the concern of how language has the ability to coordinate action in a 
consensual and cooperative way, as opposed to one that is forced or manipulated. In other 
words, Habermas posits how the use of language in contexts of interaction could produce 
mutual agreement on a course of action. Therefore, the capacity to force agreement can be 
shown in the possibility of acting communicatively. Habermas (1987a) is not concerned with 
how arguments are conducted to rationally assess claims of truth or of rightness. He is 
concerned with the realistic presumptions that competent speakers and actors make in trying 
to reach agreement on disputed claims with others. He considers as communicative action 
‘those linguistically mediated interactions in which all participants pursue illocutionary aims, 
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and only illocutionary aims, with their mediating acts of communication’ (Habermas, 
1987a:19). Conversely, he regards as linguistically mediated strategic action those 
interactions in which at least one of the participants wants to produce perlocutionary
6
 effects 
with his speech that will influence understanding of the illocutionary acts.
7
  
Habermas (1987a:286) contends that the ‘communicative’ use of language to reach 
agreement in the ‘original mode’ is dependent on ‘strategic’ and ‘parasitic’ use of language. 
This means that for communication to lead to understanding, it should be organised to do so. 
In order to advance this contention, Habermas borrows from Austin’s distinction between 
illocutionary and perlocutionary effects. Illocutionary effects of speech are said to be effects 
created by the speaker, while the perlocutionary effects are the effects created by what the 
hearer does in response to the speaker’s words (illocutionary effects) (Habermas, 1987a:289). 
Thus, the perlocutionary effects (in the hearer) produce some form of action as a response to 
the speaker’s illocutionary effects. This process requires certain predispositions and abilities 
in both the speaker and the hearer in order to produce worthwhile illocutionary and 
perlocutionary effects for a successful communicative act. This enables the intended or 
original intentions of the communicative goal to be realised, thereby reaching an agreement.  
In the same vein, the predispositions, prejudices and presuppositions that democratic citizens 
hold prior to deliberation require subjection to certain cognitive criticisms and capabilities in 
order to make informed judgments. To be able to do this, citizens need to analyse critically 
and rationally what stakeholders want to put across or achieve in order to reach an agreement. 
For such actions to happen, clear communication and understanding are needed to facilitate 
negotiations for a consensus on the problem at hand. The appropriate action here is that of 
understanding what is constructed communicatively. Such analytical abilities help to validate 
logical capabilities for a stakeholder to give a candidate reasons that will withstand scrutiny, 
and validate the speech and actions that follow (Habermas, 1987b:18). The stakeholder’s 
                                                 
6
 Perlocutionary effects are those acts of speech performed as a result of a speech act. They are the actions taken 
by audiences as a result of speech acts. For instance, in communicative rationality one might give a command or 
a warning, and the actions of the hearers as a result of the warning or command can be referred to as 
perlocutionary effects. Habermas (1787a:289) uses this linguistic philosophy to illustrate that communication 
that leads to understanding is that which causes action as a result of the acts of speech (illustration adapted from 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/perlocutionary, http://grammar.about.com/od/pq/g/perlocutionary.htm). 
7
 Illocutionary acts as used by Habermas mean acts performed by the speaker or writer by uttering certain words 
in order to steer communication towards a path of justice towards the other; they are acts of communication that 
trigger action from those who are listening to the speech act. Meaning adapted from Collins English complete 
and unabridged dictionary (2003), retrieved online http://www.thefreedictionary.com/illocution  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
35 
 
ability to assess reasons for actions and speech is fundamental in order to reach a mutual 
contract or an anticipated ending. Thus, the concept of rationality must extend beyond the 
question of rationality of assertions and/or teleological actions, and also should include a 
wider range of contexts in which validity claims are raised and redeemed. 
On this score, DCE needs to be conceptualised in such a way that the content students learn is 
depicted in a language that will aid better communication. For students to reach an 
understanding within learning communities, there is a need to learn both the skills of 
communication and the ability to communicate. Education as a social practice can be 
achieved when participants adopt an attitude oriented to reaching understanding and not only 
success (Habermas, 1987a:286). In this manner, understanding is regarded as the mechanism 
for coordinating actions (Habermas, 1987a:287). 
Communicative action explicates how rationality can be a valuable concept for DCE. Being 
able to communicate by providing reasons in pedagogical encounters and in educational 
planning and management can improve the understanding of education for democratic 
citizenry. Habermas asserts that the clarity of rationality claims differs depending on their 
organisational features. The claim of true statements and rightness of action requires 
validation, to which claims to truthfulness are not subject. Habermas indicates that this 
communication process requires that participants be free to raise and challenge claims 
without fear of coercion, intimidation and deceit, and to have equal chances to speak, make 
assertions, express themselves and make logical argument to challenge others. This process 
of communication must be relevant to the problem at hand and must provide valid reasons, as 
well as having an open mind to accepting criticism.  
Habermas’s consensus is not predetermined by the ‘original position’ as in Rawls’s theory of 
justice as fairness, but is constructed through speech. However, in a situation in which people 
cannot reach consensus by way of argumentation, then consensus can be reached through 
voting. In this process, deliberation must yield a majority that does not discourage the views 
of minorities. However, should the minority have a better reason for reversing the agreed 
upon temporary consensus, then they are given the opportunity to offer their reasons without 
exclusion. 
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2.3.2.1. Culture and communicative rationality: indicators for democratic 
citizenship education 
Culture plays an important role in how communicative communities engage with one another 
to reach consensus. Rationality embedded in cultural values will enhance cognition for 
dispositions to arrive at an understanding of and a consensus on just laws that guide societies. 
Habermas (1987b:136) notes that culture is integral to understanding subjects in 
communicative practice. In the process of communication, subjects may tell their stories from 
their cultural background as a way of providing justification for their understanding of the 
problem under discussion. This manner of reasoning allows participants to locate themselves 
in the life worlds from which they originate and which inform their understanding of a 
particular problem. As such, it provides a platform from which interaction can be sustained 
with all stakeholders as a way of providing reasons for the choice they support to achieve a 
particular consensus. Allowing cultural stories to be told in decision making may include 
those that might be excluded from communal decision making. In line with this argument, the 
notion of rationality as a basis for ascertaining communicative action suggests a particular 
form of liberalism – a participatory one. Habermas’s (1987b:134) conception of good in a 
cultural sense requires a conception of a collective right to cultural survival as opposed to 
individual rights assigned by some traditional liberal thought. Habermas stresses the need to 
accentuate the meaning of the consensually justified principles that are to be constructed in 
compliance with cultural and traditional values without pathological tendencies. In other 
words, Habermas suggests that stories from diverse cultures be shared in order to promote 
participation by all and to sustain cultures, not in the sense of practising the culture in its 
entirety, but to learn from the good that cultures provide and discard what is irrelevant for 
contemporary concerns. In this sense, cultures are sustained for their moral good, while at the 
same time including voices that might otherwise be silenced by excluding cultural narratives. 
Culture has an important place in deciding what constitutes a good life. Therefore, a 
communicative process in a liberal sense should view cultural values as normative in decision 
making. This means that, if cultures are to survive, they must co-exist with the current 
discourses on democracy and freedoms; and people must make a significant effort to 
understand the values and cultures of others.  
Communicative action describes mutual understanding as a means to transmit and renew 
cultural knowledge; it coordinates action for social integration and establishes solidarity, 
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acting as a socialisation process in the formation of personal identities (Habermas, 
1987b:137). Communicative action therefore is enabled by cultural knowledge that facilitates 
cooperation and the integration of different perspectives in order for every individual in 
communicative societies to develop a sense of belonging [developing a sense of self in 
relation to others]. In essence, DCE conceptualised in a cultural sense will enhance cultural 
knowledge, integrate different world views and create a social platform that enables 
individuals to develop a sense of belonging. 
In summary, Habermas’s central argument in communicative action is focused on reaching 
mutual understanding of inter-subjective relationships between individuals who are socialised 
through communication and reciprocally recognise one another. Habermas contrasts 
communicative reason with subject-centred reason and the possibility of communicative 
reason in the life world. Communicative rationality, according to Habermas, establishes the 
possibility that we can understand each other and agree on a course of action that is 
acceptable to all concerned. This happens when stakeholders engage in argumentation as a 
way of persuading each other so that they are all in a better position to agree. Therefore, 
Habermas’s consensus is not determined before argumentation. He holds the view that 
consensus needs to emerge from the deliberation process. In essence, DCE ‘ought’ to be 
configured as a communicative process that engenders universities as communities and 
public places that require deliberative rationality, cultural compliance and understanding 
through constructive consensus. 
Habermas’s communicative action incorporates what is lacking in Rawls’s justice as fairness. 
Rawls is concerned with procedural justice and its guiding principles, while Habermas is 
actually concerned with what happens during deliberation. Whereas Rawls recognises 
deliberation as the core element that leads to agreement on the original position for equal 
liberty, Habermas shows how complex the real speech situation is during the deliberation 
process, despite freedom of speech, and that such opportunities do not guarantee that a 
consensus will be reached. Habermas shows that each individual has the capacity to 
communicate; however, how one communicates is what results in an understanding that 
ultimately leads to an agreement. He shows how speech situations can rationally be used to 
reach a mutual agreement when all speakers involved are able to understand one another and 
reach a consensus, which is the purposive action for communication. Habermas’s consensus 
is constructed in the process of deliberation, an aspect that Rawls does not explain. Therefore, 
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the rationality of Habermas illustrates the realities of society and calls for inclusion during 
speech situations in order to reach widely accepted decision.  
Despite the fact that Habermas’s methodology and philosophical approach to communicative 
action provide an egalitarian space for citizens to communicate freely and with openness, 
they fall short when he assumes that all persons are self-directed and could rationally 
articulate persuasive arguments in the context of public deliberations. Consequently, 
deliberation in public spaces requires that individuals are prepared cognitively to generate 
reasons for problematic situations and, if not, that there is a sense of exclusion that comes 
with his view – that of internal exclusion (Young, 2003). According to Young (2003:52), this 
kind of exclusion refers to ways in which some people may lack effective opportunities to 
influence the thinking of others, even if they were given the opportunity and procedures to 
participate in discussions. In other words, it may exclude those who do not think critically by 
offering candidates reasons for problem solving even when access to decision making is open 
to all. Habermas assumes that everyone in society can offer valid reason for all decision 
making; however, Young shows how diverse society is in the sense that there are those in 
society who are more articulate in contributing to debates in public domains than others, and 
there are those whose voices are heard in relation to particular decision making, depending on 
the problem at hand, yet there are those who stay in the background whose ideas are never 
heard. Habermas does not deal with this group of people. He only depicts those who can 
articulate rationally in deliberations. Young (2003:56) further explains that the reason why 
some people’s ideas might be excluded from decision making is not because of what they 
say, but how they say what they say. In this case, Young (2003) provides an inclusive 
approach to using narratives, rhetoric and greetings to provoke and trigger others to 
communicate in such a way that they are understood in ways that argument alone cannot do. 
I therefore argue that both Rawls’s justice as fairness and Habermas’s critical theory are 
necessary for constructing democratic citizenship education. Education constructed in 
Rawlsian and Habermasian terms places it as a social, political, rational and just practice. 
These theories show that education is a humane practice and requires social justice and 
communicative rationality for understanding different life worlds and systems.  
I shall argue why Habermasian theory can be considered as a form of democratic citizenship 
education as complementary to Rawls. Habermas draws from both communicative and 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
39 
 
procedural understandings in his discussion of liberalism. He depicts a liberalism conjoined 
with a theory of social behaviour and communicative action and advances to principle-based 
accounts of moral and procedural accounts of law and justice. Habermas reframes liberalism 
in the light of both social-behavioural and liberal democratic-constitutional understandings of 
communication and justice respectively (Johnston, 2012:110-111).  
Communicative rationality accounts for deliberative processes in democratic citizenship 
education. Habermas’s perspectives on communicative action reveal the role higher 
education ‘ought’ to play in the state and community to develop students’ rational capacity 
and dispositions to communicate in matters of the public sphere [democratic citizenry]. 
Habermas (1987b) shows that it is necessary for higher education to prepare students to 
develop both their political and social potential simultaneously. 
2.3.2.2. Communicative action as a democratic capability 
Communicative action presupposes that every individual person has a capability to engage in 
public decision making. As such, every individual displays the potentiality in decision 
making to include all stakeholders in constructive consensus. Habermas’s theory of 
communicative action could be said to trigger notions of democracy in the sense that 
individuals are considered important and included in the process of deliberation. Individuals 
are seen as people who hold dispositions and abilities that enable them to think and act 
rationally and critically in communication with others in order to reach consensus. In this 
light, education becomes a process of developing cognitive potentialities to enable 
individuals to participate in communication. One such example is how citizens can 
communicatively construct social norms of society [necessary] for democratic citizenry. In 
doing this, education recognises individuals as persons of worth, and they are respected for 
both their rationality and moral attributes in their socialisation in teaching/learning 
encounters. It also considers all citizens to be free and equal in their right to effective 
discourse in decision-making processes. 
Habermas’s theory of communicative action proposes freedom as a component of democratic 
citizenship education. This is reflected in the inclusiveness that allows everyone to be 
involved in the deliberation process. This process is planned in such a way that majority 
voices are heard without silencing the voices of the minority. Decisions are made by the 
majority, but if the minority are able to develop valid reasons why other decisions should be 
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made, they are given an opportunity to argue their case, thus validating constructive 
consensus. In my view, democratic citizenship can be possible in institutions of learning 
when deliberations and actions are central to pedagogy.  
2.3.2.3. Communicative action as democratic deliberation 
Communicative action is unhindered communicative freedom. Communicative action 
recognises an individual’s engagement in matters of the public sphere. This process 
encourages human interaction without excluding anyone from communicative processes. 
Communicative action recognises speech (language, voices) as a process that entails clear 
thinking on what is to be said before it is said, and recognises the value of diversity of speech 
and open mindedness. On the other hand it also encapsulates listening as a process that 
captures patience, respect and the ability to analyse spoken and heard words. Actions taken 
by the hearer are also included – what Habermas (1987a) terms the ‘illocutionary and 
elocutionary effects’ that this creates. The process is rigorous and it seems to be the 
ideologies that trigger a process of learning and teaching. Communicative rationality denotes 
that education can be used as a tool of cultural production in which individuals are schooled 
or educated to think and act rationally and critically, and to communicate on a realistic level 
in order to develop a capable and rational group of citizens who can preside over social, 
political and economic issues that confront nations/citizens.  
Another important fact drawn from Habermas is the idea of agreement. In the process of this 
rationalisation an agreement must be reached. What Habermas fails to tell us is how this 
agreement is reached and the normative sense in which such judgement can be made. The 
process of communication is delineated and well theorised, but how this agreement is reached 
remains unanswered. However, Habermas’s theory of communicative action illustrates a 
process of transparency, in that the individual agency within a society [education] is 
significant for deliberation, rational communication and a social cultural milieu in which 
human experiences are embedded.  
Democratic citizenship education in the context of Habermas’s theory recognises diversity in 
the cultural voices, rational abilities and communicative dispositions of individuals in society. 
Habermasian democratic citizenship seeks a constructive consensus through deliberation on 
matters that concern the public sphere. It promotes the development of rational abilities that 
are embodied in individuals in order to enhance interaction and deliberation. This contributes 
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to cultural production and also magnifies dialogue as a process that enhances education and 
enriches it for citizens.  
2.3.2.4. Challenges of communicative action for democratic citizenship 
education 
The analysis of Habermas’s theory of communicative action in relation to the public sphere is 
seen to be inadequate to construct extended meanings of democratic citizenship education, 
since it is one dimensional in addressing the concerns of the public. Habermas assumes all 
humans are capable of reasoning through communication under all circumstances, without 
being educated. It seems as if he is including all in communication, but his exposition 
categorically excludes others in the sense in which disagreements might occur. He also 
assumes that mere speech acts can create human interactions, a sense of belonging and public 
reasoning that will result in consensus. This is an inadequate assumption, because for 
‘democracies to thrive, citizens have to be taught to be democrats’ (Enslin, Pendlebury & 
Tjiattas, 2001:115); we cannot assume that people naturally can participate in democratic 
communications without being inducted into doing so. Like Habermas, we cannot depend on 
Rawls’s procedures alone to develop democratic education, because they provide a thin 
understanding of democratic citizen education. We cannot rely on constitutional laws and 
government’s offices to teach citizens to act as democrats; however, formal education can 
embark on deliberate acts of teaching citizens about justice, communication and reasoning. 
Following shortly is an analysis of Benhabib’s notion of democratic iteration and 
cosmopolitanism, and how it addresses unity and the diversity of human rights in the public 
sphere, assuming that everyone is autonomous and capable of rational argumentation.  
It is insufficient to perceive education in terms of rational practice or procedural justice. 
Rawls’s and Habermas’s views help to develop a sense of deliberative democracy using 
rationality, communication and justice; these are not enough to address the educational 
pursuit. Education as a social practice cannot be considered or boxed as a rational practice 
only, without the notion of a cultural practice. The idea of public deliberation can be 
enhanced where culture plays a major role in education. However, drawing from culture 
alone, as Habermas partially notes, is not enough, because it will become an emotive practice. 
I therefore invoke Benhabib’s iterative and cosmopolitan thinking, which comprehensively 
acknowledges Habermas, while at the same time deviates by emphasising that education 
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should engender community by recognising people as human beings with right-holding 
virtues.  
2.3.3. Benhabib’s Democratic Iteration and Democratic Citizenship 
Education  
Benhabibian democratic iteration, it can be argued, offers a complementary argument to 
Rawls’s and Habermas’s deliberative democracy in relation to the public sphere. Even though 
Benhabib takes a different position from that of Rawls and Habermas, she advances what I 
think is the need to augment what is missing in Rawls’s and Habermas’ formulation, as 
discussed previously. Rawls’s procedure of justice as fairness is limited to constructing laws 
and constitutions for institutions; however, the egalitarian principles he suggests may act as 
one of the facets in creating a community sense of belonging and enhancing public 
rationality. However, creating a sense of belonging might exclude some and favour others. 
The procedures involved indicate that those involved in this process must have the capacity to 
follow procedures and the ability to offer rationality towards law making. These procedures 
are elaborate and might include others, while at the same time excluding some. On the other 
hand, Habermas’s communicative rationality assumes that an ideal speech situation is enough 
to create a sense of belonging, and includes public rationality. Communicative rationality 
alone is inadequate for conceptualising human interaction, sense of belonging, and public 
engagement, since not everyone has the capacity to engage in public deliberation unless they 
are taught to do so. Additionally, it is difficult to show how ideas agreed upon are enacted in 
cases where consensus is not reached. However, Habermas seeks to include all voices by the 
way people offer reasons and reach agreement, yet this seems impossible. It assumes a 
homogeneous way of thinking that does not depict public communication. Both Rawls and 
Habermas insist that an agreement be reached. This assumes that all humans have 
homogeneous patterns for reaching agreement. It does not depict opposing views that might 
impair agreement. Benhabib, on the other hand, advances justice as fairness and 
communicative rationality with the idea of the human right to have rights. She differs from 
Rawls and Habermas in that there is a possibility that people may not reach agreement; in this 
case, respect and reciprocity play a major role in appreciating the differences, and are a way 
of acknowledging the rights of others in a reciprocal manner to our own rights. She notes that 
reaching agreement is not mandatory to creating a sense of belonging, advancing human 
interaction and improving public engagement. Benhabib acknowledges various voices and 
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generates her ideas from a starting point at which others stop, hence expounding a sense of 
belonging within the social position of cosmopolitanism and the rights of others. 
Benhabibian democratic iteration takes the philosophical position of social constructivism to 
that of normative political theory. It also considers cultures as clearly delineable wholes and 
provides an analysis that generates coherence and purpose (Benhabib, 2011a:75, 141). 
Benhabib’s theory contends that, to be and to become a self, is to insert oneself into webs of 
interlocution and recognise the self in relation to others. She also acknowledges a 
cosmopolitan sense of belonging, because state borders have become porous, so thinking of 
citizenship education beyond the borders of our local society imagines justice for all 
humanity. She recognises an understanding of the public sphere as the space in which 
identities and affiliations are negotiated. In addition to these, she provides a deliberative 
model of democracy, and highlights egalitarian reciprocity, voluntary self-ascription and 
freedom as an exit to constructing democracy (Benhabib, 1996:69; 2011a). 
My focus on Benhabib (2011a) is on her publication Dignity in Adversity: Human Rights in 
Troubled Times. In this book she tackles democratic iteration on the issue of the ‘right to 
have rights’ – a notion that I seek to analyse. Democratic iteration refers ‘to continuing 
conversations, a complex dialogue, which challenges the assumption of completeness of each 
culture by making it possible for its members to look at themselves from the perspectives of 
others’ (Benhabib, 2011a:76).  
Benhabib (2011a) traces the discussion on ‘Unity and diversity of human rights’ from 
Husserl’s project of a transcendental phenomenology in western culture. She views Husserl’s 
answer to the question of universalism to be an essentialist one. This she achieved by 
identifying words (logos) used by Husserl as the entelechy of humanity, in other words, 
anything that is currently happening, including actuality and potentiality. Husserl’s position 
entails the claim that those from other cultures certainly deserve respect for their 
achievements, however inferior they may be to occidental or western culture characterised by 
philosophy, science, a life of theorising and the essence of scrutiny (Benhabib, 2011a:59). 
Husserl’s universalism came at a time of his life when Europe was dictated by egalitarianism 
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and fascism.
8
 It is on this premise that Benhabib (2011a:59) indicates that ‘[a]s the globe 
grows together materially into one world, it becomes all the more urgent to understand how 
claims to universality can be reconciled with assertions of religious and cultural difference; 
how the unity of reason can be reconciled with the diversity of life-forms’. She further notes 
that, due to globalisation, which has become a grand narrative, the search for universalism is 
uttered in the context of ‘human rights language’, and the defence of institutionalisation has 
become uncontested language. She points out that this language and the trend of human rights 
have not yet become a reality in human global politics. Based on this, Benhabib (2011a) 
argues that there is a fundamental human right, ‘the right to have rights’, an idea that she 
connotes as follows: that every human being is to be recognised by others, and to recognise 
others in turn, as persons entitled to moral respect and legally protected human rights.  
Benhabib (2011a) contends that human rights articulate moral principles that protect the 
communicative freedom of individuals and specify legal rights as justification claims. She 
reflectively acknowledges the work of Michael Walzer, who argues that human rights 
constitute the ‘[c]ore of universal thin morality’, and Nussbaum (1997:273-300), who claims 
that human rights form ‘[r]easonable conditions of a world-political consensus’. Benhabib 
agrees with Nussbaum on the political overlapping with consensus, but disagrees with her 
conceptions, which she notes are problematic and have a narrow view in philosophical 
anthropology regarding human capabilities. She notes that Rawls (1971:529-552) cautions for 
the need to distinguish between the list of human rights included in the law of peoples and 
that are defensible from the standpoint of a global public reason and the universal declaration 
of human rights in 1948 (Benhabib, 2011a:60). The work contends that Rawls’s position on 
human rights is provocative because it valorises the human rights to life, to liberty, to 
personal property and to formal equality, as expressed by the rules of natural justice. In 
relation to Charles Beitz (2001:272, cited in Benhabib, 2001a:87), Benhabib acknowledges 
his contribution to rights requiring democratic political forms, religious toleration, legal 
equality for women and a free choice of partner, which in many circumstances may certainly 
be excluded. Benhabib (2011a:87) argues that ‘human rights embody moral principles which 
need contextualization and specification in the form of legal norms’. 
                                                 
8
 These were forms of global capitalism whose effects were neither rational nor humane. Fascism was 
manifested in culture, sex and sexuality, abortion, eugenics and euthanasia, indoctrination, social intervention, 
social Darwinism and national corporation (Joachim, 2012:1).  
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In this regard, Benhabib is of the opinion that human rights need to shift both the justification 
strategy and the derivation of the content of human rights away from a minimalist concern 
towards a more robust understanding of human rights in terms of the ‘right to have rights’ – a 
notion she claims is borrowed from Arendt’s political stand, but she uses it as the claim of 
each human being to be recognised as moral and being worthy of equal concerns and equally 
entitled to be protected as a legal personality by his or her own polity, as well as by the world 
community. In other words, Benhabib valorises both individual (private) and community 
(public) rights in engendering the human right to have rights in communicative freedom. She 
differs here from both Rawls’s and Habermas’s starting points. I see Benhabib’s moral 
philosophy as lying between the traditional individualistic notions for her claim of the private 
and Habermas’s and Rawls’s conception of community to explain the relation of the 
individual to the public sphere. Thus, Benhabib strikes a balance by explaining a human 
being first as situating the self (private) in relation to others (public). I find her idea to be 
robust because of the respect she has for the right of an individual, yet she also recognises the 
public. 
2.3.3.1. Methodological iterations 
Benhabib (2011a) exposes the many schools of thought that claim that universal facts can be 
discovered and therefore are understood as being in opposition to relativism. The essentialist 
universalism claims that human nature consists of stable and predictable passions and 
predispositions, instincts and emotions, all of which can be discovered and analysed 
rationally. Justificatory universalism shares the normative content of human reason in the 
validity of procedures, inquiry, evidence and questioning, which have been the cognitive 
legacies of western philosophy since the Enlightenment. Moral universalism claims equal 
moral respect, and juridical universalism asserts that all humans are entitled to respect and 
rights based on legal and political systems claiming legitimacy. Upon reflection on the 
existing forms of universalism, Benhabib (2011a) distinguishes her position as that of 
interpreting communicative freedom in relation to the ‘right to have rights’. She submits that 
she is not in search of indubitable foundations for a solid ground upon which to build a fully-
fledged theory of human rights, but provides ‘a presupposition analysis’. Her contention is 
that any justification of human rights presupposes some conception of human agency, of 
human needs, human reason, as well as making some assumptions about the characteristics of 
our socio-political world. She therefore expands this concept of communicative freedom into 
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an account of human agency and hospitality. Hospitality, for Benhabib (2011a:7), captures 
the right of a stranger not to be treated as an enemy when he arrives in the land of another, 
and at the same time it involves precarious moments of finding out the intention of the guest 
in such a way that the guest will be welcomed with some suspicion until the intention is 
defined – a notion she borrows from Derrida’s hostipitality – to highlight the risky moments 
of the first encounter with a stranger when trying to understand his intentions so that one 
expresses hospitality. She notes that hospitality means a recognition of world citizenship that 
entails world peace through increasing communication between human beings. Thus, 
cosmopolitanism creates a sense of belonging in the creation of a fresh legal order and public 
domain in which humans are warranted rights based on their humanity. 
2.3.3.2. Human rights 
Benhabib warns that human rights need to move away from the naturalistic sense of 
understanding human rights. This way of looking at human rights depicts rights in the sense 
of owning property, which cannot be used to generalise the understanding of rights that she 
imagines. She maintains that the kinds of rights that are tenable are the rights that engender 
respect for one another in a reciprocal sense. As such, the claim to rights needs to be 
conceived in a moral sense. Rights imply that one has freedom and liberty not only to 
resources, but that people tolerate one another in mutual respect. She further examines 
Kantian rights, which claim ‘what exists; rather, we ask whether our lives together within, 
outside, betwixt polities ought not to be guided by mutually and reciprocal guaranteed 
immunities, constraints upon actions, and by legitimate access to certain goods and resource’ 
(Benhabib, 2011a:66). She contends that rights are not about what there is, but about the kind 
of world in which we reasonably want to live. She notes that Kant proposed one basic right, 
namely that ‘every action which by itself or by its Maxim enables the freedom of each 
individual’s will to co-exist with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal 
law is right’ (Benhabib, 2011a:66). In her analysis of this concept, Benhabib notes that 
Kant’s formulation is not about a list of basic rights that is said to precede the will of the 
republican sovereign. Rather, the Kantian principle establishes how a juridical-civil order can 
come into existence, which would be in compliance with the moral law of respect for the 
freedom of each. This implies that rights depend not on one’s will, but on some guiding laws 
that guide our thought experiment to justificatory processes through which we, in dialogue, 
must convince each other of the validity of certain norms to which general rules of action 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
47 
 
apply. In this sense, the human rights that Benhabib deconstructs develop a sense of 
belonging to a world republic, in which humans are accorded respect for their virtue of being 
humans. 
2.3.3.3. Human interaction 
It is worth noting that Benhabib (2011a) raises a critical inquiry that poses a theory of the 
right to have rights. She argues that, in order to justify why we should act in certain ways, we 
must respect another’s capacity to agree or disagree with him/her on the basis of reasons 
provided. What also is important is the validity on which one accepts or rejects these reasons. 
This implies respect for the capacity of one’s communicative freedom. This is an aspect of 
deliberation that Rawls did not consider in detail. He only pictured how individuals can reach 
an agreement in decision making in a more procedural way, while ignoring the fact that there 
are differences in opinion, reasoning and ability. On the other hand, Habermas argues for a 
communicative action in speech that leads to a consensus. He does not consider possibilities 
of disagreement, and contends that agreement is reached constructively. Benhabib’s argument 
differs from Habermas’s in the sense that her communicative freedom offers space to agree or 
disagree. To put this differently, Benhabib considers real-life realities in which there are 
differences of opinion and circumstances that may lead to disagreement that can be handled 
with mutual respect on the account of human agency and freedom of communication. 
2.3.3.4. Sense of belonging 
A sense of belonging can be created in different ways (Yuval-Davis, 2011:12). Benhabib 
(2011a) provides an analytical illustration of how iterations of human rights can develop a 
language of belonging. Benhabib (2011a:76) points out that ‘[o]nly when members of a 
society can engage in free and unrestrained dialogue about their collective identity in free 
public spheres can they develop narratives of self-identification, which unfold into fluid and 
creative reappropriations of their own traditions’. Human rights are moral principles that 
protect the right to exercise one’s communicative freedom and require legal backing. The 
right to have rights involves acknowledgement of one’s identity in general, as well as that of 
a concrete other. Therefore, this view requires us to treat each and every individual as being 
entitled to the same rights and duties we would want to ascribe to ourselves. Our relation to 
the other is governed by the norm of formal equality and reciprocity. This, in turn, assumes 
the ideology of equity, and complementary reciprocity and hospitality. 
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For Benhabib (2011a), such notions in relation to respecting another’s capacity to agree or 
disagree, formal equality and recognising one another’s identity make human rights different 
from other perspectives in the sense that a justification of human rights is viewed as a 
dialogic practice and is not stuck in the metaphysics of natural rights theories or 
overprotective individualist selves. Benhabib’s justification of human rights differs from 
essentialist accounts because, in such accounts, human rights are viewed as enabling 
conditions that allow individuals to employ their agency. In contrast, Benhabib’s view of 
human rights in the discourse view recognises one’s right to have rights as a prerequisite for 
one to be able to contest or accept her claim to rights. As such, one’s specific needs can serve 
as a justification for another only if one presupposes that his or her agent-specific needs can 
likewise serve as a justification for another. Thus the recognition of each other’s right to have 
rights is vital.  
Benhabib (2011a:70) defends her position to fit that of a theoretical justification discourse. 
She enables her readers to understand her view of the conception of human rights as the right 
to have rights in her hermeneutical circularity of practical reasons. Her choice of words, such 
as equity, symmetrical entitlement and reciprocity of communicative roles, initiates a 
reflective agenda that is rooted in her ability to exercise her communicative freedom. She 
does this by unveiling the various understandings of the notions and discourses on human 
rights, and then analyses, critiques and reconsiders these views not in a pathological sense, 
but as a redirection and as reasons to reflect on and propose a new discourse based on the 
‘right to have rights’. She also adds that her argument is not an absolute one, but arises from 
reflexive dialogue that emerged from globalisation and human rights and raised philosophical 
questions that she attempts to theorise. Benhabib (2011a:70) says the ‘motivation for moral 
discourses arises when the attitudes of our life-worlds break down through conflict, dissent, 
and disagreement, when there is conflict as well as contention, misery as well as a lack of 
solidarity’. Benhabib refutes the notion of discourses being hypothetical, but motivates 
reflexive dialogues that originate in very real life problems.  
Benhabib (2011a:76) considers a theory of human rights as ‘interactive universalism’. She 
contends that conceptualising human rights needs to begin by situating the self and 
considering ‘democratic iterations’ as a negotiation of ‘unity and the diversity of human 
rights’ (Benhabib, 2011a:76). She illustrates that this articulation of rights in relation to their 
moral core and their legal form is one of the most salient differences between her approach 
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and other contemporary positions. In the light of the foregoing, Benhabib (2011a:75) opines 
that, ‘through democratic iterations, citizens articulate the specific content of their schedule 
of rights, as well as making rights their very own’. 
2.3.3.5. Cosmopolitanism and democratic iteration 
Benhabib (2011a) analyses and appreciates Husserl’s reflection on what happened in Europe 
and the intellectual political landscape that accompanied war and political violence. In this 
connection, she argues that, in reaction to modern trends of democracy accompanied by 
global civil society, individuals are right-bearing not only by virtue of their citizenship within 
states, but by virtue of their humanity. Benhabib (2011a) claims that we need to rethink the 
law of people against the background of the newly emergent and fragile global civil society, 
which is continuously threatened by war, violence and military intervention. Benhabib calls 
for cosmopolitan imagination as a way of re-thinking human rights in order to overcome the 
dystopias of the current political and socio-economic greed that robs individuals of natural 
rights. Thus, she pleads for an approach to natural rights that considers the global sphere. 
This is vital because the ills and troubles that characterise society are common to the entire 
world. It also is necessitated by the fact that wars, marginalisation, droughts and natural 
disasters prompt migration and refugees all over the world (Benhabib, 2011a:195). Therefore, 
Benhabib calls for a cosmopolitan utopia to countenance the dystopias based on a common 
humanity. 
2.3.3.6. Inclusion and democratic citizenship education 
Benhabib (2011a) points out that the continuing cultural dialogues taking place in global civil 
society require that many citizens be involved. Doing this will enable people to learn from the 
previous dialogues, thereby contextualising narratives that can enhance communication in the 
various cultures and protect the human right to have rights in the midst of diversity. Benhabib 
(2011a) considers both Habermas’s and Rawls’s positions in constructing the ideal of the 
human right to have rights. However, she deviates from their position in order to argue for a 
cosmopolitan imagination. Benhabib engenders iteration and reflexivity as ways to 
conceptualise rights that exhibit realities of life-worlds in order to enhance the 
communicative freedom of individuals, thereby enhancing their agency, while at the same 
time respecting others’ capacity to agree or disagree. She argues for the human right to have 
rights. She also considers this an imagination that goes beyond local society to an 
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international community, since national borders have become porous. She argues for human 
rights that can withstand conflicting times – a human right that upholds human identity and 
agency. 
Democratic iteration and citizenship education 
Benhabib’s methodology is seen as a crucial starting point that can help in reconstructing 
citizenship education. The generative argumentation and philosophical routes used in 
constructing her ideas from the theory of transcendental phenomenology to interactive 
universalism provide articulated coherency and weight, as they validate the authority on 
which she bases her argument. The reflexivity and iteration of the concept of rights gives 
credibility to educational concerns. The discussions that Benhabib raises regarding human 
rights have implications for pedagogy and can ensure universal justice for all. Education 
engendered within sound morals and values that regards respect for one another in a 
reciprocal way seeks to improve educational theory and praxis. It is important that certain 
utopias, such as the one Benhabib suggests, be considered in decision making and in the way 
we rethink morals and values in education, as a starting point to developing meaning in 
education. Accordingly, Benhabib suggests that citizenship education needs to be 
conceptualised in such a way that it counters the threats posed by the dystopias [ills, 
inequalities, discrimination, ethnic prejudices and the like] in society. Doing this will enable 
us to foster healthier societies that respect and are aware of the value of human life, rights and 
the consequences of said abuses. Consequently, Benhabib,(2011a) may be inferring that 
citizenship education needs to uphold the equality of all beings, no matter their class, the 
amount of knowledge they may have acquired, their religious background, ethnic origin or 
culture. Therefore, in Benhabib’s line of reasoning, citizenship education should be able to 
reflect on how the unity of reason can be reconciled with the diversity of life-forms and the 
acknowledgement of human agency. 
Iterative universalism and cosmopolitanism as democratic education organisers 
The above ideas are very helpful in thinking about citizenship education. However, Benhabib 
has not fully demonstrated how this idea of the human right to have rights might be 
actualised, for instance that of communicative freedom, and how such dialogues can be 
enhanced in the education system. It could be argued that what Benhabib is suggesting is 
difficult to implement in Africa in order to reform both education and constitutions, since 
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much of the continent is still struggling with the legacies of colonialism, tribalism and racism. 
However, her attempts to deal with real-life issues that dig deep into human agency, identity 
and human rights create some sense of optimism for Africa. 
To summarise this section, it can be argued that, despite the presence of different theoretical 
perceptions of liberal democratic citizenship education, the liberal theorists, as discussed 
above, illustrate how educational developments involve more that egocentric aims, and that 
each of them is driven by realities and ideals for practising justice for all humanity. In this 
regard, their argumentations for justice are governed by negotiation, deliberation, discussions, 
rationality, justice as fairness and the recognition of individual rights and a collective sense of 
belonging, amongst others. These discussions also recognise the diversity of ideas and 
promote reflexivity, respect, reciprocity and recognition of the value of our common 
humanity in attaining justice in the public sphere. The section that follows is a synthesis of 
these theories and how they are complementary in constructing a defensible understanding of 
democratic citizenship education.  
From the above it is apparent that the points from which Habermas, Rawls and Benhabib 
enter into their arguments and discussions on deliberative democracy differ; however, they all 
formulate important concepts unique to their own perspectives, and they all develop different 
arguments that open up spaces for reconsidering deliberative democracy. Despite the fact that 
Habermas, Rawls and Benhabib wrote during different time periods and contexts, they offer 
unique interpretations that place emphasis on public reason, communicative freedom and 
democratic iteration, yet these perspectives are complementary and offer a vocabulary for 
human interaction, engagement and a sense of belonging. Benhabib’s understanding draws on 
both Rawls’s and Habermas’s thoughts on communication and opens areas for 
communicative freedom that propagates moral respect for one another’s capacity to disagree. 
In turn, this opens up more areas for current discourses, which include human agency and 
identity in times of conflict in society. It also is paramount that Benhabib brings to focus 
global influences and concerns. Benhabib (2011a) calls for a cosmopolitan imagination in 
rethinking deliberative democracy and the right to have rights in engendering human agency.  
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2.3.4. Synthesising Public Reason, Communicative Rationality and 
Democratic Iteration toward Democratic Citizenship Education  
This synthesis (of public reason, communicative rationality and democratic iteration) 
signifies the growth of an encompassing version of democratic citizenship education. Thus, a 
new form is emerging from various historical developments of democratic evaluations to 
produce a more vibrant notion suitable for DCE that will challenge the experiences and socio-
economic problems that we currently face. Researching African citizenship education has 
become more complex and prompts a synthesis of various global standpoints to deal with 
societal problems. If the conception of DCE I perceive is to address Africa’s prevailing socio-
political and economic anomalies and imbalances, then a hybrid of theories within a 
democratic sphere could lead to a nuanced conception of DCE. I am not campaigning for an 
absolute notion of DCE, but rather for creating a normative platform from which steps can be 
taken to fathom the delicacy of this notion of DCE and the urgency of it in our educational 
cycles, and especially in the African context. 
This section begins with the premise that any form of education rests on moral 
presuppositions relating to the way we conceive the purposes of education. Those who argue 
in favour of democratic citizenship education use the language of justice, freedom, liberty 
and rights, amongst others. In order to make sense of the interpretations of and justifications 
for DCE and to be able to judge between them, I examined the structure of moral 
argumentation for democracy, education and citizenship. This helped in the development of a 
conceptual framework enabling me to judge between competing moral educational positions 
in Kenya. The conceptualisation of educational concepts as conceived in this dissertation 
rests on moral presuppositions that have to do with the way we conceive of the purposes of 
education. The theorists discussed in this chapter use the language of public reason in 
relation to ‘duty’, ‘rights’, ‘freedom’, ‘equal liberty’, ‘respect’, ‘redress’ and principles of 
justice (Rawls, 1971); communicative rationality in relation to ‘cognitive abilities’, 
‘understanding’, ‘speaking’, ‘hearing’, ‘understanding’, ‘illocutionary and elocutionary 
effects’ and ‘interaction’; democratic iteration in relation to the ‘right to have rights’ and 
‘cosmopolitanism’, ‘reflexivity’ and ‘hospitality’, to mention but a few. 
To make sense of different interpretations and analyses of some of the philosophical 
understandings of DCE, and to be able to judge between them, I need to examine the 
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structure of moral arguments and develop a conceptual framework that will enable us to 
judge between competing moral and philosophical positions. First, in order to do this, I used 
John Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness as a concept to validate the public reason in DCE. 
Second, I used Habermas’s theory of communicative action to validate communicative 
rationality in conceptualising DCE. Third, I used Benhabib’s notion of democratic iteration 
that validates our common humanity and rights to advance universality and cosmopolitanism 
in conceptualising DCE.  
Building on the aforementioned analyses and critique, various authors have argued for the 
persistence of various features that characterise democratic citizenship education, but do not 
deny the transformative form of deliberative and iterative forms of democratic citizenship 
education. The pursuit of constructing a nuanced conception of democratic citizenship 
education is almost an impossible endeavour. As in the work of Derrida (Biesta, 2009:16), 
this pursuit is enhanced by the relationship between the impossibilities and the possibilities 
that are not yet known. Additionally, for Derrida, the very experience of the impossible 
creates space for the other, which is possible. This means that, although the very act of trying 
to create a defensible notion of democratic citizenship education up to this point seems 
almost impossible, the very presence of the theoretical attempt in redefining and 
reconstructing this notion is a worthy course. Many scholars have trod this space of 
impossibilities by trying to conceptualise DCE, but have only contributed to what we could 
refer to as a ‘one-dimensional view’ of democratic citizenship education.  
Therefore, the theorisations that are offered by Rawls, Habermas and Benhabib open the 
spaces for these iterations. In the analysis above (sections 2.3.1, 2.3.2 and 2.3.3), it is evident 
that certain concepts emerge strongly in the construction of a democratic citizenship 
education. Such notions include deliberation, rights, freedom, law/order, constitution, 
agreement/consensus, communication, cultural diversity, society, citizens, institutions, 
rationality, justice, fairness, recognition, difference, distribution, discussions, globalisation, 
cooperation, person, human dignity, rationality and conceptualisation. There seems to be an 
interplay between these concepts. However, there appear to be significant differences in 
approach and departure in arguments presented by the theorists above. These significant 
differences also lie in the approach of the philosophical tradition followed, the emphasis of 
each one of them, as well as the contexts in which the concepts were generated. For instance, 
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Rawls focused on justice, Habermas emphasises communication and rationality, while 
Benhabib focuses on the universality of rights and identity.  
The origin of Rawls’s argument can be traced to the works of Kant, Rousseau and Locke, 
who put emphasis on justice, equality, law and contractual consensus. Rawls’s reflective 
equilibrium and principles of justice also presuppose the possibility of moral deliberation in 
justice as fairness. I see Rawls’s theory of justice as an ongoing process, a circular process 
that does not have an end, in that when deliberation has been done, new ideas are co-opted 
temporarily until other new ideas or opinions emerge from or negate or are stronger than 
existing ones. This leaves the question why we must be concerned with justice at all. In 
keeping with Derrida’s hyperbolic description of justice as embodied meaning, this question 
suggests that there is something in us that longs for justice. As such one cannot give up the 
institution of justice in that one must work on this institution to make it better to work 
towards [a better] justice that is not yet known (Biesta, 2009:30). That is to say, the 
relationship between the impossibilities of justice and the possibilities of injustice prompts 
the quest for a form of justice that is as yet excluded, a form of justice that will deal with the 
injustices that are experienced in society. The clue to Derrida’s answer to my question on 
why we should be concerned with justice lies in the contentions that justice is always directed 
towards the other – that is, it is in ‘relation to the other’, the ‘other’ that is not yet known. 
Thus, the very possibility of justice is sustained by its impossibility (Biesta, 2009) – and it is 
this that triggers the continuous search for justice in which education plays an important role. 
Similarly, Habermas was inspired by Luckac’s history of class consciousness and by 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s dialectic of Enlightenment (Horster, 1992:5). His argument is 
drawn from the traditions of Weber, Mead, Durkheim and Parsons, as well as Marxism. His 
theory revolves around transformational democracy through communicative action (Elster, 
1998:1). Thus, for Habermas, ideal speech is conceived of as permeating deliberation within 
a rational approach to mutual understanding and agreement in order to instil justice for all. 
For this reason I see these theories as complementary to one another in leading to a more 
concrete notion of democratic citizenship education. That is to say, even procedural law 
and/or justice require ideal speech situations in which deliberation may take place. Education 
for citizens needs both Rawls’s public reason and Habermas’s communicative rationality to 
frame engagement, human interaction and a sense of belonging.  
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It is at this level that Benhabib’s views of democratic iteration on universal rights and 
cosmopolitanism have connotations that would help enhance engagement, human interaction 
and a sense of belonging. For Benhabib (2011a:2), ‘cosmopolitanism involves the recognition 
that human beings are moral persons equally entitled to legal protection in virtue of rights 
that accrue to them not as nationals, or of an ethnic group, but as human beings’. Benhabib 
defends the justificatory universalism of human rights on account that it is non-essentialist, 
non-reductionist and deeply implicated in the democratic project.  
Benhabib (2011a) focuses on an explanation of how current progress in human rights law and 
cosmopolitan norms misinterprets the effects of how justice is generated. Laws on human 
rights should open spaces for new actors, such as women and ethnic, linguistic and religious 
minorities to develop new vocabularies of public claim-making to anticipate new forms of 
justice in processes of democratic iterations. That is, the development of human rights laws 
should enable the minority to freely express and associate as individual beings whose 
legitimacy is evident. Democratic iteration is reflective in nature in that it enables actors to 
empirically import or understand macro-processes and the mainstream discourses that 
provide criteria for communicative ethics.  
It is important to note that Rawls, Habermas and Benhabib advance democratic deliberation 
as a process of education. They advance the conception of the public sphere through rational 
argumentation, respect of diversity and of humanity in order to advance the democracy of 
citizens. What make these philosophies ideal for education are their origins and contexts in 
which human experiences, injustice, marginalisation and exclusion have characterised society 
and engendered a demand for complementary lines of argument that would lead to a 
reconstruction of education to deal with societal problems. 
Democratic citizenship education as depicted in the analyses conducted in this chapter should 
embrace notions of deliberative democracy among free and equal citizens. This deliberation 
is viewed as transformational, as is evident both in Rawls’s theory of justice and Habermas’s 
communicative action. Both Rawls and Habermas agree that this process involves collective 
decision making with the participation of all who are stakeholders and are affected by the 
decision making at hand. They also agree that there needs to be some form of a consensus to 
reach a collective agreement. The difference between their views is that one is prescriptive on 
how the agreement is reached, while the other calls for a constructive agreement that is 
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generated through deliberation. Rawls’s A Theory of Justice therefore is of essence in 
generating rules/laws for institutions, while, for Habermas, communicative freedom is the 
highlight in which individual input and rationality play a key role in how decisions are made. 
Habermas’s focus is on the fact that the communication process enables an understanding 
that would lead to some form of action. 
These forms of deliberative democracy are reinforced by Benhabib’s (2011a:3) cosmopolitan 
approach to democratic iterations regarding human rights. This focuses on the importance of 
human rights in the conflicts between democracy and cosmopolitanism, observing that the 
world has porous borders and that their closure requires democratic sovereignty. Benhabib 
creates a sense of a global world, in contrast to nationalistic views of closed borders. Thus, 
she contends in this view of citizenship education that the ‘injustices done in one part of the 
world would be felt by all’ (Benhabib, 2011a:7). She sees the creation of a new world legal 
order and a public sphere in which human beings are eligible to have rights owing to their 
humanity alone, and not by virtue of their race, ethnic group or nationality. Cosmopolitanism 
creates justice that is generated to allow new space in which the minority groups, viz. women 
and ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities, will be able to enter the public sphere to develop 
new vocabularies towards justice in order to propagate democratic interactions. It also is 
argued that the plurality of human beings demands more creative ways of inclusion. 
Democratic citizenship education from this view looks at the global factors that influence 
education and seeks to reverse the ills imposed on countries, ethnic groups and women, 
amongst others. This demands that education go beyond national borders. 
2.4. Summary 
In this chapter I have analysed and examined the different threads of liberal thought on DCE. 
Rawls’s theory of justice describes how public reason enables people to interact, engage with 
and locate themselves in relation to others – a matter of cultivating a community of public 
reasoners. Habermas’s communicative action explicates how communicative rationality can 
emancipate individuals’ capacity to participate in public decision making. Habermas shows 
how language, cognition and inclusion can create understanding and a sense of belonging. 
Benhabib’s democratic iteration illustrates how recognising individual rights enables 
individuals to engage in cosmopolitan debates and find their voices in global discussions.  
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I described how each of these theories invokes the notion of equality, justice, fairness, 
communication, human rights, human agency, cultural values, importance of respect and 
deliberation in a pluralistic and diverse society in relation to public decision making. 
Thereafter, I indicated that these liberal theories articulate, in different ways, how decision 
making is vital through inclusion and reasoning, while considering factors of justice in the 
context of different views, societies and capabilities. I also demonstrated how the views of 
Rawls, Habermas and Benhabib differ in their argumentation and how they complement each 
other, and how their various philosophical backgrounds influenced how each of these 
theorists articulated their arguments. 
I have delineated how these threads of arguments can be synthesised in an effort to better 
conceptualise democratic citizenship education. Thus, the concepts of education as depicted 
by educational theorists may be integrated with the moral arguments presented. I argued in 
this chapter that a clearer understanding of DCE could provide education systems with spaces 
that are conducive for decision making, learning and teaching opportunities that require an 
understanding of DCE in order to advance collective deliberation among the stakeholders in 
the education system. In essence, DCE involves human interactions that are constituted by 
rationality and cultivate a sense of belonging for the purpose of justice for all individuals.  
In the next chapter I shall explore the state of democratic citizenship education in Kenya in 
relation to equality, freedom, the rule of law, human rights, access, governance and quality in 
education. I believe that doing this will enable a better determination of the relationships 
between liberal democratic citizenship education and the influence it may have on the 
Kenyan education system.  
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  Chapter Three
HIGHER EDUCATION IN KENYA: CONCEPTIONS OF 
DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION 
3.1. Preamble and Introduction 
What this chapter attempted to do is show that higher education policy documents in Kenya 
are silent about issues of DCE and more silent about recognition of diversity as an important 
facet of a just education system. If higher education is so mute on the relevance of its 
education society it seems improbable for such policy texts to address real societal concerns. 
Of course the question can be asked if this is the task of higher education. Not necessarily, 
but if the conditions are not conducive to higher learning then policies would not mean much. 
I am not suggesting that higher education is a panacea (cure) for societal dilemmas such as 
violence. But for higher education to unfold openly and freely conditions will have to be in 
place to effect higher education. Therefore, this dissertation is an attempt to argue that an 
extended view of DCE can contribute towards cultivating non-coercive and non-violent 
society – if people are initiated into such discourses they can positively influence societal 
development. Also, liberal view of DCE might not be sufficient to address the weakness and 
challenges society and within policy texts therefore, my argument is to extend the view to 
what is still in becoming. It is about what can still potentially happen. 
Based on the review of education policy documents [texts] and research published on higher 
education in Kenya [policy as discourse], there is commitment towards a number of 
important elements for democratic citizenship education (DCE), inter alia: national 
development, national unity, socio-economic development, social justice, preparing and 
equipping the youth with the skills necessary for a collective role using their individual 
talents and for personality development, and fostering and developing cultural awareness and 
international consciousness. However, the policy documents indicate that partner policies are 
weak in planning for democratic citizenship in the light of ethnic bias, conflict management 
and ethnic violence (i.e. innovation). In addition, there is a notable lack of recognition and 
promotion of an alternative understanding of citizenship that enhances and equips university 
graduates with critical and creative abilities to engage and participate in public collectivities 
so as to exercise equal opportunities, freedoms and pluralism that can deal with ethnic 
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violence (i.e. towards community management). These appear to be areas in which additional 
innovation and reconceptualisation are needed to re-imagine and improve sustainable 
education towards ethnic violence – pedagogy out of bounds (Waghid, 2014) and 
cosmopolitan education. 
Qualitative document analysis [policy texts] and conceptual analysis guided me in analysing 
written documents in a rigorous and systematic way. As with all forms of research, the 
findings from analysing policy documents for instances of democratic citizenship are 
substantiated with other sources of information, including feedback from other policy 
documents, discourse on policy in higher education in Kenya, and the philosophical 
frameworks [theoretical] I developed in Chapter 2. This chapter also draws from the 
abundance of historical, political, economic-demographic and socio-cultural sources to 
analyse the values and philosophical underpinnings that inform policy in higher education in 
Kenya (Ball, 2006:51; Oucho, 2002:105). Qualitative document analysis and conceptual 
analysis are approaches that helped me to refine my understanding of the education policies 
in Kenya and the practices towards democratic citizenry. In selecting such policies I paid 
particular attention to policy documents that enabled me to gather data about the trends in 
education policy in the Kenyan higher education sector that promote democratic citizenship 
education (DCE). This is in line with Ball’s (2006:45) submission that policies are changed 
over time by different actors, and represent and interpret a particular timeframe in history. 
This is a trend I discovered in the Kenyan case. For this reason, policy as texts sometimes is 
never read individually, but in relation to historical and current patterns – such negligence 
results in an enactment of policies on the basis of confusion. To avoid such flaws I collected 
multiple documents from the Kenyan national archive [primary sources], online sources, 
databases and books, all of which reflect the historical and current trends in Kenya, to 
supplement and ensure the validity of my analysis. The key areas I articulate in my analysis 
are concerned with liberal democratic citizenship education. More specifically, I draw 
attention to notions of equality, public deliberation, cosmopolitan education, access, 
governance and the philosophical frameworks of the policies, amongst others. All 
conclusions drawn in this chapter are based on the analysed documents [policy texts] and 
policy discourses in Kenya in relation to the three liberal strands [theoretical framework] 
discussed in Chapter 2. The theoretical framework discussed in Chapter 2 provides this 
research with the language, concepts and vocabulary that are available in democratic 
citizenship education. I consider Ball’s (2006:2) suggestion that theory should not dictate 
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entirely and constrain our thinking in policy analysis, but that it should provide the tools for 
policy analysis. He notes that theory sometimes can be constructive and invigorating, but it 
can also be violent and destructive; however, it plays a major role in breaking unproductive 
traditions. 
In addition, Ball (2006:44) clarifies that analysing, interpreting and translating policy are 
complex processes. As such, the fundamental recognition here is that textual policy is not 
necessarily clear or closed or complete, but is a result of negotiations at various stages, 
influenced by particular agendas and voices. This may provide insufficient meaning for 
public interpretation, and is notably true, especially in Kenya, where certain individuals were 
appointed to commissions to decide on and write policy texts, in many instances with 
political agendas. Even though there was an indication that public engagement was 
employed, the majority of citizens were excluded from the negotiations and also from the 
‘writerly’ aspects of the policies. 
Chege (2006c) maintains that, for one to understand what is wrong with higher education in 
any country, the philosophical framework that informs the education system needs to be 
scrutinised – particularly to examine the values that govern the education system. In this 
context, this chapter employs the three liberal strands on DCE that were discussed in Chapter 
2 to analyse and re-think higher education in Kenya in order to address the current challenges 
facing the country. As a result, I analyse the education policy informing the system of higher 
education, as well as its socio-political and economic features. 
Citizenship education in Kenya has developed as a form of political socialisation from 
colonial rule to independent Kenya. Citizenship education in independent Kenya stems from 
the local framework of national education, which is comparable to the ‘Kenyanisation’ of 
education through the adoption of democracy as a component of educational policy in the 
framing of national policies in education to advance national identity and national unity 
(Eshiwani, 1990; Luescher-Mamshela et al., 2011:xvii; Ogot, 1995b; Republic of Kenya, 
1964; 1976; 1981; 1999). The major objectives of education for democratic citizenship 
include ‘political equality, religious freedom, promotion of cultural heritage, social justice, 
freedom from want, disease and ignorance, human dignity including freedom of conscience, 
equal opportunity for all citizens, and equal distribution of income’ (Republic of Kenya, 
1981:5).  
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Higher education in Kenya refers to the level of education that follows on secondary 
education (Boit & Kipkoech, 2012; Republic of Kenya 1999:297). In Kenya, universities are 
often considered by the government as the peak of higher education. Ogot (2002:647) notes 
that, traditionally, universities have three major functions: a) to transmit knowledge and 
values from generation to generation through effective teaching; b) to discover new 
knowledge through research; and c) to serve their societies by participating in various forms 
of extension programmes. Hence my focus on higher education in Kenya in this dissertation 
will refer entirely to university education (Boit & Kipkoech, 2012). This focus on higher 
education is rooted in the premise that an independent scholarly community sustained by 
resilient universities can heighten a healthy and unwavering democracy. The universities’ 
immersion in research, knowledgeable leadership and the development of successive 
generations of engaged citizens would nurture social, political and economic transformation 
in Africa (Berresford & Rodin, 2007:xvi).  
Berresford and Rodin (2007:1), as well as Chege (2006c:8), note that higher education has 
experienced challenges that are related to historical, political, economic and social instability 
in Africa. More specific are the challenges faced by the academic faculties in the universities 
and the pressure on them to continuously review the curricula and content for subjects taught 
at universities in order to keep abreast of an ever-changing body of knowledge (Republic of 
Kenya, 1999:308). However, Berresford and Rodin (2007:1) indicate that drastic structural 
adjustments, the introduction of democracy, regionalised politics and economic liberalisation 
have brought stability to Kenya. Subsequently, the new cohort of leadership in Kenya has 
stepped forward to re-examine a vision for higher education institutions, stirring confidence 
among all those involved. Another reason for considering university education in Kenya is 
because this level of education is considered to be the motivating force behind scholarship in 
the search for truth relating to the major problems of concern to human society, as well as the 
search for solutions to these problems (Republic of Kenya, 1981:32). Kenyan university 
education is viewed by the Mackay Commission as ‘a place where intellectualism is 
cultivated, a place where the training of rational men and women of good character, with 
creative minds and strong convictions, as well as critical reasoning abilities, is pursued, and 
an institution where general culture of human society including ideas concerning the world, 
the universe and man is developed, promoted, and radiated’ (Republic of Kenya, 1981:32). 
The Kenyan government established five universities, namely; Moi University near Eldoret in 
1981, as the second university to be developed from the Mackay Report; Kenyatta 
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University, established in 1985, which is located on the outskirts of Nairobi; Jomo Kenyatta 
University of Agriculture and Technology, situated in northwest Nairobi, became a fully-
fledged university in 1994; Egerton University, located close to Nakuru, which was founded 
in 1987; and Maseno, which became a full university in 2000.
9
 These universities have 
experienced expansion and now aim to promote and improve equity, economic development 
and skilled manpower. During the period between 1985 and 1990, Kenya experienced an 
unplanned expansion of public university education, from a single dominant university to 
having two universities and two university colleges. 
It can be assumed that the aforementioned core developmental issues are not yet fully realised 
and still may bar the course of Kenyan projects toward sustainable democratic citizenship 
education and national development. This is particularly so with the focus on how the 
concepts of human interaction, a sense of belonging and public reason are depicted in Kenyan 
higher education to deal with freedoms, equal distribution of public goods and the overall 
improvement of university education and quality of life of citizens.  
This analysis concentrates on two sets of arguments: first are the hegemonic notions 
sustaining the colonial education legacy and independent governance; and second are the 
contemporary claims espousing regional politics/ethnic politics, historical and cultural 
factors, the economic players and their influence on higher education in Kenya. In this 
chapter the links between a liberal democratic conception of citizenship education and higher 
education policy texts and discourses in Kenya guided the analysis.  
A historical snapshot illustrates how the development of Kenya into a nation-state is 
characterised by collectivities, ranging from organised groups to groups merged on the basis 
of ethnic sympathy as well as political position, which provides constructive insight into the 
country’s traditions (Ochieng, 1995; Ogot, 1995a; Oucho, 2002). An analysis of the major 
educational policies and how they have influenced the democratic citizenship processes will 
highlight the state of university education in Kenya. This way of thinking will help explicate 
the concept of democratic university education and its underlying influences on the Kenyan 
citizenry and national development (Eshiwani, 1990; Falola & Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002; 
Luescher-Mamashela et al., 2011; Mwiria et al., 2007; Oucho, 2002). In the next section I 
                                                 
9
 For further details on and a description of each university, see Mwiria et al. (2007:15). Here I want to just 
highlight the main Kenyan universities in order to set the scene to talk about the reforms. 
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shall review colonial and post-colonial education, after which I pay more attention to post-
colonial educational policies that highlight the development of higher education in Kenya.  
3.2. Colonial Education, Citizenship, Human Rights and Plural 
Culture  
Apprehension about democratic citizenship education in Kenya can be traced to the colonial 
epochs. Colonial education wanted to educate Africans to achieve liberal democracy, yet the 
education system was restrictive and limited access to proper education (Wainaina, Arnot & 
Chege, 2011:180). This section examines colonial education in Kenya to determine the 
foundations and nature of democratic citizenship for progression in the formulation of higher 
education thus far. In addition, this section also exposes the colonial legacies that influence 
democracy in Kenya today. McCulloch (1994:9) notes that some historical encounters 
(colonial ones) have deep-seated influences on the present political, socio-economic and 
educational developments in Kenya. A scrutiny of the nature of democracy in its historicity 
[historical context] will enable a reflexivity that is helpful in the diagnosis of the democratic 
conception of education in Kenya to date.  
Colonial education may have denied Africans in Kenya a sense of community, freedom of 
speech and equal opportunity to participate in building the nation. Colonial education was 
racially segregated into white, Asian and black schools (Republic of Kenya, 1976:xiii). The 
system regarded Africans as inferior beings – an African adult brain was regarded as 
equivalent to that of a seven- or eight-year-old white child, and for this reason education was 
structured in such a way that it did not strain the African brain (Republic of Kenya, 1976:xiii; 
Wallbank, 1938:251). Africans were viewed as having less intellectual capacity; therefore 
limited educational aims were projected in training teachers to teach what was necessary. In 
this sense, colonial education was structured so as to stereotype and dehumanise Africans in 
order to locate the imperialist (colonialist) as a superior race (Chege, 2009:55; Eshiwani, 
1990:3; Wallbank, 1938). 
Colonisation in Kenya lasted from 1895 to 1963 (Chege, 2009:55; Ochieng & Atieno-
Odhiambo, 1995:xiv). It aimed to civilise Africans and capture the land, along with the 
people, so that the colonisers would have power over the raw material and manpower for the 
economic prosperity of the countries from which the colonial masters originated (Wallbank, 
1938). For the British to achieve this, they formulated education for Kenyans to suit their 
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oppressive needs. In this regard, the education system promoted the learning of 
practical/vocational skills to provide cheap labour for the colonial industries and to sustain 
colonial interests (Boit & Kipkoech, 2012:34; Chege, 2009; Wallbank, 1938; Yakaboski & 
Nolan, 2011:2). 
The colonial education for the Africans (Kenyans) equipped them to obey the instructions of 
the coloniser so that they would be suppressed and subordinate. The system ensured that 
Kenyans were not encouraged to question the operations of the colonial masters (Chege, 
2009:56). In addition, the education was constructed in a particular way to improve the 
practical skills and attributes of Kenyans so that they could be productive in ways that were 
determined by the colonisers. In a sense, Kenyans had no freedom of choice and equal rights 
to education. Kenyans were denied their sense of community. Colonialism divided Africans 
in such a way that ethnic differences were manipulated to keep the various communities apart 
so that the British would not face resistance from solidarity among the Africans and therefore 
could rule (Eshiwani, 1990:3). The Africans viewed colonial education as materialistic, since 
for them to be educated assured them of material gain; Africans therefore went to school to 
copy the European lifestyle, which was viewed as a personal achievement. This kind of 
education does not display the kind of human interaction that Habermas’s inter-subjective 
sense of belonging in communication among humans as equals suggests. It does not show 
how a sense of belonging to the human community displays the right to have rights, 
especially rendering equal opportunities for Kenyan African to choose the kind of education 
they needed for the integration of their voices. Colonial education denied Africans higher 
education – an education system that could bring out their potential and enhance their critical 
thinking abilities. As a result, Habermas’s, Rawls’s and Benhabib’s perspectives on 
democratic education that prepares citizens for cultivating their capacities were not 
cultivated.  
Kenya’s system of African education was entrusted to the missionaries. The major focus of 
this education was on building character and discipline (Chege, 2009:56; Muricho & 
Chang’ach, 2013:218; Wallbank, 1938:525; Wamagatta, 2008:3). This kind of emphasis was 
to ensure that all Africans were educated to weaken tribal beliefs and train people so that they 
would not to question the political system and would be obedient to instructions – this meant 
blind patriotism (Wallbank, 1938:526). The criteria determining access to colonial 
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institutions also bore similar restrictive characteristics. For instance, the 7-4-2-3
10
 system of 
education restricted students to spending seven years in primary school, four years in 
secondary school and two years in advanced secondary, and then three in a higher education 
programme. This system of education continued in Kenya even after independence, until the 
year 1980. The 7-4-2-3 system of education was controlled by strict policies and entrance 
examinations and high school fees, which meant Kenyan Africans were kept out of the higher 
education system (Republic of Kenya, 1965:21; Yakaboski & Nolan, 2011:3), since they 
could not afford to pay. Many dropped out of school after lower levels of learning to work in 
manual labour jobs. This resulted in access problems in higher education, which still is the 
case today.  
Higher education in colonial days had limited projections and objectives for education. 
Education for Africans was limited to teaching them what they could do as labourers on the 
white highland farms (Wallbank, 1938:521). Africans were denied equal opportunities to own 
property. Only their white counterparts could have land. In this regard there was no use for 
training Africans to become modern farmers, since they could not be farmers in their own 
homeland (Republic of Kenya, 1964:22; Wallbank, 1938:524). It was only in the teaching 
profession that African voices were heard. There was no form of education formulated to 
help Africans enter other professional fields. Thus, African education was limited. 
Colonial education was accompanied by intolerance. This is because religious attitudes were 
used to shape African education and neglect the tribal components that created cohesion 
among them. As such, Christianity was introduced to abolish African culture, leaving the 
African natives alienated from their own way of life and respect. Considerations of 
differences in religion and culture were not considered in colonial African education 
(Republic of Kenya, 1965:24). In this regard, religion and missionaries played a major role in 
teaching and propagating morality and discipline in the schools. This does not mean that 
missionary schools were used entirely for manipulative purposes, but what was initially 
intended for the purposes of spiritual development was rapidly used as a tool for colonisation. 
As such, freedom of speech in schools was non-negotiable and Kenyans who attended 
                                                 
10
 This is the old structure of education – seven years’ primary education, four years’ secondary education, two 
years’ higher education and three years’ minimum university education. Insufficient technical education was 
provided at the primary, secondary and higher levels and the amount of success at each level was based on an 
examination, which took little or no consideration of a child’s progressive growth at school. The system relied 
mostly on rote learning and memorisation (Republic of Kenya, 1984:v).  
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mission schools were to adhere strictly to what they were told by the nuns who managed the 
schools. Subsequently, students were not permitted to ask questions, even if there was a need 
for them to do so, and they were to take instructions as delivered by the nuns (Muingai, 
2002:5). Muingai (2002:4), who experienced this kind of education, recalls: 
In the 18
th
 Century formal schools were established in Kenya by the church missionary 
society at Rabai near Mombasa in the Coast province. This was the start of formal western 
education in Kenya. Schools were started as a means of Christian evangelism but later 
developed to be an instrument to produce skilled labour for the white settlers, farms and 
clerks for the colonial administration. 
British education forced new identities upon Kenyans, states Muingai (2002:3): 
With the British control all Kenyans felt the need to identify with what was considered to be 
Western or British and to sacrifice a lot of cultural and traditional beliefs that our forefathers 
had taught the younger generation ... Changing of names to acquire British identities because 
the African names were so difficult to pronounce the British changed African names, this 
brought about identity crisis in the sense that one had to bear different names while at school 
and another while at home. So one had to be two different people at different locations 
because of education.... 
When Muingai (2002) returned home from boarding school, she found it very difficult to fit 
in at her own home. Education during the colonial period led to some forms of alienation in 
that Kenyans lost their identities as a result of the colonial manipulation. Colonial educators 
did not consider Kenyans as a people who had a particular way of life. They did not take time 
to learn the African way of life, nor to see them as humans who had potential. In consequence 
of this, they imposed their culture on Africans without any consideration of the Africans’ 
culture or sense of humanity. Muingai’s (2002) experience exemplifies this, as her name was 
changed for the purpose of making the life of the coloniser easier. Although this does not 
mean that there was nothing good in colonial education, what I want to emphasise is the fact 
that colonial education, inasmuch as it had a goal to civilise Africans, did not take certain 
contexts into consideration; for instance, the fact that Africans had communicative potential 
and could reason for their voices to be heard. The British colonialists wanted to bring their 
own kind of education into Africa, but only in a limited form to train human resources for 
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their own industries and to build their own colonies without maximising the African 
potential.  
The foundations of higher education in Kenya can be traced back to Makerere University in 
Uganda, which was founded in 1922 during British colonial rule as a technical college for 
African students from the East African countries of Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. The 
universities at this time focused mostly on teacher training, carpentry, building technology, 
motor mechanics, medical care, agriculture and veterinary services. Makerere University 
became a university of East Africa offering degrees from the University of London. 
The first Kenyan higher education institution was the Royal Technical College of East Africa, 
which was established in 1956 to provide instruction leading to a higher national certificate 
offered in Britain and to prepare matriculated students for full-time study at university. The 
Technical College became a university in 1961. Due to nationalistic pressure from Kenya and 
Uganda, the University of East Africa was dissolved and three different universities were 
established in Kenya and Tanzania. In Kenya, the University College of Nairobi became the 
University of Nairobi – the first public university in Kenya.  
Enough has been said to show that colonial education denied Africans (in Kenya) a sense of 
belonging, communicative freedom, and equal rights to education and public engagement in 
developing the nation. This is explicated in the racially segregated education that toned down 
African education to the production of manual labourers. The next section provides an 
analysis of post-colonial education. 
3.3. Post-Colonial Education, Citizenship and Democracy 
Post-colonial education followed shortly after World War 2, when African leaders realised 
that the prevailing western colonialism was seriously undermining and destroying the African 
social infrastructure and humanistic traditional values (Bell, 2002:37). Africans, including 
Kenyans, needed to reclaim their identity, independence and governance. They needed to 
regain their sense of belonging to African humanism. In doing this, Kenya held on to the 
ideology of political socialism to plan the nation, including her education system. African 
traditions, culture and ways of life had been really battered and this brought about a yearning 
for an emotive attachment to the kind of freedom Kenyans longed to achieve (Bell, 2002:39; 
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Maxon, 1995:126). There also was a need for Kenyans to revive their sense of human dignity 
and the relevance of the Kenyan cultural heritage. Cultural heritage refers to ‘[a] unique way 
of life peculiar to a people, encompassing social institutions, values, norms and ethics as well 
as attire and various forms of artistic and literary expression’ (Maxon, 1995:139). It was 
pictured that independence would provide Kenyans with the space to express their autonomy, 
their unique diversity, their artefacts, songs, art, dance, theatre, literature and other traditions. 
Western humanism emphasises liberation and education, while African humanism is rooted 
in traditional values of mutual respect and a sense of position in the social, natural and 
cosmic order and dependence on community (Bell, 2002:40; Gyekye, 1995:47). Human 
dignity and welfare are core concerns of post-colonial education. 
In the same vein, this section attempts to situate citizenship education in universities in 
Kenya after independence – the period from 1963 to date. Earlier I defined citizenship 
education as comprising three interrelated concepts, namely a sense of belonging, human 
interaction and public reasoning [refer to Chapter 2]. Citizenship as a sense of belonging is 
concerned with collectivities that create a feeling of belonging. Human interaction denotes 
free and equal opportunities for individuals to participate in learning; and public reasoning 
means being able to engage with the other in a [cognitive] rational argumentative manner to 
persuade, convince and enable others to reach a consensus about a particular issue of public 
interest. In Chapter 2 I examined how Rawls illustrates the above components of DCE. 
Rawlsian citizenship education depicts a procedural manner for developing justice as 
fairness, and encapsulates certain principles of justice for public engagement in developing 
policies, rules and laws for public education. Also illustrated was Habermas’s theory of 
communicative action, which embraces teleological encounters to reach an understanding in 
developing educational concerns in the public sphere. Most significant was Habermas’s idea 
of a communicative act as a means of solving the problems of public education. Another 
perspective was Benhabib’s ideas on democratic iteration – talking back as a means of 
reflexive dialogue in resolving human rights issues, including cosmopolitan imagination for 
conceptualising citizenship in both private and public education. Benhabib’s idea of talking 
back is ideal for democratic education. Accordingly, I will examine how education policy in 
Kenya resembles or differs from the conceptualisation of liberal DCE. 
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Earlier education policy documents in Kenya illustrate that university education focused on 
socio-economic and manpower development to eradicate poverty, ignorance and disease 
(Republic of Kenya, 1976:83). In comparison to the current national policy on university 
education -University Act No. 42 of 2012- prominently recommend democratic education in 
the university. This policy document is a supplement Act in the Kenyan Gazette. In this 
document, education is described to achieve specific objectives such as: inclusion; promotion 
of equality of persons mostly with disability, minority and other marginalised groups; also is 
the realisation of national economic and social development;  promote highest standards in 
quality of teaching and research, fostering the capacity for critical thinking and promoting 
gender balance and equality, promoting cultural and social life of society and promotion of 
learning among student and society at large (Republic of Kenya, 2012).  However, following 
Cavell (1971), there is little wrong with an argument of assuming responsibility. In this light, 
participants in higher education should be held responsible for their capabilities to change 
societal impediments to higher education like violence.   
The importance of such considerations becomes particularly evident when account is taken of 
the plurality within Kenyan society and the unfolding policies that have informed university 
education over time (Munene, 2013). Currently, the University Act of 2012 is a national act 
that guides universities in Kenya; however, each university has developed its own policies 
that guide it. The continuum found in the current national policy is a reflection of the values 
reflected in the Kenyan Vision 2030, which in turn contains a translation of NEPAD’s efforts 
towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals. 
The concept of citizenship is rooted in the idea of the individual as a participant in a 
democratic polity, and this requires an understanding and acceptance of human rights 
(Benhabib, 2011a; Habermas, 1987a; Osler & Starkey, 2000:4; Rawls, 1971). Human rights 
enable opportunities for decision making and social interaction in democratic societies, 
thereby encouraging the equality of all individuals as guided by the countries’ constitutions 
and policies. These legal statuses enable human dignity and fundamental freedoms, duties 
and responsibilities (Osler & Starkey, 2003:4; Rawls, 1971).  
Currently education policies in Kenya highlight inclusion, human rights, freedom of 
conscience, freedom from want, ignorance and disease, equality of opportunity, equal 
distribution of resources, social justice and human dignity (Republic of Kenya, 1965; 1981; 
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2012), yet the gap between the rich and the poor, who live without proper education, is 
alarming. Wawire et al. (2008:1) note that education plays an important role in equipping 
individuals with skills that enable them to participate fully as citizens in society. Their study 
reveals that, ‘[w]hile [the] Kenyan education system is designed to shape young people’s 
consciousness, varying schooling experiences based on socio-cultural and geographical 
divides determine the level to which they are able to enjoy their citizenship rights and see 
possibilities of achieving full citizenship’ (Wawire et al., 2008:1). This is a legacy that was 
inherited from the colonial education system, which segregated access to education along 
racial lines and at the same time divided Kenyans into separate geographical locations in 
order to rule (Eshiwani, 1990:18). 
Another problem that influenced the implementation of education policies in Kenya was the 
language problem, since English was introduced as the language used in academia and many 
hence students were disadvantaged. The curriculum inherited from colonial education had 
contents that did not relate to the needs of Africans. This led to the development of the 
Kenyan Institute of Education (KIE) to develop a relevant curriculum. This has also been 
problematic. However, the use of English as the language of instruction in Kenya has 
facilitated international relations and Kenyans therefore do not require course materials to be 
translated. 
Kenya’s higher education has gone through various transformations in its setting, policy and 
management, and even in the way universities are governed. The transformation process has 
posed several challenges to the access to and quality, relevance and expansion of higher 
education. Mwiria (2007:2-3) describes it as follows: 
From a policy perspective, issues of quality, relevance and employment were compounded by 
the confused state of legislation of governing universities. Each public university in Kenya 
had their own act, dating back to its date of foundation, but they are also affected by 
numerous pieces of sectorial legislation that created a situation in the ministry of education. 
Ministry of education was not the sole institution of government responsible for all matters of 
higher education. 
Consequently, the current policy on education targets key reform areas, namely: i) 
governance/management, ii) quality/relevance, iii) expansion/integration, iv) access/equity, 
v) financial/management, and vii) community service and engagement with society (Mwiria, 
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2007:3; Republic of Kenya, 2012). According to Mwiria (2007:33), members of the 
communities that made the earliest and more stable contacts with European settlers, 
missionaries and colonial authorities have enjoyed greater access to formal higher education 
opportunities than their counterparts in other regions, with students from arid and semi-arid 
areas being underrepresented in public universities. 
National Education, Identity and Conflicts 
By 1964, Kenya had developed a rationale for national education, which was based on the 
anomalies and imbalances that were generated by the colonial system of education. At this 
time, nationality was the basic and safe vocabulary that created a sense of belonging among 
Kenyans. On this foundation of independence [uhuru, literally meaning freedom in Swahili], 
the new Kenyan government was ripe with ideas about education for a new nation.  
Educational planning was anchored in the concepts and philosophy of African democratic 
socialism (Chege, 2009; Muingai, 2002:1; Ochieng, 1995:91; Republic of Kenya: 1964:1; 
1965). Based on democratic socialism, the education system was expected to lead to 
economic advantages for and the social advancement of all citizens. The principles that 
guided this process were to: ‘i) draw from the best of African traditions; ii) be adaptable to 
new and rapidly changing circumstances; and iii) not rest for its success on a satellite 
relationship with any other country or group countries’ (Republic of Kenya, 1964:3). 
Democratic education took the form of Africanisation from the traditional sense to provide a 
background in which education was to carry the task of creating a politically free and equal 
society in which respect is considered more highly than economic wealth.  
African education in Kenya during this period meant that education would draw from African 
traditions, with their essential ideas of mutual social responsibility and political democracy – 
where each member of society was equal in his/her political rights – and that no individual 
member or group was to be permitted to exert undue influence on the policies of the State. 
This idea seems to have arisen from the emotional abuse and torture that colonial Kenya 
experienced that denied Kenyans their sense of human dignity and potentialities to advance 
through formal education. 
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Based on the fact that colonial education manipulated wealth and did not allow Africans to 
have their own property, by 1964, the Kenyan government had endeavoured to create equal 
opportunities, rights and responsibilities, including the right to equal possession of property. 
Education was seen as a means that would aid the process, and as a redress process. On the 
achievement of independence, Kenyans recognised the need to build a national culture that 
would reflect and promote national unity, pride and patriotism (Maxon, 1995:126). There was 
a need to fix the erosion of Kenyans’ identity that had taken place during the colonial period 
and led to Kenyans being regarded as ‘primitive’ people. Next, I will briefly examine how 
democratic citizenship education is depicted in the various policies that guided education in 
higher learning. 
The contemporary policy guiding public higher Education in Kenya is found in Sessional 
Paper no. 14 of 2012 on reforming education and training (Republic of Kenya, 2012a). The 
philosophy that drives education in Kenya also aims to ‘instil patriotism, equality, honesty, 
mutual respect and high moral standards’ (Republic of Kenya, 2012b:18). Subsequently, 
present-day reforms and innovation in education in Kenya have encompassed free primary 
and secondary education, which have aided the country to achieve progress in reaching the 
goal of education for all, as depicted in the Millennium Development Goals. Presently, the 
reform focus in university education includes access, retention, equity, quality, relevance and 
the overall efficiency of the education sector. Indicators to attain such objectives should 
reflect on regional equality, demographic dynamics, macroeconomic performance and the 
elimination of poverty, as set out in the University Act No 42 of 2012 (Republic of Kenya, 
2012c). 
3.4. Setting the Agenda for Policy Analysis 
Policy is the formulation, endorsement and operation of a plan of action approved by law in 
the public or private sector (Bogenschneider & Corbett, 2010:3). Policy analysis is a 
combination of diverse concepts and theories. Examining policies requires an investigation of 
the macro-level policy and micro-level policy development, especially those aspects that 
entail feedback and the response of stakeholders to the enactment and implementation of 
policy (Ball, 2006:43). Ball (2006) highlights the complexity of policy analysis and admits 
that it is a messy process. Policy takes different forms and processes, inter alia rationalisation, 
dialogue and writing. Policy is not enacted from without, but is intertwined with the contrast 
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between structure and agency (Ball, 2006:43). Ball’s perspective brings to the fore the 
understanding of policy analysis as a contested terrain that ranges between policy as a text 
and policy as a discourse, and the impact and effects it creates. In keeping with this 
understanding, the analysis will consider textual and discourse policy to provide a thick 
description. 
Rizvi and Lingard (2010:45) note that there is no recipe for carrying out policy analysis in 
education. They suggest that an appropriate approach to policy analysis would depend on 
where it is developed and the nature and kind of policy being analysed. I will analyse 
educational policies in Kenya to understand why they were developed at particular times, 
what their analytical assumptions were and the effects they might have had on the Kenyan 
education system (cf. Rizvi & Lingard, 2010:45). The analysis in this chapter will take a 
deconstructive turn in relation to the problem constructed by the policies’ content; the values 
articulated in the policies in relation to democratic citizenship education; production 
processes; policy actors and processes of advocacy; and policy allocation, dissemination, 
implementation and evaluation. It will explore how policies are developed and how they are 
enacted. In addition, I will focus on how human interactions, public reasoning and 
engagement have been enacted and implemented in policy development in Kenyan higher 
education. I will take cognisance of the fact that policy as a text relies on commitment, 
understanding, capability, resources, practical limitations, cooperation, intertextuality and 
compatibility (Ball, 2006:46). In examining policy as a discourse I will look at the language 
used, and the concepts and vocabularies that are available for DCE. 
I will highlight the colonial values and processes that determined higher education in Kenya, 
as well as the independent Kenyan policies. I do this to illuminate the links and continuity 
between the transitions. After independence, the Kenyan government reformed education 
through the development of commissions, recommendations, sessional papers and education 
acts to integrate opportunities for citizens to move away from the segregation of colonial 
education. To further understand the educational transition in the Kenyan education system, it 
is necessary to examine a variety of commissions that were set up to bring about certain 
changes that the government deemed fit to improve education. This brings me to an analysis 
of educational change in Kenya from the colonial period until the present day.  
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Due to colonial manipulation, the post-colonial government sought to reform education to 
meet the needs of Kenyans. This led the government to set up major inquiries to look at ways 
and means to achieve the national education policy, objectives and reforms in education. 
These policies include: i) the Kenya Education Commission 1964 [the Ominde 
Commission]
11
; ii) the National Committee on Educational Objectives and Policy 1976 [the 
Gachathi Commission]; the Presidential Working Party on Second University 1981 [the 
Mackay Commission]; and the Totally Integrated Quality Education and Training 1999 
[Koech Commission]
12
. In addition, among the education acts that have contributed to 
development and reform in higher education in Kenya are the Education Act of 1980, the 
University Act of 2012, and Vision 2030. 
3.4.1. Kenya Education Commission Report 1964 (The Ominde 
Commission) 
The Kenya Education Commission Report of 1964 was the first national report in Kenya. It 
reported on the whole of national education in the country. I will not focus entirely on the 
content of the report, but would like to highlight how the report presents democratic 
citizenship education, especially in relation to higher education. This report noted that the 
concept of national education enabled the Kenyan constitutional law to legalise equal rights 
for all citizens, unhindered by considerations of race, tribe or religion. The report 
acknowledged that the concept of unity [harambee
13
] became apparent with nationhood. 
                                                 
11
 The focus on enrolment in schools became central to the achievement of the developmental goals that were to 
be achieved. Shortly after independence, the government appointed a commission chaired by Professor S.H. 
Ominde to survey the existing educational resources and advise the government on an elaborate and systematic 
plan of action for future schooling and policy. This commission recommended nationalistic thinking on 
education for Kenya (Maxon, 1995:126). The nationalistic education was aimed at reducing the manipulation of 
education by missionaries, thereby enabling the expansion of secular education that could respect other faiths of 
communities and individuals. However, the missionaries were still given the opportunity to run their schools 
alongside national schools. This was so because, by this time, education in Kenya required a new content. 
12
 The four reports of the three national commissions were named after the chairmen of the committees, viz. 
Ominde (1964), Gachathi (1976), Mackay (1981) and Koech (1999). 
13
 Another notion that was introduced to make schools a reality was the notion of harambee schools (see Maxon, 
1995:126 and Eshiwani, 1990:3). Harambee refers to cost sharing or cooperation in education costs between 
government and the local communities where the schools are situated. Harambee is a Swahili word that literally 
means, ‘let us pull together’, which was a communal ideology used by Kenyans in the local communities before 
the arrival of the colonial masters. For instance, Kenyan communities worked together to nurture and cultivate 
values in children in the community. Thus the discipline of a child in Kenyan society was the responsibility of 
everyone in the community. In this sense, the communities mapped the need for secondary schools in their 
region, built the schools and contributed funding to run the schools. When Jomo Kenyatta called upon Kenyans 
to ‘pull together’ their efforts to build schools in the harambee spirit, it was not surprising that their response 
was a quick one, since this was a notion they were familiar with. This led to striking success in the development 
of secondary schools, which grew rapidly. During this period, skilled manpower became available that was seen 
as adequate to Africanise the public service. Thus, African teachers became readily available to take up 
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However, it noted that the various transformations caused by the divisive influences of the 
colonial past, such as the attitudes and habits of the colonial system, were going to linger 
longer than expected. As such, the committee noted that education would be the solution to 
breaking away from the past, and that this required time. Another problem that faced Kenya 
was limited manpower to take up colonial positions, because colonial education did not equip 
Africans to handle certain administrative positions. Due to this, national education was 
needed to educate and equip citizens with skills to take up the new challenges that the young 
nation faced. 
The committee acknowledged the community concept of cooperation [harambee], in the 
sense that students were to be encouraged to play responsible roles to build the community, 
yet they had to struggle with the colonial legacy of competition. The committee members 
travelled around the country in order to include everyone in decision making towards a 
national cooperative education (Republic of Kenya, 1964:24). Their observations of the 
learning conditions of students revealed impoverished and poor infrastructure and insufficient 
learning materials, and for this reason education was structured with socio-economic 
purposes towards development; however, the poor learning conditions remain a problem even 
now. The idea therefore was that post-colonial education was to eradicate poverty, disease 
and ignorance. The social role of education was partly to render citizens adaptable to change 
from African colonial education to a free and independent society, and at the same time to 
educate them for social equality in society. This meant that every citizen was to have an equal 
opportunity and responsibility to contribute to and in education and to do away with the 
divisive colonial legacy of segregation.  
The national education report also indicated the need to Africanise education, in terms of 
which traditional social values that were not yet blended were to be reconciled with 
modernity to form a truly African version of modern society. It was noted that this would 
take a toll on the older generation, but with adult education in place it would accelerate the 
process. The committee suggested cooperation with the British government to continue the 
process of building higher education in Kenya through Makerere University; this, they noted, 
required friendship and cooperation without colonialism or imperialism. 
                                                                                                                                                        
teaching, which had been dominated by the colonial services. This became so because more Kenyans had been 
trained to become teachers, in other words, secondary education enabled graduates to be employed as teachers. 
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In essence, the national education commission report of 1964 saw education in Kenya as a 
function that fostered nationhood and promoted national unity; served citizens without 
prejudice; enabled tolerance through respect of religious differences; respected and promoted 
the cultural traditions of the people of Kenya; encouraged responsibility in cooperation; used 
education as a tool to foster respect for the traditional beliefs of others; and served as an 
instrument for conscious change of attitudes and relationships towards modern thinking on 
nationhood; education therefore was to serve national development and to help promote 
social equality, social responsibility and respect for humans, and to help citizens adapt to 
change. 
The Ominde Commission was one of the landmark educational policies that influenced 
educational progression in Kenya. The objective of free primary education became policy and 
socioeconomic aspiration was accepted as national policy in education, even though it was 
noted that it would take time to achieve; as a result, the notion of universal primary education 
became policy. The government recommended that universal free education be expanded in 
primary schools where the enrolments fell short of the national average. The commission also 
recommended the incorporation of a single curriculum, but with different fee structures, since 
Kenya was characterised by racial division in the schooling system (Eshiwani, 1990:3-4; 
Maxon, 1995:126).  
The recommendations made by this commission were implemented in the government 
planning documents that were used in the first years after independence. By 1970, shortly 
after independence, it was realised that African socialism in the form of free primary 
education would lead the country to ruin. The notion of universal education therefore was 
replaced by the need to develop secondary education if the expansion and development of the 
nation was to be realised through the development of skilled manpower. The expansion of 
secondary schools was rapidly realised during this period as a prerequisite for well-skilled 
manpower. 
Government efforts in policy formulation still faced some criticism; for instance, in relation 
to the inappropriateness of the curriculum and the inherited regional imbalances in schools 
and enrolment (Maxon, 1995:131). The improvement in the education system was largely 
linear, since it did not consider the structural changes in the education system (Maxon, 1995). 
This was evident in the kind of curriculum that was used in schools. The curriculum was seen 
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to contain colonial perspectives and only prepared ‘experts’ for white-collar jobs, leaving the 
majority of graduates unequipped for public service. This led to the need for educational 
change to prepare graduates not only for white-collar jobs, but also to take initiative in their 
life after school, and to create their own jobs.  
3.4.2.  Sessional Paper no. 10 of 1965 
Another landmark policy that influenced the education system in Kenya was the Sessional 
Paper no. 10 of 1965, in which education was viewed first as an economic value rather than a 
social service, which meant that education was established as a means of relieving the 
shortage of domestic skilled manpower and equalising economic opportunities among all 
citizens (Eshiwani, 1990:6). The goals and objectives of this policy were to fight poverty, 
disease and ignorance; mobilise resources for rapid economic growth and social progress; 
promote greater individual and community awareness of better health practice; and to balance 
the growth of the agriculture industry between urban and rural areas (Republic of Kenya, 
1965:9). These objectives still remain a challenge in Kenya due to political inequality in most 
national planning, and the fact that social justice and human dignity remain problematic, 
since there still are tribal conflicts and violence across the country. The outcome of the major 
reforms in education in Kenya has been the creation of more problems, for instance recurring 
poverty, ethnic conflicts, violence and discord in politics, and educational mediocrity. Major 
parts of the country have no access to proper health care (Muricho & Chang’ach, 2013:124). 
The political elites in Kenya have interfered in educational reforms, forcing their way in to 
solve problems away from what education ought to be. In other words, the political elites 
have excluded the majority of stakeholders from sharing ideas and playing their roles in 
developing education in Kenya, resulting in the messy situation Kenya is in today.  
3.4.3. The Education Act of 1968 
The Education Act of 1968 put the responsibility for education in the hands of the minister 
for education and instituted various organs for the organisation and management of education 
at all levels. It was only in 1970 that the University of Nairobi Act was established to enable 
the University of Nairobi to become a national university. During this period, education was 
conceptualised as engendering the ‘Kenyanisation’ of education in the country, and 
expanding much-needed manpower skills to enhance development. Thus, the establishment 
of vocational schools to provide vocational skills was central to the educational themes so 
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that the Kenyan economy would rise and bring social balance and equality of educational 
opportunities for national integration and progress in Kenya (Eshiwani, 1990:6). The result of 
this Act was that the production of manpower was more than the labour market could cope 
with. The consequence was a mass of graduates who were unemployed. This problem still 
lingers in the country today. Could the objectives have been better if stakeholders were 
involved in the planning? What kinds of skills were taught at these institutions that left 
graduates without innovative skills for self-employment?  
3.4.4. Report of the National Committee on Educational Objectives and 
Policies 1976 (the Gachathi Commission) 
The Gachathi Commission was charged with the role ‘to evaluate education in Kenya and 
define [a] new set of educational goals for the second decade of independence and formulate 
[a] specific programme of action for achieving those goals’ (Republic of Kenya, 1976:vii). 
This report was to form part of the sessional paper and policy statement on education by the 
government. The committee held several meetings and conducted interviews in various parts 
of Kenya in order to have a national account of education. The government of Kenya 
supported the committee with a range of technical and professional resources. Members of 
public were engaged in this review process. The committee reported that cooperation and 
initiatives were already in place and supported access to formal education. However, they 
noted that the institutions had not changed; students were still prepared more for white-collar 
jobs, yet were poorly equipped to deal with the socio-economic development of the young 
nation. The result was a waste of human resources and disparities in development (Republic 
of Kenya, 1976:xviii). 
In an effort to evaluate national education, the Gachathi Commission found that very little 
had been done to integrate and implement the national ideals of harambee [cooperation] with 
formal learning in the country. Harambee means that the social development of the nation 
depends on every citizen’s contribution within his/her potentiality to build national cohesion. 
Another hindrance to the communal sense of belonging that was intended to inculcate an 
African cultural tradition was the colonial legacy that left parents ingrained in an academic 
and performativity spirit, which meant that teaching social values was overlooked so that 
students could pass exams and meet the demand for the socio-economic returns that parents 
were expecting from formal schooling. The committee recognised that imparting national 
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unity and development needed education about a national and international consciousness of 
the regional inequalities that encourage nations to motivate learning for socio-economic 
purposes. Therefore, the commission recommended the continuous promotion of national 
unity, the removal of social and regional inequalities to create international consciousness, 
and to conceptualise education with an emphasis on adaptability and relevance to the real-life 
situation in Kenya. 
In building mutual social responsibility, the commission noted that this was the recognition 
and an extension of the African family spirit of cooperation. In this regard, the committee 
recommended the following: i) to develop the talents and personalities of individuals within 
the context of reciprocal social responsibility; ii) to develop those being educated into useful 
citizens capable of and motivated towards contributing to improving the nation; iii) to instil 
positive attitudes in students towards a cooperative effort and mutual social responsibility 
through an encouraging approach. In relation to social values and ethics, the committee 
recommended: vi) the teaching of religion and social ethics in the education system as a basis 
for the continued survival and enhancement of the quality of life of society. In promoting 
cultural values, the recommendation was to identify traditional methodologies and theories 
and to integrate such rational education into modern educational practices for lifelong 
continuing education. 
University education in Kenya was recommended as tertiary or post-secondary education 
(Republic of Kenya, 1976:79). Nairobi University and its constituent, Kenyatta University 
College, were the main sources of university education that provided manpower for the 
country. This illustrates the extent to which such education would allow for the participation 
of citizens in developing the country instead of being spectators. The committee found that 
the universities had inadequate governance and management to coordinate the various 
ministries to participate in facilitating the activities of universities. In this regard they 
recommended a permanent Commission on Higher Education that would advise the 
government, plan curricula and finance higher education (Republic of Kenya, 1976:87). 
University education was perceived as essential for advancing knowledge and human welfare 
through the cultivation of reason, free inquiry and dialogue to create a sense of dedication and 
personal and social advancement. It is my view that such an understanding of education 
would promote capacity building that would enable democratic ideals. This period was 
marked by the planned and controlled expansion of university education. After independence, 
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Kenyan higher education was provided free of charge in an effort to ensure access and the 
production of manpower to replace the colonialists in the labour force (Yakaboski & Nolan, 
2011:6). Free higher education ended in 1974 and was replaced by student loans to cover 
other costs apart from tuition fees. The implementation of loan schemes failed because the 
government had not planned how the loans were to be repaid. The University of Nairobi was 
the dominant university between the years 1963 and 1984 (Boit & Kipkoech, 2012:33). 
3.4.5. The National Council for Science and Technology Act of 1978 
The next major development was the establishment of the National Council for Science and 
Technology Act in 1978, which was focused on the coordination of research in science and 
technology and also had to guide the government on relevant policy matters. This Act was 
founded on democratic values such as dialogue among stakeholders, including researchers, 
society and scientists. It also aimed to cultivate cooperation between the public and the 
private sector. Allocations of resources are made according to agreed-upon priorities for the 
benefit of all. It also enables capacity building by enabling an appropriate environment for 
research, training and knowledge application (Muricho & Chang’ach, 2013; Republic of 
Kenya, 1978). This Act conceptualises universities as places of democratic action through 
cooperative ventures in knowledge production and community development. However, there 
still is difficulty in operationalising the objectives of science and technology in Kenya. This 
is because higher education in Kenya is coordinated by different ministries, and therefore is 
cumbersome to manage. For instance, the interaction, collaboration and communication 
between the ministries paralyse the purpose of establishing the goals in a democratic sense. 
Some of the challenges contributing to this failure are the high rate of population growth and 
the hierarchical state of institutional governance. 
3.4.6. The Presidential Working Party on the Second University in 
Kenya: The Mackay Commission, 1981 
The Mackay Commission was appointed to review the government’s implementation of the 
establishment of a second university that had been proposed by the Gachathi Commission. 
The former commission was established in 1981. The commission reiterated the national 
objectives contained in the Kenya African National Union (KANU) manifesto, Sessional 
Paper no. 10 of 1965 and the national development plans (Republic of Kenya, 1981:5). The 
objectives range from: political equality, human dignity, including equality of opportunity, to 
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freedom of conscience, freedom from want, ignorance and disease, and equal distribution of 
income. On these premises, the commission developed a rationale for a second university 
along with the one that existed at the time [the University of Nairobi] to provide greater 
access to university education. Another reason for this development was to increase the 
economic agenda for improving the rural areas of the country. As a result, the university they 
proposed was to be built in the rural areas, away from the national capital, to improve access 
by those living in the already marginalised areas of the country, which mostly are perceived 
as arid areas. 
As such, the most important objectives for the second university were to foster national unity, 
serve the needs for national development, and equip the youth with the knowledge, skills and 
expertise necessary to play a collective and effective role in ensuring equal opportunities for 
using individual talents and personalities. Social justice and morality were also depicted as 
important for developing the right attitude for social obligations and responsibilities. In line 
with the aforementioned objectives, I will not concentrate on the entire terms of reference for 
this commission, but will review the philosophical framework that informed the commission 
in order to diagnose how citizenship education was conceptualised. 
The university as an institution was viewed by this commission as a centre for the search for 
truth in relation to major problems faced by human society and to discover solutions to them. 
It was also seen as a place where intellectualism was cultivated by training rational citizens of 
good character, with creative minds and strong convictions, as well as critical abilities in 
studying human culture universally, and promoting and radiating humanity. Another main 
function of the university as depicted by this commission was to provide professional training 
for social development – in such a way that students can maintain a balance between skills, 
knowledge and correct attitudes. 
In relation to cultural heritage, the second university was seen as a place for the regeneration 
of human values and the development of cultural values. This is because the colonial legacy 
left behind western values and ways of life, to the extent that Kenyans seemed to have 
discarded their traditional African values and modes of life. In this vein, universities were 
seen as possible places where the cultural values that survived colonial manipulation should 
be preserved and promoted through rigorous research and communication with the youth.  
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Regarding national development, the university was viewed by this commission as a place 
where national unity, identity and community service would take precedence by focusing on 
respect as a common denominator and component that ran through all the communities found 
in Kenya. It should also promote social values such as responsibility, self-discipline and 
confidence among students at the university to enable them to live effectively as citizens in 
their own society. Following the awareness that the Kenyan population was growing, an 
increase was needed in access to relevant knowledge to help the country resolve some of the 
predicted problems. For this to be realised, the commission described universities as places 
where students can be trained so that they can produce practical solutions to the ever-
increasing problems of society. In essence, university education should provide students with 
the ability to fulfil social responsibilities, as well as the expertise and skills to tackle the 
problems of society. 
In essence, the philosophical and conceptual guidelines proposed by this commission were: i) 
the university must plan its teaching to continuously be adaptive to Kenyan ideological and 
pragmatic development aspirations; ii) universities should produce graduates who freely 
interact with people, live comfortably in their own society in rural areas, are effective in 
serving all, and are innovative and committed; iii) the curriculum should adequately prepare 
graduates for professional disciplines with sound knowledge of and skills for their society to 
appreciate humanity and Kenyan aspirational and national goals; and iv) the university, 
through research, should relate to societal needs in a reciprocal, continuous and positive 
dialogue to address the relevant national problems. 
3.4.7. The 8-4-4 System of Education - 1984  
The 8-4-4 system of education was and still is a significant education policy in Kenya. It 
created major changes in the Kenyan education system in 1985 and the impact is still felt 
today (Muchiro & Chang’ach, 2013:123). It replaced the colonial 7-4-2-3 system of 
education. The 8-4-4 system of education meant that learners would spend eight years in 
primary schooling, four years in secondary schooling and four years at university. At the end 
of every schooling level, students were envisaged to be equipped with the necessary skills to 
be self-reliant and to be able to create jobs or be self-employed. At the end of primary school, 
students received the Kenya Primary Certificate of Education (KCPE), after secondary school 
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the Kenya Secondary Certificate of Education (KCSE), and then university degree 
qualifications thereafter. 
The 8-4-4 system of education was one of the recommendations of the Mackay Commission, 
and was subsequently implemented in 1982 (Republic of Kenya, 1985:1). The rationale for 
developing this policy was the challenge of national development, the need for a more 
relevant curriculum and the equitable distribution of education resources, the need for 
technical and vocational training, assessment and evaluation, increased opportunities for 
further training and education for national unity. The focus on university education in the 8-
4-4 system of education aimed to  
i) produce mature and conscientious graduates with the ability and desire to help 
with the country’s national development, 
ii) provide national service and development that reflect the national cultural 
heritage, 
iii) develop and transmit knowledge and skills through research and training at 
undergraduate and postgraduate levels, 
iv) foster national consciousness and unity, 
v) preserve knowledge and stimulate the intellectual life, cultural development and 
manpower relevant for national needs (Republic of Kenya, 1984:8). 
The conceptions of DCE found in this system were its articulation of cultural development, 
even though respect for diversity was not mentioned. Further, the idea of the equitable 
distribution of educational resources resonates with Rawls’s second principle of distributive 
justice [refer to Chapter 2]. Also of importance were the reflective nature of and the iterative 
manner in which the policy talks back to previous policies as a springboard to develop and 
redefine the educational needs of the nation further. The implementation was achieved mostly 
in primary and secondary education, and in the establishment of the second university [Moi 
University] following the Mackay Commission.  
There is speculation about the implementation of this policy. Muricho and Chang’ach 
(2013:130) note that this system of education faced a lot of criticism, because experts from 
foreign countries were employed to craft an education system that was in the minds of the 
president and the political leaders. Parents, teachers and academics were excluded from the 
planning process. As such, not much research went into the conceptualisation of this policy. 
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As a result, students became overloaded with work, and worked outside of normal school 
hours (Republic of Kenya, 1999). Implementation became problematic, since teachers and 
those at the implementation level were not adequately trained to deal with the curriculum 
demands. Also, schools in the rural areas were disadvantaged because many learnt in schools 
built from mud with hardly any resources or qualified manpower to implement the policy 
requirements.  
This policy led to the expansion of post-secondary training institutions. Moi University was 
established at about the same time as the Commission for Higher Education. The policy 
aimed to improve the quality of education in Kenya – an aspect that was developed by the 
Mackay Commission; however, Kenyans resisted the 8-4-4 policy since its formulation did 
not include the stakeholders. Rather, it was constructed by top experts who neglected the 
people at grassroots level. For this reason, people resisted and demanded further review 
(Muricho & Chang’ach, 2013:138). The 8-4-4 system of education was implemented in haste, 
causing the staggering of students who graduated from secondary education to access 
university education. There were limited resources to implement this policy, hence quality, 
access and equality were problematic to implement. 
The universities also experienced student strikes that led to their closure for one whole year 
(1986 to 1987). This meant that there were two sets of graduates from secondary schools who 
were waiting for university acceptance. This led to an explosion in university intake. 
Consequently, the universities had a large number of student applicants but limited space 
available. As a result, middle-level colleges were phased out to accommodate university 
students. Moi Science Teachers Training College was converted to Moi University, and 
Siriba Diploma Teachers College and the government training institutes of Maseno 
University and Kenyatta University took up facilities at the Kasarani international sports 
centre to accommodate students (Boit & Kipkoech, 2012:36). Even with this expansion, 
universities were unable to accommodate all the student applicants. There also was a problem 
of teaching different groups of students together in the same classroom. This necessitated the 
staggering of admissions for the next intake of students. In addition to this was a shortage of 
staff with academic qualifications to teach in university programmes. The result was 
recruiting lower academically qualified personnel with masters’ degrees who had recently 
graduated from the university to take up teaching positions. Even this did not result in having 
enough qualified teaching staff to handle the university classrooms, and part-time teaching 
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staff from polytechnics and private universities were appointed to cut costs. However, this 
policy has informed the current education policy and Vision 2030, which now guide 
education in Kenya. 
The report of the presidential working party on education and manpower training for the next 
decade and beyond was the Kamunge Report, 1988. This report focused on improving the 
financing, quality and relevance of education. The policy of cost sharing between government 
and communities was introduced. This report also recommended the reduction of the 
workload that came with the inception of 8-4-4. 
3.4.8. Totally Integrated Quality Education and Training Policy 1999: 
The Koech Report 
The commission of inquiry into the education system of Kenya produced the Koech Report 
1999 (Republic of Kenya, 1999). This commission was selected to review the education 
system in Kenya to expedite the following: national unity; mutual responsibility; accelerated 
and technological development; and consolidation and enhancement of lifelong learning and 
adaptation in response to changing circumstances (Republic of Kenya, 1999:xix).
14
 The panel 
on the Koech Commission also was required to recommend the following: possible 
programmes of action, since the government had limited funding – compared to what was 
obtainable in the legal framework of education; the structure of the 8-4-4 system of 
education; the role of the private sector in providing educational opportunities and training; 
ways to improve continuing education; ways and means of improving accessibility, equity, 
relevance and quality, with special attention to gender sensitivity and the disabled and 
disadvantaged groups; suggest ways and means of developing alternative educational 
programmes and promoting the liberalisation of the education sector, with special reference 
to the utilisation of the specialised resources of universities and similar institutions as 
vehicles of accelerated national development. In doing this, the Koech Commission reviewed 
previous official reports and sessional papers and studied the commissions, committees, 
working parties and task forces to examine Kenya’s educational system in order to obtain an 
                                                 
14
 These perspectives formed the mission statements of the Koech Report. National unity was assumed to be an 
overarching effort by Kenyans to cooperate in strengthening the state of nationhood. Mutual responsibility refers 
to the contribution education makes to enable freedom and the willingness of people to exercise their moral 
obligation for the benefit of all members of society. Accelerated industrial technological development refers to 
the contribution of and training in making improvements, both qualitatively and quantitatively, in the 
application of technical advances in industry, with special reference to manufacturing, strengthening and 
increasing the quality of learning for life (Republic of Kenya, 1999:xxi). 
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accumulative understanding of the system. They opened up their views for review by the 
public, and invited expert papers and reviews to enrich their inquiry. 
This commission recommended totally integrated quality education and training (TIQET). 
The commission recommended the provision of education to the marginally gifted, the 
handicapped and to rural areas. The recommendations also included the liberal ideals of 
gender equity, equality, governance, human rights – especially the rights to medical and 
health-care services, most specifically for those with HIV/AIDS, who generally were 
stigmatised. The recommendations of the Koech Report were different from the other 
commissions in that they articulated the expansion of access to basic education, the 
eradication of discrepancies in education based on geographical, social and gender factors, 
the introduction of practicable curriculum content and modular learning in secondary school, 
and the intensification of access to education through extended alternative continuing 
education. The report also recommended flexibility in university admission and in technical 
education and continuous assessment. One of the recommendations made by this commission 
that relates well to DCE in higher education is that university education needs to improve 
studies aimed at improving the youth towards nationhood, as well as moral and ethical 
studies to practise mutual social responsibility and pursue nationalistic values (Republic of 
Kenya, 1999:309). The government failed to adopt the report due to cost implications 
(Muricho & Chang’ach, 2013:131). However, some of its recommendations, such as 
curriculum rationalisation, were adopted and implemented. 
3.4.9. Vision 2030 and a Cosmopolitan University 
Vision 2030 contains ideas developed from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
The MDGs are internationally accepted standards for gauging development towards poverty 
alleviation (Republic of Kenya, 2007:ii). In order to reach the benchmarks of the MDGs, 
Kenya puts together Vision 2030 as a guiding document to attain the global predictions of 
economic growth levels in order to comply with world economic development predictions. 
Much emphasis is put on economic growth at the expense of social-cultural growth, hence the 
emphasis on science and technology. 
Currently, education is being channelled to respond to and be aligned with the new Kenyan 
constitution and Kenyan Vision 2030 (Republic of Kenya, 2010:74). The main thrust of the 
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current education policy is strategised to address sustainability and efficiency, to improve 
financial management and accountability, and to make education in Kenya more relevant and 
inclusive to enhance the country’s competitiveness regionally and internationally. 
The vision for education in Kenya is to offer quality education and training to all Kenyans as 
a fundamental contribution to the government’s agenda for development. The vision for 
education in Kenya is directed towards government agendas. That is, citizens are to be 
educated to embrace entrepreneurship so that they are able to engage in lifelong learning. 
This means acquiring new knowledge in order to apply complex problem-solving skills, a 
willingness to take more decisions, and understanding their work and being able to do it 
without being supervised. Education is envisioned to provide vital tools towards better 
qualitative reasoning and expository skills. 
Kenyan education is conceptualised to create an environment in which learners are equipped 
with the values, attitudes, knowledge, skills and competencies that will help them to develop 
the country. Emphasis is placed on competencies in technology, innovation and 
entrepreneurship, while also enabling citizens to develop their full capacity, live and work in 
dignity, enhance the quality of their lives and make informed personal, social and political 
decisions as citizens of the Republic of Kenya. 
Recent policies for education in Kenya have been developed comprehensively from a 
framework of earlier commissions on educational policy task forces, the 2010 Constitution 
and Vision 2030. This framework is aimed at propagating and cultivating a national system 
of education that will lead Kenya on the path of national unity, economic growth and self-
determination. Current policies in Kenyan education draw ideas from previous policies that 
encouraged the financing of quality and relevance, accelerating industrial and technological 
development, promoting lifelong learning and re-aligning education to the constitution and 
Vision 2030. 
Despite the fact that the formulation of Vision 2030 was done through a deliberative process 
in which most of the population was involved, there is a discrepancy with regard to what 
audience was part of this formulation. It is also noted that a team of both national and local 
experts was chosen to develop this vision; it therefore does not reflect the opinions of the 
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marginalised – those who were robbed of the right to life during the post-election violence 
(Kibaki, in Republic of Kenya, 2007:ii; Oucho, 2002:105). 
Even though the draft of Vision 2030 was completed in 2007, the post-election violence that 
manifested in 2007 was an indication that something was missing in the conceptualisation of 
educational policies. Although this was not a new phenomenon, attention had to be paid to 
the myriad of ethnic conflicts that Kenya had experienced over the years that were regarded 
as the years of the new democratic dispensation. Consecutive elections in 1992, 1997, 2002 
and 2007 led to post-election violence that scarred many citizens. Despite the fact that 2012 
was considered a free and fair election, Kenya still experienced traces of unrest and violence 
in Garissa and the coastal regions and beyond (Smith, 2013). For this reason it can be argued 
that the manifestation of ethnic politics and conflict in Kenya points to the fact that 
citizenship education has not been manifested in the education system, since the 
consequences of the lack of it leads to the kind of negative conduct that is displayed in post-
election violence. 
These circumstances call attention to a re-looking at the kind of citizenship education that 
could help relinquish this phenomenon that has repeated itself and reclaim the human rights 
to life, peace and education. It is imagined that rethinking education in Kenya requires a re-
imagining of the citizenship education that Kenya offers to its citizens to deal with the 
political instability in the country and the undemocratic scenarios that the country 
experiences if economic and social growth are to be a reality.  
3.4.10. University Act of 2012 
Kenya experienced a new democratic regime in 2003 after twenty-five years of autocratic 
one-party rule. This democratic dispensation was characterised by a peaceful electoral 
transition that promised transparency, was decentralised in its style, accountable in resources 
and relevant in objectives and outcomes (Mwiria, 2007:1). The political transition in Kenya 
effected changes in how universities were governed and managed. Universities in Kenya 
became autonomous in that the president no longer was the titular head of all public 
universities. Universities were given the liberty to choose their chancellor. This transition was 
vital in the sense that the changes that occurred in the political spaces no longer affected how 
universities were managed and how they conducted their internal affairs. 
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Kenyan universities have undergone thorough reform in their governance. Mwiria (2007:4) 
notes that critical attention is needed to deal with the political manipulation of and 
intervention in the governance and management of universities. He notes that a myriad of 
strikes and closures of universities over the past decade have postponed graduation days for 
students and disrupted academic life, making prospective students opt for private universities 
or consider universities outside of Kenya. Mwiria (2007:4) indicates that steps have been put 
in place to enhance the democratisation of the leadership of the universities. There is student 
and staff representation in key areas of governance, especially in the decision-making process 
and the selection of senior administrators of the university. Each university chooses its own 
vice-chancellor, which was not the case during Moi’s rule, when the president was the vice-
chancellor of all the universities. 
By 2005, Kenya had experienced reform in all areas and created an environment that was 
conducive to innovation and transformation within the higher education system. The focus on 
reform in Kenya was directed at policies related to equality, access, quality, governance and 
relevance. These changes reflect the national values. As such, university education is guided 
in its functions by those values and principles that are also part of the constitution, as 
articulated in the University Act of 2012. These include: i) promoting inclusive, efficient, 
effective and transparent governance systems and practices and maintaining public trust; ii) 
enhancing the equity and accessibility of its services; iii) promoting quality and relevance in 
its programmes; iv) ensuring sustainability, the adoption of best practices in management and 
the institutionalisation of systems of checks and balances; v) promoting private-public 
partnership in university education and development; vi) institutionalising non-discriminatory 
practices; and vii) community service and engagement with society (Mwiria, 2007:3; 
Republic of Kenya, 2012). These principles resonate with the liberal perspective of 
community as a sense of belonging, inclusion in public engagement, equity and accessibility 
of public resources [refer to Chapter 2]. 
The University Act of 2012 outlines the educational objectives of educational policy as 
follows: i) advancement of knowledge through teaching, scholarly research and scientific 
investigation; ii) promotion of learning in the student body and society generally; iii) 
promotion of the cultural and social life of society; iv) support and contribute to the 
realisation of national economic and social development; v) promote the highest standards in, 
and quality of, teaching and research; vi) education and training of and retraining higher-level 
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professional, technical and management personnel; vii) dissemination of outcomes of 
research conducted by the university to the general community; viii) facilitation of life-long 
learning through the provision of adult and continuing education; ix) fostering a capacity for 
independent critical thinking among students and promoting gender balance and equality of 
opportunity among students and employees; and x) promotion of the equality of persons with 
disabilities, minorities and other marginalised groups (Republic of Kenya, 2012:1862). 
Consequently, the 2012 University Act spells out the objectives and values that higher 
education is expected to follow. Below is an exposition. 
3.4.10.1. Access and equality as democratic organisers in Kenyan higher 
education 
Access to and equity in Kenyan higher education have been re-moulded to address the 
inequalities that the country experienced previously. This process entails the inclusion of 
economically disadvantaged groups and other marginalised groups in decisions regarding 
access to higher education institutions (Mwiria, 2007:9). Affirmative action programmes 
were implemented for redress. The government increased its supports for an increase in 
access by female students, students from remote regions and disabled students with slightly 
lower grades than the regular student intake. Bursary programmes have also been 
strengthened to help improve this policy. By the year 2007, Mwiria notes that the idea of 
improving administrative opportunities for women in higher education was a priority to 
address disparities that existed in the previous system, which was male dominated. In this 
regard, Kenya founded an all-female university for the first time in history, rendering equal 
opportunities to counter gender disparity. 
Kenya also implemented parallel degree programmes as a cost-sharing policy in higher 
education (Yakaboski & Nolan, 2011:8). This means that there are two sets of student 
admissions to the university – those who are admitted to the university through the admission 
board with higher grades and whose university fees are funded by the government, and the 
second group, who have lower grades but still have entry to the university as long as they can 
pay for themselves. This policy has resulted in inequality, especially in accessing higher 
education in Kenya. This is because even the highly qualified sometimes do not get access, 
while those who cannot afford university also are excluded from the university system, 
leaving the system undemocratic in terms of access. This means that access to higher 
education remains for those who are rich and have the money to pay for their degrees. 
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The implication of the parallel programme policy is that the aspirations of students from 
secondary schools for university education are reduced, since access is dependent on the 
money one can pay. On the other hand, the system does not guarantee that those who perform 
with higher grades will have access to higher education in Kenya. Yakaboski and Nolan 
(2011) note that cost sharing, as a policy introduced by the liberal policies of the World Bank, 
will paralyse regional development and inter-tribal cooperation.  
3.4.10.2. Service outreach and engagement with society as democratic 
indicator in considering ‘otherness’ 
The university in Kenya has become more engaged with society than before. This has been 
done in such a way that universities send students for internships and collaborative research 
in Kenyan society. Jomo Kenyatta University is an example of a university extending 
research into the surrounding area by responding to the crisis of HIV/AIDS awareness, 
involvement in improving farming through its relationships with small-scale farmers in the 
university’s programmes in agriculture, and its technology programmes (Mwiria, 2007:12). 
This collaboration of universities and society is important because it engenders an 
improvement in and implementation of belonging together with the wider society, therefore 
improving citizenship education. 
3.4.10.3. Expansion and integration as indicators of inclusive democracy 
Following the declaration and implementation of the policy on free primary education and 
free secondary education in 2003, Kenya has seen a massive increase in access to education. 
Most Kenyans have been able to access primary and secondary education. The success rates 
of this implementation have pushed universities to expand and integrate students qualifying 
for university education. The government has also encouraged growth in and the 
accreditation of most private universities to allow greater access to university education 
(Republic of Kenya, 2012). Furthermore, the government has opened university centres in 
almost every province to allow expansion and integration (Mwiria, 2007:8). Universities have 
also been encouraged to recruit students individually as opposed to the previous system, in 
which there was a central body (Joint Admission Board) doing the selection. In the previous 
system, students were admitted based on obtaining residential accommodation, but with the 
new policy of integration and expansion, university admission is no longer based on this. 
Catering and accommodation have been diverted to the private sector as a measure to 
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improve the quality of instruction and the efficiency of resource utilisation so that more 
students can be admitted. 
3.4.10.4. Governance and management as organisers of democratic 
education  
Governance and management have been a thorny issue in university education in Kenya. This 
is because the manipulation of Kenyan higher education by politics has delayed the growth 
that it had planned to achieve. This delay was due to numerous strikes and closures in the past 
regimes, as explained previously, which led to many students postponing their graduation 
year and limited the number of students that the university could admit. Added to this was the 
flight of academics in search of better working conditions in other countries. In response to 
this, the new legislation governing universities provided for a single, integrated act to cover 
public and private universities (Mwiria, 2007:1). This legislation includes the democratisation 
of decision making within the universities by promoting wider representation of staff and 
students in key university bodies such as governing bodies, and allowing staff a greater say in 
selecting university administrators.  
University education experience autonomy in the sense that the governance of universities is 
partially detached from politicians. The president is no longer the chancellor of all 
universities, but individuals have been appointed for each university in Kenya, and university 
councils now have the opportunity to choose their own vice-chancellor and other high-level 
university officials. This reform has provided universities with a sense of autonomy that did 
not exist in both Moi’s and Kenyatta’s regimes. 
3.5. Democratic Citizenship Education and Ethnic Identity 
In this section I explore the main historical developments among Kenyan ethnic identities to 
understand the roles they played in Kenyan political, social and economic life and how ethnic 
identities are formed and consolidated. With reference to the analysis conducted in Chapter 2, 
citizenship signifies a sense of belonging. In Kenya, ethnic identities seem to provide ‘safe 
social positions’ in the country. The democracy and consensus reached in politics in Kenya 
suggest that consolidation by the dominant ethnic group has a degree of influence on the way 
decisions and agreements are reached. It is hoped that this section will highlight and analyse 
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the democratisation processes that are revealed or depicted in ethnic politics and their 
influence on higher education Kenya.  
The analyses in this section are based on the propositions that the sociocultural life worlds of 
society depict a pattern that occurs in relationships in humanity, whether of a political, 
sociological, economical or educational nature. Ogot (1995b) captures the idea that the 
histories of most societies indicate that, in working out priorities in decolonisation, the 
reconstruction of technological and economic development is given a greater focus and the 
cultural aspects are neglected. However, it is evident that cultural concerns should be central 
to and instrumental in decision making and political undertakings in developing a country’s 
education system. In most developing countries, the focus has been on modernisation as 
being synonymous with westernisation and capitalist ideologies. 
Atieno-Odhiambo (2002) contends that tribalism as a reality in Kenya, and ethnicity as a 
universal topic in academic discourses, are cultural contentions that ignite discourses in 
policy development. He argues that these two terms do not mean the same thing, even though 
they may be perceived to do so.  
Kenyan African do not speak of ethnicity in their offices, on public platforms, or in whispers 
along the streets. They talk and think about tribalism as a regular experience of their everyday 
lives in its many enabling capacities, its incapacitating impediments upon the hopes of 
individuals and its blocking of opportunities for whole communities. They use of tribalism as 
a practical vocabulary of politics and social movements (Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002:230). 
Ethnicity in the Kenyan context and in relation to colonial segregation is tied to the notion of 
citizenship. This citizenship is connected to ethnic identity, authority and legitimacy. Thus 
ethnicity is also perceived as a comprehensive birth right that refers to ‘recognition’, 
‘identity’ and ‘patrimony’, and a state of citizenship that is rigid and only attainable by the 
issue of Kipande [Swahili word for the Kenyan identity card] (Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002). 
Atieno-Odhiambo argues further that ethnicity is a product of social imagination that must be 
constantly worked at to be achieved. Omolo (2002:213) contends that an ‘understanding of 
ethnicity and democratisation in Kenya today, lies not only in identifying the important tri-
polar relationship between history, agency and contingency, but even more importantly in 
locating the historical seamless thread of this multi-dimensional process’. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
94 
 
Ethnicity is central to humanity, and it has taken a centre stage in most parts of the world (see 
Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002:230; Ogot, 1995:234). Understanding that ethnicity can have an 
immense impact on national democracy is important, since the Kenyan education system 
aims to promote cultural heritage. Ethnicity and cultural differences are not bad in themselves 
(Ogot, 1995:234), and many nations the world over possess some form of ethnicity or the 
other, in terms of either people, customs, language or traditions, and many are multilingual in 
nature. Thus, multiculturalism should be perceived to be an integral part of any national 
decision or development, including education. 
Contemporary studies conducted in Kenya regarding ethnicity and democracy have 
highlighted the function of history, agency and eventuality in an ever-changing complex 
political scene (see Ajulu, 2002; Nyakuri, 1997; Ogude, 2002; Omolo, 2002; Otieno & 
Munene, 2007; Oyugi, 2000; Stephen & Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002; Wawire et al., 2008). 
Stephen and Atieno-Odhiambo (2002:230) track the development of ethnicity, with details 
oriented to the Luo and the Agikuyu. They investigate the conception of citizenship, which 
they recognise as an organisational obligation. They claim that the advent of politicised 
ethnicity, popularly known as ‘tribalism’ in Kenya, must be located in the tension between 
ethnic and bureaucratic citizenship. Both were nurtured and fortified under British 
colonialism and were achieved by the post-colonial political leadership as part of the 
instrumentality of survival and the uncertain social formation in post-colonial Kenya, in 
which only ethnic citizenship seemed to be safe. 
Kenya is made up of more than 40 different ethnic groups that vary in size (Ngome, 2003). 
The Kikuyu (6.6 million), Luhya (5.3 million), Kalenjin (4.9 million), Luo (4.4 million) and 
Kamba (3.8 million)
15
 are the most populous ethnic groups, and together with other small 
ethnic groups amount to ninety-eight percent (98%) of the population (Ngome, 2003). The 
remaining two percent are composed of Indian, European and Arab immigrant communities. 
Despite the multi-ethnic nature of the nation, Kenya adopted Kiswahili as the lingua franca 
and English as the national language and the language of instruction in schools (Ngome, 
2003). 
                                                 
15
 The information on figures was obtained from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news, “Kenya defends tribal census 
figures”, dated 31 August 2010, as found in Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, retrieved on 15 February 2012.  
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Mwiria (2007:33) shows quantitatively that the distribution of Kenyan public university 
students by ethnic origin reveals a heavy representation of the Kikuyu ethnic group, which 
makes up to 37% of all students enrolled in public universities. In descending order of 
representation, we find the Kamba (13%), Luo (12%), Luhya (10%), Kalenjin (8%), Meru 
(7%), Kisii (4%) and Embu (3%). Only 6.7% of all students originate from the remaining 
ethnic groups in Kenya, namely the Teso, Mijikenda, Maasai, Samburu, Turkana, Borana and 
Somali (Mwiria et al., 2007:33). 
The large presence of the Kikuyu within the public university system reflects their strength in 
the country. They are the largest single ethnic group, with 24% of the country’s population. 
Additionally, there are various factors that contribute to the Kikuyu’s large access to 
universities, including geographical, regional and developmental factors. Comparatively, 
other large ethnic groups such as the Luhya, Kalenjin, Luo and Kamba are under-represented 
in the university system in relation to their demographic numbers. For instance, the 
University of Nairobi is situated in the heartland of the Kikuyu community, which, 
comparatively speaking, is economically advantaged – hence the large student presence at the 
university (Mwiria, 2007:34). 
Universities have compromised their mission to develop national unity and to ensure 
socioeconomic development, equality and political freedom. Otieno & Munene (2007) 
illustrates how universities in Kenya have experienced the manifestation of ethnic 
dominations. This was clearly demonstrated during the 2007 post-election violence. For 
instance, universities are located in geographical areas where specific ethnic communities are 
dominant, and professors perceived to belong to different communities other than the 
majority ones saw their homes burned and were forced to escape, resulting in the closure of 
institutions for fear of having students on campus intensify the violence (Otieno, 2008:24). 
Incidents such as those highlighted by Otieno have given rise to ethnic politics in university 
governance, where students from a particular ethnic group gang together to elect a member of 
their own ethnic group. In the same manner, the majority of members of university councils 
come from the dominant ethnic group in the country’s mainstream politics. Accordingly, 
academic freedom at universities has become compromised. 
Research (Menkhaus, 2005:1; Mwiria, 2007:33; Oyugi, 2000:4) shows that massive neglect, 
coupled with insecurity, banditry and the nomadic nature of the indigenous populace, appears 
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to have prolonged the underdevelopment that has in turn limited the provision of education to 
pastoral communities, especially girls.  
Ethnic conflicts in Kenya are caused by several factors, namely land disputes (Yamano & 
Deininger, 2005:1), political power, and the aftermath of colonial rule (divide and rule), when 
the British in Kenya emphasised keeping various ethnic groups apart (Ringquist, 2011). This 
has influenced the current ethnic division and discrimination. Unequal distribution of 
resources [educational resource] and the rise of pluralism in multipartyism are other causal 
factors of divided ethnicity (Nyakuri, 1997:5 Oyugi, 2000:11). Ethnic conflicts and clashes 
therefore have left behind diverse effects on and consequences for the country, such as 
division, suspicion, the destruction of the environment, loss of human life, homelessness, 
destitution, traumatisation, stigmatisation, stagnation of the education system, hatred and 
anger (Easterly & Levine, 1997:1206; Menkhaus, 2005; Nyakuri, 1997:5; Oyugi, 2000; 
Yamano & Deininger, 2005).  
Ajulu (2002:251-268) maintains, however, that much of the violence that has constituted the 
political conflicts in Kenya over the last decade cannot be attributed directly to ethnic hatred, 
but rather to a deliberate mobilisation of ethnicity by the political elite for political ends. 
Klopp (2002:269-290) argues that Kenyan politics adds a critical dimension to the struggle 
for state power based on ethnic lines. This is a concern in many systems today that 
accompany globalisation and socio-economic development. Ethnicity is a phenomenon that is 
difficult to negate, but when politicised for the ‘majority’ brings forth inequality for the 
‘minority’ and accrues conflicts that threaten human life and dignity. 
The political situation in a country usually influences how education is conducted, and this is 
not different in Kenya. The influence of politics on Kenyan higher education has manifested 
in inequalities that are triggered by ethnic conflicts, violence and tension (Mwiria, 2007:33; 
Nyakuri, 1997:6-7). While Kenya now is divided along ethnic lines and educational policies 
favour the minority, history has it that this was spearheaded by British colonial rule, which 
implemented education for British administrators and their families, with policies to keep 
Kenyans out of education. This left Kenyans with little or no knowledge to develop their own 
education system, which they are still busy creating (Yakaboski & Nolan, 2011:2).  
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3.5.1. Culture and Education 
Similarly, it is noted that not much attention was paid to culture in conceptualising the 
development that Kenya had highlighted in the early stages of policy development, as 
discussed in the previous sections. Even though the promotion of cultural heritage was 
inscribed in policy documents, actual practice, more specifically the great deal of ethnic 
violence experienced in the country, points to the contrary. I argue that the objective of 
university education interacting with society ought to have dealt with ethnic anomalies and 
imbalances in the country, but this has not proven to be so. It could be argued further that 
culture is perceived as uniform in the current state of democracies, especially in Kenya, 
where development and modernity are still connected to westernisation. African cultures are 
not perceived as being part of this development and modernisation, and even though the 
articulation of mutual reciprocity and respect is highlighted in the policies, the opposite 
seems to be the norm. Human dignity as an objective also has not been evident since the 
massacre of citizens, because of political greed. It is argued that, in Kenya, modernisation 
meant that Kenya had to abandon traditional institutions, beliefs and values to suit the 
demands of ‘development’ (see Ogot, 1995b:215). The transition from colonialism produced 
confusing notions of modernisation that demanded that Kenya abandon its ways of living, 
leadership, administration and doing things to follow western culture for full development to 
occur (see also Eshiwani, 1990:3; Republic of Kenya, 1981:34). However, the repercussions 
of such ideologies are felt all over Africa and are evident in civil wars and political unrest. In 
addition to this, the western institutions and ideologies were complex and foreign to the 
African need, and because the colonial education did not prepare Africans to deal with such 
knowledge there was a need to educate Africans for manpower to deal with the modern state 
of the nation. Consequently, the phenomenon caused repercussions in the formation of 
various cultural associations with ethnic affiliation (which was also perceived as a political 
mobilisation of power), which reacted against some liberal notions that wanted to dominate 
Kenyan politics. This reaction reigned in Kenya until the 1980s, when people became aware 
of the domination of an alien culture [divide and rule] driving their ethnic boundaries and 
division. 
The response to this challenge was that the Kenyan government realised that education and 
research could play a role in the reconceptualisation of culture and development. It became 
clear that the research and documentation at the University of Nairobi was being used by 
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Africans to promote western values (Ogot, 1995b:218). This led to a liaison between the 
university and the government to re-think this phenomenon. The re-conceptualisation meant 
that universities therefore had to be seen to promote African values as well. The result was 
the establishment of a Centre for African Studies at Nairobi University. This led to a form of 
democracy and autonomy in the sense that the universities were seen as institutions of 
transformation and change by undertaking research through which the relevant African 
culture could form part of African education and development. Emphasis was put on 
promoting and conducting research in the field of African archaeology, history, social 
anthropology, musicology, linguistics, oral literature, and traditional arts, crafts and belief 
systems in order to contribute to the need to Africanise the content of cultural instruction in 
the university and throughout the Kenyan nation (Ogot, 1995b:219).  
Ethnic organisations sprung up early in the period from 1964 to 1978 and increased during 
the 1980s. The formation of these groups was perceived to be political, even though some of 
the groups claimed that they were just cultural organisation. Examples of these organisations 
are GEMA – the Gikuyu-Embu-Meru-Association, the Luo Union (East Africa), the New 
Akamba Union (NAU), the Abaluhya Association, and the Kalenjin Association, Miji-Kenda 
Association and Kalenjin-Maasai-Turkana-Samburu Association (KAMA-TUSA) 
configuration, which was formed in 1990 (Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002:232; Ogot, 1995b:195). 
GEMA was founded in 1971 as a cultural and social welfare organisation, but it was viewed 
as a political organisation because most of its members were in strategic positions in 
government. GEMA thrived economically and politically and gained roots in politics (see 
Ogot 1995:196 on how this happened). The Luo Association was also seen as a prominent 
political agency. It was founded in 1940 to promote Luo welfare. The resultant politics was 
evident in Oginga Odinga, who was one of the pioneers. NAU was founded in 1960 to 
promote the welfare of the Akamba people. With it emerged a pioneering politician, Mulu 
Mutisya, who was an MP. Ogot (1995a) indicates that the other three associations mentioned 
in the previous paragraph were less political.  
The formation of these associations indicates how ethnic politics was becoming prominent in 
Kenya. Every tribe realised that, for their region to prosper and for their plight to be taken 
care of, they had to come to a consensus on the welfare of their own tribal people, otherwise 
their needs would be neglected. This was so because the political parties that ruled channelled 
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development to the group from which they came. However, at the conference chaired by the 
President in 1979, a decision was reached that these ethnic organisation were becoming a 
threat to national unity and had to be removed (Ogot, 1995b:223). 
Nonetheless, the opposition grew stronger and KANU was challenged by opposition parties 
that arose as a result of these ethnic associations. Moi suppressed the growing need for 
opposition and indicated that Kenya lacked the capacity and space to accommodate this 
growing opposition. The opposition grew stronger and the universities became a place and 
space for political recruitment and politicians who became activists for change and 
transformation. This aroused academic intolerance; for instance, Oginga Odinga was denied a 
chance to present a lecture at Nairobi University. On the other hand, KANU began to 
promote the notions of political equality, freedom from want, equal distribution of income, 
equal opportunities, human rights and the rule of law, which were used for planning 
education and other sectors of national development. These policies became redundant and 
the politicians and government officials became corrupt, yet much division remained among 
the citizens. ‘Problems of greed, selfishness and corruption continued to undermine the 
national objectives so clearly as spelt out by President Moi in 1982’ (Ogot, 1995:210). Ogot 
(1995) points out that the kind of human rights propagated by KANU were abstract, 
unrealistic and theoretical, failed to reflect the state of the Kenyan people, and avoided 
looking inside the life worlds and culture of the Kenyan people. Ogot (1995) argues that even 
though human rights should be looked at universally, it also is important that they are 
relevant to the local people. I will differ from Ogot’s argument that, although such policies 
were sound, what was lacking was the manpower to implement them; education could have 
been the greatest weapon to eradicate such ignorance. 
It can be argued that KANU limited human rights to freedom of speech and political equality 
when it insisted on a one-party state, despite the mounting opposition. KANU also amended 
the constitutional law without notice to the stakeholders, and this limited citizens’ rights to 
freedom and political equality to enable KANU to survive opposition (see Ogota, 1995:211). 
Power was given to the police to arrest those who disobeyed and/or opposed KANU. 
Amendments were also made regarding the abolition of ethnic alliances, thus contradicting 
the goal of promoting cultural heritage. One could argue that this led to Kenyans showing 
allegiance to blind patriotism due to their fear of victimisation. 
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Ogot (1995) explains how the historical literature demonstrates different ideological stances 
in understanding national unity in Kenya. This literature suggests that colonisation has 
alienated African culture from its roots and that this alienation has extended to the current, 
independent Kenya. Ogot describes how Kenyans currently exploit and dehumanise each 
other, while sacrificing their cultural identity and the national objective of unity, human 
dignity and freedom. Similarly, the post-independent literature suggests that Kenya’s 
problems will be solved if Kenyans are able to re-evaluate what has been done to them in the 
past and what they are doing to one another today (Ogot, 1995:230).
16
 To depict the New 
Kenya, Ogot (1995:230) uses works of literature
17
 to indicate that the new Kenyan society is 
fragmented into three main, discordant elements. These elements are, first, wealth and an 
insecure elite; second, the poor and frustrated urban working class; and, finally, the mass of 
people who fit nowhere – the peasantry, the unemployed urban migrants living off their 
relatives, and those living by their wits – criminals, beggars and prostitutes. Thus, according 
to these authors, the experience of independence has always been painful and hollow for 
many Kenyans in both rural and urban sectors. 
It could be argued from Ogot’s (1995) interpretation above that Kenya is characterised by an 
unequal society, despite the fact that the national objectives and principles promote equality. 
The question could be asked: what form of democratic citizenry does Kenyan society operate 
on? In response to this question, Omolo (2002:61) contends that, despite the fact that Kenya 
has embraced a form of democracy by allowing opposition parties to participate in politics in 
the country, there are striking elements and structural features that still make it difficult for 
opposition parties to practise democracy as it ‘ought’ to be. In other words, Omolo suggests 
that liberal democracy has taken roots in Kenya, although there still is a great deal of civil 
strife, inter-state conflicts and inequalities that have claimed the lives of many Kenyans. 
Omolo (2002) believes that these conflicts and strife are caused by the refusal of some 
political actors to play by the rules of democracy.  
                                                 
16
 Ngugi wa Thiong’s novels, The river between and Weep not child, are some of the literature Ogot (1995:230-
233) uses to illustrate the ideas of how history has contributed to our understanding of identity formation in 
Kenya. Thus, alienation introduced by the colonialists is still causing much of the division in Kenya today. 
17
 Here, Ogot (1995b:231) uses the works of Leonard Kibera (Voices on dark, 1970), Grace Ogot (Land without 
thunder, 1986) and Charles Mangua (Son of woman, 1971), amongst others, to illustrate how they describe 
Kenyan’s identities in what he calls the New Kenya. 
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From a theoretical perspective and in classical dimensions, democracy is constructed as 
reducing inequalities, improving the state of citizenship, and enabling inclusion and justice 
and respect for human rights. However, democracy as practised in Africa and Kenya has led 
to pervasive and endemic conflict in countries such as Rwanda, Kenya, Nigeria, Somalia, 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Congo and Kenya (Kagwanja, 2003; Omolo, 2002:61). 
Similarly, since the introduction of multipartyism, democracy has been played out in ethnic 
politics in Kenya. The question that can be posed is what educational systems are in place to 
deal with this form of inequality and the reconciliation of past history with the ills of current 
society that pose conflict and violence? To address this problem, Ogot (1995) shows that 
many Kenyans have embraced a moralistic approach to this question, while others have no 
commitment to addressing the problem, but pin the solution on the elimination of the alien 
policies that are adopted by the ruling élite and place their hope in a revolution. Ogot (1995) 
urges that Kenyan problems would be solved if Kenyans reaffirmed their traditional 
humanistic ideals, such as pride, respect, self-confidence, dignity, industriousness and 
communal spirit. The argument is advanced further that, in an African setting, one does not 
need to be rich or powerful to be respected. Thus, wealth and power are not core values that 
determine the respect due to human beings. 
Ogot (1995b:233) highlights the ideas of Okot p’Bitek, a Ugandan scholar who contributed to 
history and literature in Kenya. Ogot explains that Okot p’Bitek says that Kenyan problems 
can be addressed when scholarship is geared towards an integration of African philosophy 
with modern development challenges. p’Bitek, like other Kenyan scholars, indicates that 
Kenya needs to be reconstructed from the shambles that was left behind by slavery and 
colonialism, and calls for a change in the framework of African philosophy within the 
existing social institutions, rather than Ngugi’s call for change within the ‘Marxist context’. 
In the same way, Ogot (1995:234) contends that culture is a motivation that leads to 
innovation. Thus, the politicisation of culture can lead to dangerous conflicts and violence. In 
this manner, it can be argued that ethnicity is a natural phenomenon and is not bad. However, 
the manipulation of ethnicity to cause division is a negative construction that can lead 
societies to ruin. I argue that the main concern for Kenya is to seek a national identity. 
Identity is a cultural question, thus a concern for Kenyan development ‘ought’ to be: what 
kind of citizen should we project for a Kenyan nation? Our historical experience therefore 
needs to embrace the diversity present in Kenya, while embracing the philosophical values of 
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citizenship accepted universally, such as respect, justice, equality, human dignity, 
communicative action, deliberation and human rights. I will deal with these aspects in 
Chapters 4 and 5. 
3.5.2. Post-election Violence and the Conception of Democratic 
Citizenship in Kenya 
Evidence of political instability in Kenya emerged through the spontaneous violence 
following the 1992, 2002, 2005 and (most calamitous) 2007 post-elections (Diepeveen, 
2010). The political instability in Kenya could be argued to have led to ethnic politics in 
education in the country (Alwy & Schech, 2004:266; Otieno, 2008). What is evident from the 
literature is that Kenya embraced democratic principles in governance when it attained 
independence and in the period that followed. In 1992, Kenya took a new turn in political 
democracy to multipartyism, which was welcomed with much optimism after the previous 
one-party state (Kagwanja, 2003; Mwiria, 2007). However, in this period, which was 
expected to lead Kenya to embrace democratic processes, the country encountered a myriad 
of conflicts that led to violence during the 2002 elections and in the following years. The 
2007 post-election violence was the most severe and claimed the lives of many (Diepeveen, 
2010; Oucho, 2002). This violence also threatened ethnic coexistence in the universities 
(Otieno, 2008). 
Political violence marred Kenya’s multiparty election in 1992 and 1997 and has since mined 
the road to the 2002 elections and the decisive transition to a post-Moi-era. Over a decade 
after ‘ethnic clashes’ in 1991, Kenya has become a cesspool of all genres of political violence 
and have effectively confined its embryonic democracy to cold storage. Against this backdrop 
of mounting domestic and international pressure for political pluralism, the beleaguered one-
party elite warned that introduction of multiparty system would trigger cataclysmic tribal 
violence that would destroy Kenyan nation. President Moi’s own ethnic group publicly 
demanded the return of majimbo … a notion of ethnic purity which required the expulsion of 
all other ethnic groups from the land occupied by Kalenjin and Maasai before colonialism… 
(Kagwanja, 2003:25).
18
 
                                                 
18
 See details on how Kagwanja (2003) describes the nature of the ethnic politics in Kenya. Kagwanja shows 
how ethnic violence took place culturally. He describes how the Kalenjin ‘warrior’ and the Maasai ‘morrans’ 
dressed in their traditional costumes and descended on non-Kalenjin populations in parts of the Rift Valley, 
Nyanza and Western Kenya. This phenomenon of informal repression, he argues, appeared to be a strategy by 
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Furthermore, an ethnic group called Mungiki emerged that was perceived by scholars to be 
one of the informal repressive political ethnic movements. Kagwanja (2003:29) believes that 
Mungiki is a movement constructed in the context of the culture of violence. He notes that 
this movement was formed as an element of informal repression to achieve ethnic cleansing 
in the 1990s. It can be traced largely to a Kikuyu-based religio-political movement with a 
long history of resistance to civic and religious organisation that transformed into a disruptive 
force espousing political tribalism – resulting in human rights violations and insecurity in 
Nairobi and Central Kenya (Kagwanja, 2003:29). 
Conflicts in Kenya have manifested in diverse ways – the struggle for grazing land for 
pastures; the Somali banditry and insecurity that make that part of the country ungovernable 
unless the military and security forces are in place; the 1997 coastal clashes in Mombasa, 
where immigrant groups in the region such as the Kikuyu, Luo and Akamba were noted to be 
a threat to the indigenous people; and the informal repression of ethnic politics by KANU, 
which led to the violence in Likoni (Oyugi, 2000:3). The ethnic violence in 2007 triggered 
ethnic hatred in universities in Kenya, for instance lecturers at the University of Kenyatta and 
Maseno who belonged to the minority ethnic groups were threatened and had to flee for their 
safety (see Otieno, 2008:24). 
Kagwanja (2003) shows how the ‘retribalization’ of the public sphere sharpened the tensions 
between civic citizenship and ethnic citizenship. State (or civic) citizenship is based on liberal 
notions, while ethnic citizenship is determined by membership of an ethnic group that ensures 
access to social and economic rights, such as the right to land. Kagwanja (2003) shows how 
state citizenship is accelerated by globalisation, and reinforces parochial identities and 
sensibilities. Thus, globalisation allowed ethnic militia to acquire illegal arms by expanding 
cross-border smuggling. This has resulted in the violation of human rights by most ethnic 
groups that have mobilised themselves in politics. 
The patterns and trends depicted in political power in Kenya show that political positions 
have been used as positions of power to accumulate wealth, rather than for good governance. 
Politics in Kenya has also become personalised. As a result, those in politics during 
Kenyatta’s and Moi’s administrations encouraged political tribalism – where ethnic identities 
                                                                                                                                                        
the ruling elite to employ violence to undermine political opposition and to counter multiparty democracy in 
order to remain in the political positions they had held so dearly for 23 years. 
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were used to foster power relations and retain political power. This practice resulted in 
increased corruption, and spontaneous violence became even more prevalent after 1992, and 
has continued up to the present (Diepeveen, 2010). As a result of the political situation in 
Kenya, a constitutional review commission was formed to evaluate the rule of law in relation 
to political power. This process is argued by Diepeveen (2010) to have been an open and 
deliberative process, because it included a survey of and hearings in all the regions in Kenya. 
Diepeveen (2010) indicates that early constitutional reform was rooted in bad and oppressive 
governance and a lack of respect for the separation of power and the rule of law. However, he 
observes that the 2010 constitutional review was inclusive of Kenyans of all regional 
identities. 
Despite the emphasis of the civic education programme on participation and the rule of law, 
in contrast with elitist perspectives, distrust of the leadership prevailed in the public hearings 
during the constitutional review. Diepeveen (2010) notes that, during these hearings, there 
were varied responses from the citizens. Some regions’ responses to the constitutional review 
showed that they had been neglected and excluded from political endeavours in the country. 
These regions had also experienced a lack of access to education, infrastructure and 
educational development, amongst others. 
Before undertaking an analysis of the higher education system, it is important to highlight 
that the mobilisation of ethnicity for political ends has led to ethnic inequalities in education 
in Kenya (see Alwy & Schech, 2004). As such, ethnic inequalities in education in Kenya are 
prevalent when geographical factors and ethnic proximity to the ruling elite are considered. In 
addition to these are factors such as gross enrolment ratios, the number of schools and the 
number of qualified teachers teaching in those schools. Research shows that ‘relatively small 
clearly defined ethnic groups have accumulated an advantage over the majority in the 
national population in terms of education infrastructure and resource’ (Alwy & Schech, 
2004:226). 
3.6. Summary 
This chapter has analysed Kenyan higher education policies within the colonial and post-
colonial settings and revealed how policy in higher education has been conceptualised 
towards democratic citizenship education. It is obvious that Kenyan higher education has 
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survived, from its beginnings in the segregation of education in colonial times to its nuances 
of freedom, equality, cultural heritage, national unity, economic development and potential 
development of skills and abilities to participate in national development in the post-colonial 
epoch.  
What is paramount is that Kenyan higher education has resisted the obstacles of colonial 
domination and dehumanisation to achieve a more democratic ideation, although Kenya 
currently struggles with ethnic division and ethnic violence, despite the liberal bracketing of 
education in most of the commissions, policy documents and reports analysed. Some of the 
concepts that point to DCE include the promotion of cultural heritage – mutual social 
responsibility and respect, human dignity, national unity, national development, equality of 
opportunity, political freedom, social justice, political socialism and freedom of conscience.  
Clearly, liberal thought in education describes an already existing educational setting and 
community, rather than that which is yet to be imagined. This kind of thinking has not 
envisioned the difficulty Kenya faces in ensuring justice for all because of conflicts as a 
result of the plurality of ethnic identities. The political setting in Kenya seems to influence 
the policies in Kenyan higher education and neglects the cultural values that are supposed to 
determine the equality, interaction, public engagement and rationality needed for equal 
opportunities for citizens to engage in policy development and participate in democratic 
citizenry on the basis of the relevant education.  
In the next chapter I will show how the conceptualisation of higher education as a community 
in the becoming can help us think differently about Kenyan higher education. 
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  Chapter Four
THE NEXUS: LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP 
EDUCATION AND KENYA’S HIGHER EDUCATION 
SYSTEM 
4.1. Introduction 
Democratic citizenship education (DCE) as depicted in Chapter 2 provides a liberal 
understanding for conceptualising education. DCE is not a given; it is an actively constructed 
concept. Within the liberal setting, DCE highlights the significance of responsibility, 
belonging, rights and freedoms in assisting individuals to cultivate their potential by escaping 
the restrictions of social status, traditional roles and ascribed fixed identities (Waghid, 
2013:9). For liberals, such practices are made possible when legal systems are organised so 
that they promote liberal values of freedoms and human rights. For instance, the current 
Kenyan education policy is arguably founded on liberal principles. It emphasises that 
students should be equipped with skills and knowledge to enable them to utilise their 
potential individually and collectively in service of national development and national unity 
to achieve social equality, religious freedom and the promotion of cultural heritage, equal 
opportunity and equal distribution of public goods, with specific emphasis of education as a 
public good (Johnson, 2013:331; Osler & Starkey, 2005:19). Liberal perspectives provide a 
limited understanding of individual human rights and do not ensure that equality is achieved 
(Osler & Starkey, 2005:19). This is most evident in the example of Kenyan education, where 
unequal access to university education is still prevalent; and also in the fact that the gap 
between the poor and the rich is alarming and that ethnic discrimination and violence remain 
problems. Nevertheless, the liberal policies of the Kenyan education system promote equity 
as a target of education. 
This chapter analyses Kenyan higher democratic citizenship education with focused links to 
the three liberal strands depicted in Chapter 2, namely public reason (Rawls, 1971); 
communicative action (Habermas, 1987a & b); and democratic iteration (Benhabib, 2011a). 
The reason for doing this is to reconceptualise and address the question whether the depicted 
liberal thought can address ethnic conflicts and, at the same time, whether it has addressed 
the intentions of Kenyan higher education towards egalitarian and democratic education as 
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engendered in the current policy documents, namely Vision 2030 and the University 
Education Act of 2012. The question is also raised whether education, according to the 
policies/acts, is adequately engendering the education that Kenya needs. The analysis in this 
chapter will show that the Kenyan education policies depict a democratic citizenship 
education that already exists within the liberal framework, especially that discussed in 
Chapter 2, yet also is absent in certain instances. One example is the prevalence of 
inequalities and violence that negate the values of deliberative democracy. In this chapter, I 
argue that the liberal DCE presented in Chapter 2 is narrowly conceptualised in terms of 
responsibility, rights and belonging (Waghid, 2013:9). Then, I will show how nationalistic 
framings have posed challenges to Kenyan higher education.  
Democratic citizenship education in a Derridian sense is established through various subjects 
or agents who actually produce and consume it (Waghid, 2002:86). Derrida (1988) notes that 
we can never arrive at a meaning of a concept that can be said to be actual. This is because 
the meanings of words can never be actualised perfectly, because when we look for the 
potentiality
19
 of concepts we realise that they also have impotentialities
20
 of meanings when 
they fail to address the problems at hand. In such thinking, meaning making becomes a 
constant activity. 
This chapter argues that liberal DCE in Kenya higher education is thin on the basis that it 
gives distorted views of participation [including deliberation] and belonging. Kenyan higher 
education is limited in its conceptualisation of DCE because of its nationalistic cleavage that 
narrows education to national development and neglects humanistic overtones. Despite the 
fact that Kenyan universities are purposed to teaching, research and community service, 
including their role in shaping a civilised and democratic society in order to liberate minds 
and contribute to shaping an inclusive society, their realisation is still a blur (Nyaigotti-
                                                 
19
 I consider potentiality as the capacity to do something (Waghid, 2013:24), for instance Bryan’s (2009:736) 
ideas of ‘potentiality’ and ‘actuality’ in describing friendship in a Derridian sense apply potentiality and 
actuality to describe ‘how human beings become excellent by becoming who they are’. He notes that human 
beings become who they are only because of the possibilities they have to engage with each other. This process 
of engagement provides possibilities for becoming human. In the same vein, I use these concepts to explain 
democratic citizenship education as signalling the tensions in the nuances of potentialities and impotentialities 
for DCE in becoming in order to disrupt the three liberal strands analysed in Chapter 2, and to advance plausible 
nuances for Kenyan higher education. 
20
 Impotentialities represent the incapacity [lack of capacity] of a concept to do what it is intended to do – this 
happens when the actual fails to manifest. For instance, certain concepts can be portrayed as having the capacity 
to solve particular problems, and then, when put into action, prove otherwise, prove incapacious even though 
they display limited capacities [potentiality]. 
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Chacha, 2002:7). For instance, in Kenya, the meaning of citizenship as leading to 
bureaucratic enterprise, the culture of capitalism, international aid and sovereignty has 
assumed centre stage in higher education. This kind of shift means that, even though Africa is 
a distinct continent [and Kenya a distinct nation], its decisions and conceptualisation 
[including what education means] are still incommensurate with the aspirations of Kenyan 
higher education. Despite the massification and expansion of universities to allow equal 
opportunities, there still are challenges in relation to access. For instance, students from low-
income backgrounds continue to be underrepresented in universities. In addition, the 
computer-based access selection criteria deny entry to applicants who may have been 
admitted if entrance examinations were used (Nyaigotti-Chacha, 2002:7). Nationalistic 
discourses encourage ethnocentrism, violence and xenophobia because they draw distinct 
lines between those who are Kenyans and those who are not, and between those who belong 
to a particular tribe and those who do not belong (cf. Chapter 3 and Broch-Due, 2005:3; 
Nasong’o, 2010:221; Osler & Starkey, 2005:20).  
A nationalistic conception of DCE therefore is not enough to engender education, which is 
thin and weak for several reasons. Firstly, the structural policies intended to develop effective 
public services [including higher education] have turned out to be masking corruption, 
inequalities, academic capitalism and the force of privatisation from the liberal (international) 
push for development (Calvert & Muchira-Tirima, 2013; Chege, 1998; Otieno & Munene, 
2007:461). This has led to a breakdown in the redistributive functions of the national state 
and to its inability to cater for the welfare, education and health of and to provide services to 
its citizens (Broch-Due, 2005:3). This is mostly so because the increasing demands to educate 
citizens has attracted international aid and donors who dictate policies [even though alien and 
inappropriate] to necessitate educational policy and practices, hence pose challenges to 
academic planning and the intensification of the education process. Chege, a scholar who 
once was a lecturer at the University of Nairobi, recounts his experiences and notes that the 
challenges facing Kenyan higher education institutions are not money or infrastructure, but a 
lack of ‘professional and moral integrity among influential Kenyan academics and university 
administrators, who squander and mismanage what funds they have and dishonour basic 
academic ethics’ (Chege, 1998:B9). This illustrates how citizenship in Kenya undermines the 
integrity of higher education in Kenya. Secondly, post-colonialism has resulted in uncertainty 
about the legitimacy of established identities, rights and claims in that violence [a force for 
social (re)construction that extends from the post-colonial state and its international relations] 
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is often used to establish and reinforce specific ideas about identity and belonging that are 
considered essential (Broch-Due, 2005:2). According to Broch-Due (2005:1), violence in 
Africa [Kenya alike] and the world over has escalated from the intrinsic modern, translocal, 
national bureaucracies and business interests (capitalism). In Africa, for instance, Broch-Due 
(2005) points out that multiparty democracy, privatisation and structural adjustment have 
increased instability and violence in Africa, and Kenya has not been immune to this.  
Violence in Kenya has taken many dimensions. Evident in Kenyan higher education are 
student riots, which have resulted in violence, academic disruption and the temporary closure 
of universities in the country (Chege, 1998:B9; Tunbridge, 1997:A37). The major causes of 
such violence among university students have been identified to be protests against 
legislation to hike tuition fees and the tightening of the collection of student loans, which the 
government originally gave as grants, and was implemented by a board that students 
considered corrupt (Chege, 1998:B9). This escalated into violent disruptions in which 
students were dispersed by paramilitary police using tear gas and clubs to remove the 
students from the university premises, and some were left dead and others injured (Chege, 
1998; Tunbridge, 1997). In addition, ethnic violence has led to the instability of higher 
education institutions, and also has cultivated societal hatred and division among so-called 
citizens (Broch-Due, 2005:6; Johnson, 2013:329). Johnson (2013) notes that the 2007 post-
election violence over the contested election results contributed immensely to conflicts and 
division within Kenya’s public universities. At the heart of the conflict, students, faculty and 
staff turned against one another and impaired their sense of belonging [relationships] and the 
ability of higher education institutions in Kenya to contribute to national development as part 
of a national agenda for the institutions. In this regard, universities had to change their 
internal policies to deal with such conflict situations in order to build peace (Johnson, 2013). 
Broch-Due (2005:6), on the other hand, notes that ethnicity has been used to explain violence 
in Africa, yet the complexity of the violence is related to identities formed around gender, 
generation, locality, class, religion, nationality and difference, rather than the universal mask 
of ethnicity. Regarding gender inequality, for instance, Sifuna (2006:85) claims that gender 
was not a determinant and or an essential framework in educational policy formulation during 
the colonial epoch; however, the post-colonial epoch has increased the inclusion of women in 
higher education. Even though the improvement is noticed, exclusion is still persistent as a 
result of this legacy, since women’s participation in higher education currently presents 
instances of inequality (Odhiambo, 2011:667; Sifuna, 2006:85). For this reason, Sifuna 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
110 
 
(2006), Otieno and Munene (2007) and Odhiambo (2011) urge the Kenyan government to 
revisit its education policies and legislation to address this phenomenon of gender inequality, 
amongst other disparities in policy formulation.  
Boit and Kipkoech (2012:78), however, note that, over the years, the Kenyan government has 
made an effort to equalise educational opportunities for its citizens, although there still are 
lingering disparities. Participation in and access to education institutions remains highly 
unequal, and the various socio-economic groups in education are considered to be the cause 
of such disparities. According to Boit and Kipkoech (2012), higher education is biased for 
and against particular groups of people in society, especially in terms of the social class 
composition of students. In this sense, Boit and Kipkoech (2012) argue that the provision of 
financial support to the needy student is a solution to these disparities. This view is in 
contrast to Chege’s earlier proposition, that academic and management integrity are more 
fundamental to citizenship development than financial factors [in as much as this also 
counts], since finances abound in Kenya. These aspects point to the complexity of the 
citizenship education challenges in Kenya. 
Another challenge faced by Kenyan higher education is the massification [rapid enrolment]
21
 
of universities and their expansion, and the impact these aspects have had on the quality of 
citizenship education cultivated for critical citizenship. Much emphasis on the marketisation 
of courses taught at the universities has led to the neglect of nationally needed programmes. 
This is partly so because the challenges of parallel degree programmes have resulted in 
lecturers not committing to any institution, because they are doing part-time lecturing (work) 
at several institutions to meet their financial needs (Nyaigotti-Chacha, 2002:7). Even though 
parallel programmes are available, there is limited opportunity for part-time classes for 
students, so those who wish to access such opportunities cannot. This kind of move has led to 
the commercialisation of Kenyan higher education, in which quality [critical citizenship] is 
compromised (Nyaigotti-Chacha, 2002:7). Research by Odhiambo (2011) and Misaro, Jonyo 
and Kariuki (2013) on the quality of higher education in Kenya illustrates how politics has 
led to the indiscriminate expansion of higher education in Kenya, which has resulted in a risk 
                                                 
21
 Massification, as described by Misaro et al. (2013), signifies ‘rapid enrolment of students’ at the university 
without considering the impacts this has on the workload of lecturers or the implications for lecturer-student 
ratios and the available infrastructure. They note that this has deteriorated the quality of higher education in 
Kenya and caused Kenyan universities to be run as businesses/enterprises without quality. I therefore argue that 
such policy formulation excludes significant stakeholders and diminishes the quality of citizenship education, 
hence limits space for deliberation, participation and critical citizenship. 
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to quality education. Such expansion has had an impact on the lives and identities of 
academics in Kenyan universities. To such an extent that new higher education institutions 
are rapidly increasing bureaucracy and accountability, offering innovative ways of 
management and limited academic freedom (Calvert & Muchira-Tirima, 2013:403). 
According to Misaro et al. (2013:139), the mass expansion of higher education has dragged 
Kenyan universities into crisis in terms of quality, relevance, sustainable financing, limited 
research and low staff morale [especially because their workload has increased due to the 
double intake in parallel degree programmes and the regular programmes being conducted by 
the same academics]. For this reason, egalitarian practices in Kenyan higher education 
institutions have become a challenge. Odhiambo (2011) suggests that a new model of 
leadership is needed to deal with the rapid expansion of higher education institutions in 
Kenya. In this regard, questions that arise are: does policy formulation in Kenya consider the 
perceptions [viewpoints] of students, lecturers and administrators regarding this policy 
formulation? What critical skills do Kenyan higher education institutions cultivate to enable 
students to engage in such spaces to create a sense of belonging for them without violent 
disruption? 
I illustrate in this chapter how such links can contribute to DCE in Kenya and, at the same 
time, recognise the foundations they lay for re-imagining DCE in Kenya. In addition to the 
concepts presented in Chapter 2, liberal democratic citizenship education highlights the 
functions of education to achieve intersubjective, mutual interaction through collective effort, 
to prepare citizens to participate in public deliberations about issues of justice and morality, 
and to focus on developing capabilities for reasoned arguments in both the written and oral 
form.  
For instance, national borders have become porous, and communication, migration and 
international relations present ever-changing educational terrains. In the light of this, a 
cosmopolitan view of citizenship education presents a more plausible perspective for framing 
education and education policies. Osler and Starkey (2005:20) suggest that cosmopolitanism 
provides a more plausible conception of citizenship because it challenges purely nationalistic 
education. Cosmopolitanism creates a sense of belonging to a human community that draws 
its values from such a community. Constructing education from a cosmopolitan perspective 
does not devalue nationalistic education, but sees it as a springboard for generating 
humanistic values that are universal to humanity. ‘Cosmopolitan citizens process their 
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multiple identities … they actively reflect on the communities to which they belong and the 
links that join these communities. In so doing, cosmopolitan citizens recognise others as 
essentially similar to themselves and arrive at a sense of citizenship based on a consciousness 
of humanity rather than on allegiance to a state (Osler & Starkey, 2005:20). 
Further, I argue in this chapter for the use of Derrida’s (1997) and Agamben’s (2007) ideas of 
the ‘actuality’ and ‘potentiality’ of post-liberal democratic citizenship education to disrupt the 
liberal understanding developed in Chapter 2 in order to achieve a thicker understanding, 
which offers a reimagined view of DCE that has the potential to make Kenyan universities 
excellent as democratic institutions that propagate citizenry and curb ethnic violence in the 
country. In addition, the notion of Ubuntu within African philosophy circles will assist in 
contextualising DCE for the African context, which also offers a way of thinking differently 
about DCE, thus making it substantive (thick). This is aimed at expanding the liberal DCE 
functions and, at the same time, extending the post-liberal perspective of education as a 
process in becoming (Agamben, 1993; Derrida, 1988; Waghid, 2013:9; 2014). 
4.2. Flaws in Democratic Citizenship Education in Kenyan Higher 
Education 
4.2.1. Deliberation and Governance 
Deliberation and governance are core to universities’ role in shaping a civilised and 
democratic society. Kaimenyi (2013) noted in a stakeholder workshop that Kenyan 
universities have experienced weak governance and management. This is felt most especially 
in the separation of powers that delinked channels for communication, hence the unrest in 
various sectors in university education in Kenya. Nyaigotti-Chacha (2002) notes that 
universities in Kenya are considered as engines of economic growth, and they also play a role 
to liberate minds and contribute to cultivating a democratic and inclusive society. To do this, 
universities need to be innovative, a lack of which is detrimental to civil society’s 
responsibility for social justice. Since independence there have been several attempts to 
reform education in Kenya (Chege, 2009; Eshiwani, 1990; Makori, 2005; Maxon, 1995 
Muricho & Chang’ach, 2013; Mwiria et al., 2007; Posner & Kramon, 2011; Republic of 
Kenya, 2010; 2012; Sifuna, 2010). The reforms took the form of recommendations, 
commissions and policy articulation. Despite these attempts, the implementation of reformed 
policies has proven cumbersome and has resulted in more educational problems; for instance, 
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an increase in ethnic conflict and political violence that has led to the death of many citizens 
– which can be attributed partially to communicative problems [a lack of inclusive 
deliberation] (Posner & Kramon, 2011). For this reason, the policies have not served Kenya 
well. Policy development in Kenya shows a trend of excluding stakeholders in policy 
modification. It is clear from the analysis in Chapter 3 that policy development in Kenya has 
been delegated to a few political elites. This is exemplified in the top-down administration of 
policies from the political elite to the university administrators. It is clear from the literature 
that, when the policies are handed down to the universities’ administrators, they are required 
to be implemented without questioning. For instance, during the Moi Regime, the 
administrators of universities were forced to implement reforms without questioning, and 
failure to do so led to termination of employment and more (Muricho & Chang’ach, 2013). 
This negates the democratic ideals postulated by the liberal concerns in Chapter 2. On the 
other hand, the failure to implement the various educational policies and commissions, 
especially the 8-4-4 curriculum, can be linked to poor communication and a lack of 
participation by the stakeholders in education in Kenya. The reaction of the mass of citizens 
to the failure of the 8-4-4 system of education and the workload that came with it, leading to 
demands for reforms, is an indicator of communicative problems in the construction of 
education in Kenya. Muricho and Chang’ach (2013:123) indicate the difficulty of 
operationalising the objectives of the science and technology CAP Act 250 due to a lack of 
coordination and communication between the various ministries that coordinate policy 
development and implementation. There is a need to develop interactive channels, a sense of 
community of practice and public deliberation within higher education. A lack of 
communication and coordination among policy makers and higher education stakeholders is 
paralysing the implementation of policy, as documented on liberal DCE in the analysis in 
Chapter 2. The other question could be whether a liberal bracketing of education in Kenya is 
plausible. Goodman (2007:193) notes that reflexive solidarities between nationalism and 
globalism affect how democratisation operates in nation states. He notes that 
cosmopolitanism brings with it normative ideas that disrupts inclusive forms of national 
identity. He suggests that there should be a balance between global demands and national 
divides. 
The restructuring of education policies in the post-colonial period took place in the years 
1964, 1976, 1981, 1985, 1988, 1999 and 2005 [cf. policy analysis in Chapter 3] (Eshiwani, 
1990; Ogot, 1995a; Republic of Kenya, 1964; 1976; 1981; 1999), but there still are 
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challenges in terms of leadership and the relevance (Misaro et al., 2013) of the education and 
the suitability of graduates for the job market in Kenya, despite education policies 
emphasising aspects of capacity building, for instance human resources and skills for job 
markets, as core roles of university education (Calvert & Muchira-Tirima, 2013; Court, 1980; 
Chege, 1998; Odhiambo, 2011; Otieno & Munene, 2007:461). Another challenge Kenya 
faces is rapid expansion of higher education in terms of enrolment in proportion to available 
resources. This expansion is experiencing a crisis because of the deteriorating quality and 
relevance of education, for instance the available infrastructure, leadership and student 
enrolment are not sustainable. This is most pressing in relation to staff morale and workload, 
as it reduces the research output that is needed for universities as centres of development 
[which is a policy requirement for university education] (Misaro et al., 2013). Liberal DCE in 
Kenya is thin because it portrays the impotentialities of the available leadership in higher 
education institutions in their inadequacy to deal with the rapid expansion of education and 
the quality of education that its institutions offer in equipping its citizens. Kenyans still long 
for a change in education, although at the same time have resisted change. The question could 
be asked why these problems still persist. Do Kenyans still plan their education system? The 
lack of democratic communication [participation and deliberation] and of inclusive practices 
in decision making on public higher education has contributed to resistance to change. I also 
question the nature of the education that goes on in the classrooms in relation to 
communicative action. Part of the problem is related to the lack of resources, population 
growth and an obsession with consumerism among the elite; however, the major problem is 
related to the communication channels in higher education (Muricho & Chang’ach, 2011). 
Student strikes and riots are other indicators of a lack of cultivation of a democratic 
community in Kenya. However, following Cavell (1979), there seems to be little wrong with 
an argument for human agency along the lines of assuming responsibility. Participants in 
higher education should be held responsible for their capabilities to change societal 
impediments to higher education like, violence.  For instance, students, management and the 
lecturers could assume the responsibility to deliberate amicably on disputes at stake, thereby 
avoiding violent options. Chege (1998) and Tunbridge (1997) show how violence erupted 
among students upon the passing of legalisation to change into student loans money that 
initially was given as grants. The student riots, according to Chege (1998) and Tunbridge 
(1997), were escalated by the students’ knowledge that the management of such loans was in 
the hands of corrupt leaders who would give loans to those they preferred. If communicative 
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channels were put in place to deal with students’ anxieties, would there have been an eruption 
of violence? As indicated earlier, equal opportunity is a necessity for a democratic university. 
However, student riots, as explained in Chapter 3, are an indication that student voices had 
been unheard for a period of time in Kenya and that this had tampered with democratic values 
for citizenship. By saying this I am not implying that universities should be paradigms of 
perfection. But, as institutions of learning, they should acknowledge students’ voices and 
involve the communicative abilities of citizens to be present in egalitarian spaces where they 
are recognised as part of the university community and can contribute to reforms in university 
education. There is a saying that changing universities is as difficult as moving graveyards. 
This is not what I am trying to do. What I am emphasising specifically is that communication 
that leads to understanding in the Habermasian sense has something to offer university 
education in Kenya. For instance, university education will be engendered to build social 
intelligence, which will enable students to live together with others and participate in 
diversity – thereby dealing with the anomalies and imbalances of ethnic diversity in the 
country. 
4.2.2. Equality 
The notion of equality can be derived from policy sentiments/principles of education and 
development throughout the history of education and policy in Kenya. Formal education 
involves selecting and sorting out the skills that every individual has to acquire by the end of 
every level of schooling. In Kenya, reforms in higher education are championed by the push 
from a declining economy, population growth and increasing sectorial competition for scarce 
financial resources and the neo-liberal policies that dictate policy reforms for financing 
higher education (Otieno & Munene, 2007). This has resulted in the rapid expansion of 
universities, leading to the marketisation of universities as enterprises, which poses 
challenges and risks to students, academics and higher education institutions in Kenya – 
making equality necessary and yet allowing it to become impossible. Otieno and Munene 
(2007) note that such policy shifts threaten equity, since universities face the risks of 
academic capitalism, which means that universities are run more like businesses instead of 
paying attention to the country’s needs – for instance educating critical citizens who would 
become participants to counter poverty, violence [war] and other ills that may hamper a 
peaceful society (Johnson, 2013:330). Johnson (2013:331) shows that universities in sub-
Saharan Africa [Kenya included] have been conceptualised as serving the rich, the elite and 
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the politically connected, and notes that this will result in ‘maldevelopment, social 
stratification and the centralization of knowledge’, which will undermine the concept of a 
university as engendering equality. 
Accordingly, inculcating cultural heritage is a broad policy statement contained in policy 
documents throughout the history of Kenyan education. This concept is broad enough to 
cover issues from cultural instruction to the norms associated with adult membership in 
society (Eshiwani, 1990; Nyaigotti-Chacha, 2008:7; Republic of Kenya, 1976). In this sense, 
civic and citizenship education are commonly taught. Morality [conduct] and good grammar 
are both taught in higher education in Kenya. However, deliberative socialisation is far 
removed from real schooling in Kenyan higher education. Much of citizenship education 
includes nationalism in relation to independence, harambee [self-help projects] and African 
socialism. Kenya has strived to inculcate the ideas of equality in its education policy 
statements to instil the notions of liberty of person; freedom of speech, thought and faith; 
right to own property; and rights to justice (Eshiwani, 1990; Luescher-Mamshela et al. 
2011:xvii, Mwiria, 2007; Ogot, 1995a; Prewitt, 1972:5; Republic of Kenya, 1964; 1976; 
1981:5; 1999; 2010; 2012). Liberalism and political citizenship in Kenya and in its education 
policies can be traced to the attainment of independence [achievement of a republic and 
freedom from colonial rule], which improved the rights to economic welfare and security for 
the country’s citizens. 
Despite the massive effort to liberalise education policy in Kenya, equality has not been 
achieved. In Prewitt’s (1972:8) words, ‘there has not been levelling of societies’. In Kenya 
today, citizens are still stratified in terms of wealth, power, ethnicity and difference (Hornsby, 
2012). Governance [political power] and access to higher education institutions are still 
linked to minority groups. Inequalities of status remain a problem in Kenya. Some citizens 
count, while others are ignored or are hardly noticed. 
Education in Kenya simultaneously promotes the conditions for equality and the conditions 
for inequality. Put differently, higher education is Kenya promotes equality in the sense that it 
enables an individual’s increase in skills and aims at improving the economic wealth and 
state of the country. However, it also promotes inequality in the way it cultivates hierarchies 
according to class, status and power (Hornsby, 2012:818). A lack of critical skills in 
education cripples critical citizenship and marginalises those who are not able to acquire or 
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access education. Education ought to open spaces for all citizens to claim rights to be 
different. Prewitt (1972:7) rightly points out that, ‘if equality implies that education should be 
accessible to all, it also implies that each individual has the right to be educated according to 
his talents and ambitions’. In this case, the policy formulations in education should consider 
the equality of all human beings, irrespective of their geographical origin or ethnic affiliation. 
Equal opportunity means equal chance to display difference. 
In the light of the aforementioned, I will argue here that, even though education policy in 
Kenya promotes equal educational opportunities in higher education, opportunities for 
education are not equally available to all in the country. I will also point out instances in 
which this manifests. First, the geographical location [space and place] in which an individual 
grows up determines his/her chances to access higher education [the question of quality]. 
Those who grow up or go to school in the central province have greater access to prestigious 
higher education institutions than those from other parts of the country (Mwiria, 2007), for 
instance those from the eastern part of the country. This is because the availability of quality 
higher education institutions in Kenya was centralised in the capital, making it difficult for 
people from other parts of the country to access them. The quality of higher education 
institutions also varies in terms of quality of instruction, facilities and resources, as well as 
academic standards. Geographical inequalities are also expressed in rural and urban 
differences. For instance, universities located in Nairobi are mostly regarded as prestigious. 
Even though many people from other provinces get access to rural universities, they prefer to 
be in the prestigious ones due to the lack of facilities and poor quality of instruction found in 
the rural universities. In the central part of Kenya, facilities are of high quality and levels of 
instruction are better because of more qualified academic personnel. Therefore, educational 
opportunities in Kenya are not distributed equally. 
Educational opportunities in Kenya are also influenced by family loyalty (Prewitt, 1972:10). 
Most elite
22
 parents secure positions and cultivate relationships with power to acquire 
positions for their children in universities they have attended or to which they have ties. 
Wealthier parents also get more access for their children, for instance to the parallel 
programme at Nairobi University that caters for Module C students – students with university 
qualifications who are not considered via direct entry because of the demands and cut-off 
                                                 
22
 The term elite as used here refers to ‘influential subgroups within ethnic groups’ and classes that control every 
sector, including access to higher education institutions and economic access (Brass, 1991:14).  
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points for entry in a given year. Such students are then given access based on whether they 
can afford to pay [they pay more than regular students] or whether they have ties to the 
institutions. Thus, educational opportunities in Kenya are obtained through family 
connections and ties, except students who can afford to pay through the indirect route, like 
Module C entries. The question that arises is: what happens to those students with similar 
qualifications who cannot afford to pay? 
Paradoxically, meritocracy plays a big role in selecting educational opportunities in Kenyan 
higher education institutions. Prewitt (1972:13) notes that educational attainment, merit 
considerations, qualifications and job performance determine access to prestigious positions 
in Kenya. On the other hand, favouritism, patronage, social connections, ethnic affiliations 
and political loyalties determine opportunities to access higher education. In essence, equal 
opportunities are not considered in relation to being human, with the intelligibilities that 
come with it. In other words, inequality is the norm propagated by the most privileged 
citizens, which is contrary to what is articulated in policy. 
The question that arises is: how can democratic citizenship education, career mobility and 
occupational status be determined by merit and performance if factors such as tribalism [and 
ethnicity] and patronage play a decisive role? There is a strong emphasis on patriotism and 
paternalism in Kenyan higher education – blind patriotism by those who are marginalised in 
society, and paternalism by those destined to occupy privileged positions. This situation in 
Kenya presents a narrow understanding of self in relation to society.  
It was noted in the analysis in Chapter 3 that various commissions were used in the process of 
reforming education in Kenya. It also is evident that there has been limited collaboration 
among stakeholders in higher education, which makes the governing of universities 
problematic. Policy documents were analysed and an articulation of unity, justice and 
democracy was at the forefront of the description of the purposes of education in Kenya (cf. 
Chapter 3; Nyaigotti-Chacha, 2008; Republic of Kenya, 2010). However, policy 
implementation has been problematic in practice. Most particular is the issue of justice and 
how it plays out in policy formulations. For instance, a few political elites are seen to be the 
only ones running education reforms in Kenya, marginalising the majority from decision 
making. As a result there has been much resistance to education reform in higher education, 
as exemplified in the many student strikes. These strikes point to the fact that students’ voices 
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have been silenced, leading to them, at times, having to raise their voices violently (details in 
Chapter 3). Nyaigotti-Chacha (2002:7) notes that funding education is Kenya in done through 
the Higher Education Loan Board (HELB), which is directed at specific universities rather 
than to students and programmes. This, he notes, restricts students’ choices in terms of 
university programmes they would like to follow. On the other hand, Boit and Kipkoech 
(2012:1) note that there still are disparities, especially in inequitable access and participation 
by various socio-economic groups.  
4.2.3. Access 
Access to universities is contentious, unequal and exclusive (Furlong & Cartmel, 2009:17). 
The Kenyan government has attempted to equalise opportunities for higher education, but 
there is apprehension about disparities in access and participation by several socio-economic 
groups. Endeavours to democratise access promoted by public subsidies do not seem to have 
had any meaningful influence on the participation in Kenyan higher education by students 
from the lower end of the socio-economic scale (Boit & Kipkoech, 2012:79; Kinyanjui, 2007; 
Nyaigotti-Chacha, 2002). The number of students from low-income background continues to 
diminish in higher education. In addition, access to universities currently is problematic; it is 
interesting to note that access to universities in Kenya is based on how much money an 
individual is able to pay for access. Those who qualify have no assurance that they will have 
opportunities to access higher education because the economic factor has been proven to be 
the key determinant of entry. The question is: how just is this process when it includes some 
and excludes others? Who participated in making such policies that exclude? Is this policy in 
tandem with justice as described in the liberal strands of DCE analysed in Chapter 2? 
Another access challenge in Kenyan higher education is the computer-based selection of 
those who gain access. Nyaigotti-Chacha (2002:28) notes that selection according to 
computer criteria denies access to applicants who may have been admitted if entrance 
examinations were used. He suggests that other avenues be explored to improve access to 
higher education. For instance, he suggests that computer-based selection criteria deny 
applicants who may have gained access if entrance was determined through interactive, 
rational ways such as personal statements, recommendations from schools and entrance 
examinations, because these may provide an understanding of the individuals’ potential. 
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Instances of injustice in Kenya cannot be overlooked, because they have resulted in so much 
commotion and unrest in the country. The distribution of universities, for example, has not 
addressed the country’s demographics, and their geographical location does not allow equal 
opportunities for access by the different ethnic groups. This means that some ethnic groups 
have had more access to universities than others. Apart from access, the quality of the 
universities that have risen in Kenya is alarming. Universities have opened in centres in 
various provinces to cater for those who previously did not have access because of the 
unequal distribution of universities, but the issue is that the quality offered at these centres 
does not compare with that on the main campuses, because most of them do not have the 
qualified staff, resources and infrastructure that universities demand. This undermines the 
principles of justice that Rawls proposes. Is it just that the ethnically divided provinces have 
inferior university centres with very limited resources? Will such universities achieve the role 
of universities as a hub of knowledge for developing a just citizenry? What equal platforms 
can these centres create, for instance to alleviate injustice and ethnic tensions? 
Interestingly, private universities in Kenya are on the increase, with the intention being to 
increase access. However, the rise of private universities is a challenge because it they are for 
a select few. This is so because these universities are very expensive (Eisemon, 1992:157), 
and some socio-economic groups cannot afford access to such institutions, hence the problem 
of accessibility and inequality posed by private universities in Kenya (Nyaigotti-Chacha, 
2002.  
4.2.4. Public Reasonableness 
The Kenyan constitution [Chapter 2, article 10] provides rights to fundamental freedoms 
(Republic of Kenya, 2010), specifically freedom of expression, freedom of association, 
academic freedom and access to justice. While public reasonableness is highlighted in the 
constitution, there seems to be discrepancies between what is constitutional and the reality in 
the everyday running of university and societal interactions. Kenyan higher education seems 
to be an example of a lack of and or an actualised understanding of public reasonableness 
(Hornsby, 2012:537; Knighton, 2010:107). Students, academics and management alike, could 
avoid violence by taking responsible action in exercising their public reason as a potentiality.. 
Following the analysis in Chapter 3, it could be argued that  colonial education had a greater 
influence to unresponsive and an unquestioning culture among Kenyans in relation exercising 
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their agency [to authority] – Kenyans were taught to respect authority and never to question 
it. This negates Habermas’s (1987) communicative freedom and undermines the human need 
for interaction. These issues penetrated post-colonial education. With reference to the 
analysis in Chapter 3, it is evident that, even at the level of university education, the political 
elite silenced academics teaching public reasonableness, and students were not encouraged to 
question or engage in public discourses about public policy or to question political authority 
in Kenya (Hornsby, 2012:269). Today, with limited freedom of communication [even though 
the constitution provides space for academic freedom, and freedom of expression], Kenyans 
would rather keep quiet about their problems in order to maintain the peace. This has 
remained one of the uncontainable issues that erupted in several instances of violence, 
culminating in the ethnic violence in 2007 (cf. Chapter 3). I will discuss this further in 
Chapter 5. 
4.2.5. Iterations and Human Rights  
From the analysis in Chapter 3, iterations of access, governance, equality and the quality of 
education in Kenya need to attract parents, academics, politicians and all other stakeholders 
with an interest in Kenyan higher education to conceptualise education that can provide 
innovative solutions to Kenya’s problems. By saying this I do not mean that iteration will 
solve Kenya’s problems instantly, but that a lack of this has a negative effect on the country’s 
education. Examples are the critical state of poverty that keeps many away from higher 
education; the reality that ethnic politics has contributed to the conflict and violence that have 
destabilised the running of universities, as well as given rise to ethnic hatred among citizens; 
and the domination of the decision-making process by the political elites, thus excluding the 
majority of Kenyans. 
Iterations should also provoke deliberations on how quality universities, similar to the ones 
accessed by the majority, can be established so that the ethnic minorities without access to 
quality education and other resources can gain these. Benhabib illustrates how human rights 
entail moral principles that protect the communicative freedom of the individual – a 
justification that provokes Kenyans to claim a consensus for deliberation by all without 
exclusion. This is because human rights call for mutual respect. For instance, the post-
election violence that ended the life of many Kenyans signifies a lack of respect for the 
human right to life. It also illustrates the inability of Kenyans to engage in dialogue to solve 
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their differences. If one respects another’s right to life, one does so in a moral sense, so as to 
preserve their life. Therefore, one ought not to end another’s life, as doing so infringes on 
another’s right to life. As such, one should not protect one’s own right while infringing on the 
right of others. Benhabib argues that we should respect another’s capacity to communicate in 
a reciprocal way. In this way, when faced with opposition one can respect the other’s 
communicative freedom, so that both parties can talk back to each other in order to contribute 
to addressing public concerns – an act of necessity for a world republic [humanity]. Only a 
member of a human republic will allow another a chance to communicate freely. In this 
section, I have addressed the challenges and flaws that Kenyan liberal DCE poses for the 
country. In the next section I will view these challenges in terms of the minimalist 
understanding of liberal DCE. 
4.3. Viewing the Challenges in Tune with a Minimalist View of 
Liberal Democratic Citizenship Education 
Democratic communication recognises the equality of citizens (Benhabib, 1996; 2011a; 
Dewey, 1916; Habermas, 1987a & b; Rawls, 1971). It is interesting to note that the political 
elites in Kenya have interfered with this conception of citizenship in such a way that some 
citizens are preferred to others in the way the political elites dominate the formulation and 
administration of policies, leaving out the voices of the majority, yet using the concept of 
equality in framing policy reforms in education. Of particular interest is the political 
influence in education reform, which has resulted in the failure to implement the 
recommendations of education commissions, for instance the Mackay Commission, which 
has led to technical vocational and practical education remaining a challenge for the country. 
Education planning needs to be done over a reasonable period of time, with the stakeholders 
being included through democratic participation [communication] – not through a coercive 
strategy or [dictatorial] power relation; all citizens should be included as equal participants. 
This does not suggest that anyone can formulate education policy, but just means that the 
voices of the masses that have an interest in university education be heard when considering 
policy formulation.  
Communication is a core feature in education and is depicted in liberal strands of thought as 
providing favourable conditions for participative learning experiences (as discussed earlier in 
Chapter 2). Communication, as depicted by Habermas (1987), is a democratic action that 
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enables understanding and consensus in public deliberation on education. In his 
communicative theory, Habermas sheds light on democratic deliberation as a necessity for 
the equality of citizens and for the opportunities they have to voice their thoughts and 
contribute to their own learning and to matters of public concern. Habermas’s theory has 
historical links that encourage discourses within contextual histories to disrupt modern 
notions of democratic education. As such, he offers a theory of communicative action to 
emancipate rationality and reflexivity for meaning making in education theory, policy and 
practice. This assumption of Habermas requires a reciprocal ‘ear’ to listen actively to what is 
being communicated and being able to act communicatively, rather than being passive. This 
process requires clear, critical and logical communication that leads to understanding. At the 
same time, it requires a reciprocal action of listening, hearing and response – leading to 
understanding – so that citizens can communicate with each other in order to act 
appropriately. What Habermas suggests can assist in developing education policy and other 
public concerns that require stakeholder agreement; for instance, policies that will reflect the 
voices of all involved in structuring education. The voices of students should be reflected in 
particular, as they are often forgotten in policy deliberations. Democratic equality in 
communication depicts substantive types of human relationships and creates a sense of 
belonging (Anderson et al., 1997; Habermas, 1987; Yuval-Davis, 2011). It depicts an 
understanding of one’s self [identity] in relation to the other – community. Communication is 
a channel that can help students to understand the world around them in order to participate in 
shaping education for the society to which they belong. Such thinking on community defies 
the current understanding of DCE in Kenyan higher education – because Kenya’s higher 
education policies conceptualise education [community] in nationalistic terms, which exclude 
some and include others. This is why the divisive ethnic violence, rioting students, corruption 
and such vices follow such an understanding [community] of education that excludes the 
other [human being]. It is such concepts that are taught to students and result in students 
reproducing irresponsible attitudes and a lack of understanding of diversity and difference. I 
argue so because, if students understand the richness of tribal difference, plurality and the 
possibilities of responsible deliberative channels, they can engage critically to encounter their 
difference and avoid violent occurrences that may infringe on the rights of others. 
Rawls shows how respect and reciprocity exemplify democratic communication in egalitarian 
fairness. Communication is one way in which education enables equal participation by 
stakeholders in their roles in teaching and learning. In this sense, Dewey comprehends 
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education as a conjoined, communicated experience (Dewey, 1916:144), because it valorises 
the development of a consciousness of the interconnectedness of humanity. Benhabib (1996; 
2011a) illustrates how recognising humanity wherever it occurs can accelerate the process of 
communicative freedom and advance the capacity for individuals to consciously respect each 
other in a reciprocal manner. Such recognition has important implications for educational 
experiences in higher education. Communication in a democratic sense has potentialities to 
improve governance and access and to promote culture in higher education. Democratic 
communication can advance egalitarian social relations, human interaction and a sense of 
belonging. Communicative democracy has a tendency to promote a culture of sympathy and 
caring in education (Noddings, 2012; Nussbaum, 1997; Waghid, 2007). Martha Nussbaum 
(1997) suggests an education for citizenship that develops three distinct capacities that will 
enable citizens [university graduates/students] to understand the self in relation to others, 
thereby recognising humanity wherever it occurs. These capacities include, first, the capacity 
to scrutinise oneself and one’s traditions; second, the capacity to recognise the citizenship of 
human beings, and not just on the local or regional or group level; and third, the capacity for 
narrative imagination – being able to understand a person’s story and emotions from speech, 
which expresses something of importance to the other, and thereby being able to gain an 
understanding from imagining what others express. This means that, when citizens in higher 
education recognise one another’s need for social relations, they are able to enter into the 
mind of others, a caring attitude that promotes respect for the other – humanity. In this sense, 
teaching and learning become a process of understanding one’s self in relation to other 
human beings, not just those close to the self, but all of humanity. Citizenship education can 
enable Kenyans to look beyond ethnic or national citizenship to humans as world citizens – 
motivating multicultural relations and cooperation. The question is how can Kenyan higher 
education pursue this? 
Higher education comprises a community of individuals who have an interest in advancing 
education. This makes higher education a deliberative platform that offers environments for 
collaboration and cooperative public engagement. As such, constructive and meaningful 
engagement requires democratic communication, in which individual voices are heard in an 
equal opportunity pattern. Rawls shows how respect and reciprocity exemplify democratic 
communication in egalitarian fairness. Higher education policies should be designed to 
inspire communication at all levels – be it at the macro (policy makers) or micro (university 
classrooms) levels – to maximise learning and teaching. Communication in higher education 
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has the capacity to enable university autonomy so that the institution can advance initiative, 
independence and imaginative action to construct own learning. That is to say, public 
expression grants citizens opportunities to hear others’ feelings about formulating new 
thinking in education. When this is lacking in education, democracy is not cultivated in the 
sense of egalitarianism. Democratic communication might mean supporting ethnic politics if 
it means that it will provide environments for dialogue to abolish the abuse of the human 
right to life. The end point for democratic communication ought to be egalitarian universities 
in which every citizen will feel safe and secure and have a sense of belonging, despite the 
diversity found in these institutions. Dewey notes that communication [deliberation] is central 
to education; as such there is a need for a theory of communication that can help us 
understand the practice of education (Garrison, Neubert & Reich, 2012:78). I view 
Habermas’s attempt at communicative action as helpful. I will revisit the issue of 
communication later, in Chapter 6, where I will show how communication and pedagogy can 
improve higher education. I now turn to an examination of whether Kenyan higher education 
displays some elements of communication. 
The development, policies and implementation of Kenyan higher education depict a limited 
sense of communicative action. This is evident from the analysis in Chapter 3. I will not 
rewrite aspects of what has already been discussed in Chapter 3, but I have highlighted how 
the development of higher education in Kenya displays aspects of communicative action. 
Justice is fundamental to conceptualising education. Rawls (1971) clarifies justice as a 
balanced and fair assessment of social circumstances by way of argumentation – a claim to 
reason to reach agreement. Put differently, Rawls views justice as a reflection of a fair system 
of cooperation over time by creating a more equitable, respectful and just society for 
everyone. Rawls notes that such a process must be guided by the principles of the equality of 
citizens and of equal opportunities, and the principle of distributive justice – whereby any 
inequality is redressed so that everyone involved participates for the benefit of all. Rawls 
notes that the process of justice needs moral values such as respect, reciprocity, cooperation 
and communication, without which fairness cannot be guaranteed. For Rawls, the principle of 
justice provides liberty and freedom for citizens to participate in building their society and 
securing their sense of belonging to the community, in which they are valued. What is 
alarming in Rawls’s case is the exclusion of indifference. For instance, how can such a 
pluralistic and diverse community be able to deal with disagreements except by agreeing? 
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The moment fairness is mentioned, the idea of democracy and citizenship is reduced to those 
who agree. What happens to those who do not agree? Must citizens always agree? 
On the other hand, Rawls’s idea of justice brings to the fore the purpose of education, which 
is that every effort should be made to ensure that all citizens enjoy fair access to education. If 
education exists to ensure justice for all citizens, then democratic education is a worthwhile 
practice for higher education to pursue. Justice, as viewed by Rawls – a procedural process – 
is helpful when considered for policy development in education. It is also worthwhile to 
consider education as a process of recognising those who are marginalised by the politically 
elite education system, so that they get the education needed to develop their capacity for 
critical rationality and opportunities for deliberation. However, the notion of justice needs to 
extend beyond Rawls’s preoccupation with justice as fairness in reaching agreement.  
In ensuring justice, higher education needs to extend and capture ‘opportunities for all 
citizens’: this statement is a rhetorical one and poses the question whether all citizens are 
capable of accessing higher education. Specifically, in terms of access, education for justice 
from Rawls’s perspective is rather narrow and exclusive; for instance, what about citizens 
who do not have the same intellectual capacity to secure a place in higher education, which 
espouses meritocracy, high social mobility and a variety of tastes and allegiances? However, 
as Ryan (1999:43) notes, ‘the idea of university in liberal education is something contrasted 
with vocational education – no ordinary people will have access to’. Ryan (1999:40) suggests 
that an educating society is one that tries to maximise the intelligence and perceptiveness of 
all its citizens, not necessarily to acquire the same educational standards, but to achieve their 
potential and participate in innovation and the development of themselves and the society 
they share.  
Using justice to conceptualise higher education is a worthwhile venture; however, the 
meaning of justice needs to be extended beyond reaching agreement. The egalitarian notion 
of justice needs to capture even the moments when people do not seem to agree. Amy 
Gutmann (2012) puts forward Rawls’s notion of justice as the purpose of education. She 
defends a democratic education that acknowledges all role players in identifying the justice 
factor. As such, she notes that education is a process that involves a number of people, and 
that it cannot be the role of one person to decide what justice means. In this regard she gleans 
ideas from Plato, John Locke and Stuart Mill, and argues that justice in democratic education 
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ought to be decided by the state, parents and the individual learner [student]. In this case, not 
one entity has more power in contributing to education than the other, but all have equal 
chances to participate in contributing to the concept of justice in education. This implies that 
education policies and constitutions need to reflect a collective of contributions by all 
stakeholders who are involved in such a way that democratic rights and responsibilities 
become cooperative and collaborative. She implies that the reasons for this are that 
‘education may aim to perfect human nature by developing potentialities to deflect into 
serving socially useful purposes or to defeat it by repressing those inclinations that are 
socially destructive’ (Gutmann, 1987:328). In this sense, Gutmann believes that developing a 
normative theory of education, such as the one she suggests, is one way of conserving 
participation and deliberation in democratic education. For instance, a democratic state 
recognises the value of professional authority differently from that of the family, and 
recognises the value of political education that equips students to participate in sharing rights 
and responsibilities. 
According to Habermas, to be understood by others and to understand others’ opinions are 
ways of making the education process a just one. This is because, for him, communicative 
action is justice if the process facilitates learning by way of negotiating, persuading and 
convincing others about what we think is just. For Habermas, this process requires a language 
of understanding, a cultural platform for negotiation and the recognition of the ‘other’. 
However, the question is: how many people in our society today are able to participate in 
deliberation? If education is conceptualised only by a real speech situation, then it might be 
exclusive and render itself meaningless to those who are not eloquent enough to convince 
others for consensus. Iris Marion Young adds to the above in that she recognises that, even 
though some might not be as eloquent as others, opportunities should be provided for such 
voices to be heard by allowing these citizens to participate in ways that may not be rational. 
She notes that narrative – that is, listening to the stories or experiences of others – might 
provide ample data for logical collection that could contribute to deliberations. Young (2003) 
also suggests that rhetoric can be used to provoke or awaken voices that might otherwise be 
excluded from conventional conversations. Another way she suggests that might create or 
trigger a conversation is greeting – a symbolic recognition of others, of recognising their 
presence. Young’s articulation is timely in including those who might not, in normal 
circumstances, include themselves or who do not participate in public discussions. It counters 
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Habermas’s view that rationality is the only way to include others in the discussion of matters 
of public concern, like education. 
According to Benhabib (2011a:151), iterations offer uncompromising accounts for political 
justice. This process is inclusive and deliberative, interrogates schemas and entails equal 
participation. Iteration implies the uniqueness of participants, demands the distribution of 
speech acts, and takes place in overlapping communities. Iterations comprise both 
international and transnational organisations. They are concerned with both moral and 
political constitutional obligations to human rights contracts. Iterations arbitrate between 
collectivities that depict our sense of belonging and institutional duties, and the setting 
beyond universal human rights and justice to which such a collectivity ought to be distributed 
equally. Iterations should not be constrained by majority politics or by prescribed, law-
making processes. 
Benhabib (2011a) moves away from limiting conversations to local communities [an aspect 
begun by Nussbaum] and introduces the idea of talking back to each other over and over. In 
this sense, when deliberation takes place in the first instance, certain agreements are reached; 
however, the exclusion of other voices may prompt disagreements in further discourses and, 
as such, reflexiveness is necessary to identify decisions in conflicts that discomfort others so 
that iterations are provoked by those discomforted by the previous decisions. This process is 
a circular one, until every human need is fulfilled. Benhabib says that, despite the fact that 
nation states are limiting such discussions, it is the context in which such discourses should 
begin. They then should transcend borders in relation to international discourse, such as that 
on human rights in what she calls ‘cosmopolitanism without illusion’ Benhabib, 2011a:15; an 
account she contextualised in relation to human rights in troubled times. In this context, 
Benhabib unravels the conflicts that prevail concerning a conceptualisation of human rights 
that has limited a utopian understanding, and hence descends into conflictive human 
experiences of war and tension. 
Benhabib calls for a human right that protects human dignity, without boundaries relating to 
where the human being is from. In other words, the human right to dignity and right to life 
are worth protecting and require iterative discourses to formulate a plausible and universal 
protection of human rights. 
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Borrowing Benhabib’s notion of iteration, it can be said that democratic education in Kenyan 
higher education ought to create spaces for stakeholders to participate in addressing societal 
needs and the protection of human rights. Benhabib’s thinking informs higher education in 
Kenya, especially her notion of talking back as a way of reflective thinking in the 
construction of education. Currently taking place in Kenya is the devolution of governance. 
This process requires iterations of history and the understanding of education policies, and of 
the political and current needs of Kenyan citizens. However, I do not want to delve into the 
concept of devolution, but rather stay focused on Kenyan higher education. 
In Benhabibian terms, education is engendered as a process of talking back to each other in 
the moral sense of respecting another’s communicative freedom by virtue of our humanity. In 
this sense, we can participate in formulating the kind of higher education that will be relevant 
to the needs of our society, which will reflect a citizenry we perceive and imagine. 
In the next section, I argue that liberal democratic strands [analysed in Habermas, Rawls and 
Benhabib] are helpful starting points for thinking about education; however, they portray thin 
and limited thoughts for conceptualising education that will help Kenya to deal with the ever-
changing terrain of society and overcome the challenges experienced by education in Kenya. 
This can be stated on the basis of the analysis in the previous sections, which highlights the 
flaws of such thinking for Kenyan higher education. In the section that follows, I analyse 
DCE in becoming as a tenable conception that constantly can help us think differently and 
provide us with nuances to make meaning of education to challenge the ever-growing 
challenges.  
4.4. Democratic Citizenship Education in Becoming – A Potential 
Remedy to the Liberal Flaws 
4.4.1. Agamben and the Community in Becoming 
In this section I will employ Agamben’s (1993) perspective of The Coming Community: 
Theory Out of Bounds
23
 to engender DCE in becoming. Doing this will involve whatever 
                                                 
23
 I will not indulge in long explanations of what already exists in Agamben’s book, The Coming Community, 
also explained and interpreted in the works of Waghid & Davids (2013:21 ; Waghid, 2014:37- 47). Waghid& 
Davids explains Agamben’s theory of potentiality and the coming community in detail. Without repeating what 
they have done, I would like to unpack what Agamben’s ‘the coming community’ means for democratic 
citizenship education in becoming. 
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potentialities DCE displays that relate to its actuality in dealing with conflict situations in 
Kenya, as well as the impotentialities that determine a DCE in becoming. From Agamben’s 
perspective, democratic citizenship education holds certain potentialities
24
 that determine its 
actuality,
25
 and at the same time manifests potentiality that ends in itself and never passes into 
actuality – ‘it saves itself of actuality’ (Waghid & Davids, 2013:23). This demands further 
curiosity about what is absent – [signified when a concept fails to manifest actuality of its 
meaning] about the conceptualisation of DCE in Kenya. In other words, DCE was found in 
the Kenyan education system to be a concept that is made by the same people who use it, and 
as such depicts an obsession with the consumerist sense of its meaning, hence the lack of 
effort to inquire further about the potentialities that will sustain DCE as a becoming concept 
[with its sustainable potentialities] in order to deal constantly with the challenges of 
educating for democratic citizenship [a necessary venture for Kenyan higher education]. In 
keeping with Agamben’s (1993) seminal thought on ‘the coming community’, DCE is in 
becoming and is always unpredictable, yet it holds potentialities to counter the anomalies and 
imbalances in the Kenyan education system. Thus, DCE lies in a state of becoming and not of 
attainment (Waghid, 2014:41). Moreover, DCE in becoming portrays potentialities in a 
language and communication that are necessary for human experience [education]. 
Accordingly, human experience [education] needs to be framed in a language that disengages 
predictability, thereby enabling endless learning; such learning is considered durable 
(Waghid, 2014:41). 
From the aforementioned, DCE in becoming breaks away from predetermined outcomes in 
education and brings people together as a matter of engaging – not to determine the actuality 
of ideas as such, but to find potentialities of meaning for human experience [education]. This 
kind of engaging in communities creates potential for a sense of belonging determined by 
whatever results come from such an engagement. In this sense of understanding democratic 
education, communication does not determine what DCE becomes, but determines what DCE 
                                                 
24
 Potentiality is a concept Agamben traces from Aristotelian discussion on metaphysics and physics. 
Potentiality refers to ‘dynamis’ – ‘the presence of an absence’; Agamben is concerned with the idea of ‘existing 
potentiality’ – Waghid and Davids (2013:23) notes that potentiality is that which preserves itself in itself – in 
other words, that potentiality is never actualised, for if it is then it holds no potential. This is to suggest that DCE 
in becoming is one whose meaning is constantly being constructed, and the moment its potentiality is actualised 
it ceases to have potential (see more in Waghid, 2013:23; Waghid, 2014:38-41). This means that there can be no 
finality of DCE, also that the DCE potentialities of belonging are not fixed [not actualised], for if they are, they 
stop holding on to DCE potentials of belonging. 
25
 Actuality is the ‘energesia’ – sensation (Waghid, 2014:38). 
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is becoming. This differs from the liberal understanding of both Habermas and Rawls, who 
posit consensus in deliberation as an actuality. In the same manner, it shows that justice has 
the potential for fairness [from Rawls’s perspective] and that, when its fairness becomes 
unfair, it becomes fairness in becoming [an Agamben/Derridian perspective] – justice in 
becoming. In the same manner, justice is constantly in becoming. In addition, Benhabibian 
iterations manifest the potential for reflexivity and talking back, as is necessary for human 
rights in becoming, and when it becomes, its impotentialities demand continuous iterations of 
human rights in its becoming. Waghid (2014:4) notes that iteration in the Benhabibian view 
does not necessarily substantiate how such iterations should be conducted. However, he notes 
that iteration may mean that participants in a deliberation are given the opportunity to say 
things again and again. He indicates that such a view of iterations [talking over and over] 
may not provoke participants to think differently or to see things a new. In this sense, 
iterations should be such that they evoke new potentialities for DCE in becoming. 
In the same light, democratic citizenship education in Kenya is demonstrated in the tensions 
between civic citizenship and ethnic citizenship. Civic citizenship in Kenya shows 
potentialities in education policy, inter alia national unity, national development, freedom, the 
right to economic resources, equality, social justice and the right to education, as portrayed in 
the country’s liberal policy documents (cf. Chapter 3; Republic of Kenya, 2010). However, 
the impotentialities of the liberal outcomes of the policy documents suggest predetermined 
policy stipulations that are not achievable and cannot meet or address Kenyan problems [dual 
loyalties to citizenship in Kenya]. This is because, in Kenya, one has two or more identities to 
reckon with – keeping tribal citizenship and, at the same time, observing civic citizenship, 
which means that national citizenship is controlled by civic laws and ethnic citizenship is 
tamed by tribal loyalties. To contend with such complexity, citizenship education in Kenya 
requires reconsideration. This reconsideration, I contend, entails viewing Kenyans first as 
human beings before noting their national loyalties. I believe that the commonalities Kenyans 
share provide ample space for constant dialogue on reconstructing DCE that could help 
Kenya deal with the loyalties to nationalism and ethnicity. In this case, nationalism only is a 
potential sense of belonging; it is not an actual sense of belonging, for if it is, as proposed in 
the Kenyan higher education policies, it ceases to have potential. This is why the challenges 
[impotentialities] that Kenyan education experiences push for a constant search for 
innovative possibilities [potentialities] to constantly address such challenges; thereby, 
enabling Kenyan higher education to reimagine how human dignity and democratic practices 
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can be constructed constantly. The impotentiality of actualising DCE in nationalistic terms 
portrays its potentialities and denies its actuality, hence the need for a constant search for 
meaning in Kenyan higher education to deal with the imbalances in Kenyan society. It is safe, 
therefore, for Kenya to think of DCE in terms of becoming. 
This suggests that Kenyan education policy is in becoming, since it has not resolved the 
ethnic violence, poverty, disease and corruption in the country. Ethnic citizenship recognises 
one’s right to belong to a particular ethnic/tribal group, with loyalty to what the group 
demands. Such thinking depicts the possibility that ethnic citizenship holds for Kenyan 
higher education and suggests that it is in becoming [in the making]. However, the 
impotentialities that ethnic citizenship displays in ethnic conflicts and post-election violence 
in the country suggest the absence and inadequacy of the liberal view of DCE in the Kenyan 
higher education system. In this sense, DCE in Kenya is in becoming. Re-imagining DCE in 
Kenya demands that DCE be viewed within potentialities and impotentialities, so that 
education becomes durable DCE in becoming. 
I argue that DCE in Kenya demands a re-imagining of citizenship education that transcends 
the boundaries of possibilities and impossibilities in order to enhance education as a process 
of becoming in relation to human experience, interactions and/with ethnic relations. Since 
ethnic rights have the potential to influence the development that the country predetermines 
in policy documents, it could be viewed as being in a stage of infancy and having the 
potential to solve higher education problems. A reconsidered notion of DCE in becoming has 
the potential to enable Kenyan policy makers, educators and students to think and speak 
differently and to suspend quick judgement on how policies, power and decisions in 
education are made (Waghid, 2013:24). 
4.4.2. Democratic Citizenship Education in Becoming: Emancipation 
and Equal Intelligence 
Rancière’s (2006) philosophical thoughts have in recent times been considered by 
educational theorists (Bingham & Biesta, 2010; Davis, 2010:100; Lambert, 2011a; Mercieca, 
2012; Pelletier, 2011; Waghid, 2014:31) as among the most prominent and valuable 
contributions to education. The particular emphasis has been on his articulation of equality of 
intelligence and emancipation as a disruption of the discourses of democratic education. 
Rancière’s method is not another theory or a solution, but an intervention to produce 
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innovative solutions to contextual problems that arise in democracies (Rancière, 2009). Most 
of those who read Rancière (2006) submit that his style of writing is cumbersome and 
difficult to interpret. However, I find Rancière’s (1991; 2006) provocative thoughts on equal 
intelligence and emancipation a valuable disruption of what education is becoming and an 
extension of imaginaries for democratic citizenship education in becoming that can grapple 
continuously with the flaws in Kenyan liberal democratic citizenship education. 
Rancière (2006) describes democracy as an active equality. This implies that there is no end 
to equal democracy. It also means that democracy begins in equality, rather than ends with it. 
Rancière disputes Athenian democracy, which was based on classism, and that of those who 
could obtain sovereignty and contend for a democracy that promotes active equality to 
counter wrong conceptions of democracy that encourage inequality (Davis, 2010:80). 
Rancière’s work awakens in us scepticism of the discourses of ‘social exclusion’ – which 
blocks citizens’ aims to attain political equality. Rancière’s work, when encountering 
Jacotot’s writing, challenges the conventional understanding of democracy, particularly that 
the voices of the marginalised can only be included by the marginalised themselves, which 
means that the elite do not necessarily have to include the minority, since equality of 
intelligence of speech is found in every human being. Thus, democracy becomes democracy 
when the marginalised can raise their voices and be heard. It is when they raise their voices 
that the state of the marginalised will be termed democratic and emancipated (Mercieca, 
2012:409). 
Davis (2010:100) emphasises that Rancière’s thinking on emancipation and equality of 
intelligence advances the role of politics rather than that of the police to disrupt power 
relations. This is because the police are seen as authoritarian. He rather is encouraging us to 
plan for better forms of social arrangement that are open to disruption by egalitarian politics. 
This means that what Rancière is concerned with is not a pre-packaged hierarchy that dictates 
how individuals are included in decision making. Rather, his thoughts on democracy are of it 
as being a remedy to the hegemonic notion of equality. He intervenes in the constant debates 
about inclusion and equality. For Rancière, equality is inherent in every individual, and what 
is needed is the creation of consciousness of this equal intelligence and self-emancipation for 
possibilities of becoming. In keeping with Rancière’s thought, education is a process of 
creating consciousness of the inherent equality of intelligence that is present in us, but only 
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actualised when one is actively engaged through speech. In this sense, education becomes an 
explanation of society (Mercieca, 2012:410), not a tool for social inclusion. 
Rancière’s equal intelligence provides consciousness of what intelligence can do. This is a 
profound conception of intellectual equality, which must be presumed from the beginning of 
conversations about social inclusion in democracies. For instance, in pedagogical encounter, 
equal intelligence must be declared and verified in that encounter (Davis, 2010:27). Waghid 
(2014:30) notes that equal intelligence is connected to the communicative traditions of 
democratic education. The intelligence referred to here is the intelligence that every 
individual holds actively in a democratic society in speaking and being listened to. This 
means that every individual in a democratic space has equal intelligence to commence 
speaking and contribute to democratic state building. In other words, each individual has a 
consciousness of equal intelligence to contribute to politics through speech, and accordingly 
can contribute through speech to improve the democratic state of education. In this sense, one 
does not have to be given the capacity to speak; but that we are all capacious in speech, so 
our initiative to contribute to democratic education is not a given, but is inherent in us and no 
one has to give it to us. This means, then, that democratic education demands that all voices, 
from the intelligences that are equal in all of us, should push us to voice our polity to build 
democratic societies. Failure to contribute through speech is not an excuse for inequality of 
intelligence. In this sense, Rancière’s view is not about being included or excluded, but that 
one has to include oneself in conversations, thereby ascertaining one’s own equal intelligence 
of speech that is found in all humans. Biesta (2009:110) affirms that, when people speak, they 
exercise their speech and act; they intervene with equality. This understanding of equal 
intelligence brings to the fore the inclusion of everyone in conversations; that is, if everyone 
can voice their concerns, no matter the consequences, then one can contribute to polity. 
Similarly, according to Rancière, emancipation is found in people being able to verify their 
equality by being active through their speech as an act of democratic intervention. Through 
speaking they announce their intellectual equality. In the same way, one does not have to wait 
to be included by external forces or another person. Emancipation is one’s individual choice 
to join in conversations in democratic interventions. This is exemplified in Rancière’s 
encounter with and exposition of Jacotot, a French lecturer who found himself in a university 
of Flemish-speaking students; he spoke no Flemish and had to teach in English. This 
exploratory analysis is found in his seminal work, The Ignorant School Master (Rancière, 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
135 
 
1991). In this book, Rancière disrupts the power of explanation in learning and questions the 
role of a teacher in learning. Davis (2010:27) notes that ‘what an emancipated person can do 
is be an emancipator: to give not the key of knowledge, but the consciousness of what 
intelligence can do when it considers itself equal to any other equal’. By implication, 
democratic education in becoming ought to arouse the consciousness of equal intelligence in 
students so that they can speak and engage actively in building a democratic society. For it is 
through constant speech that every voice counts in democratic societies. For instance, the 
development of education policies needs to include the equal intelligences of stakeholders in 
a constant deliberation for a continuous formulation of democratic citizenship education that 
can become an intervention to posit innovative solutions to Kenyan educational problems. 
Accordingly, every individual becomes consciously emancipating, through an education that 
they constantly engage in themselves, to curb the ever-evolving sense of belonging, 
interaction and public reasoning. 
Rancière’s understanding of equality provokes a new way of understanding equality that 
differs from the conventional way. It causes all individuals to search within themselves for 
the conscious equality that is present in them, which can only be realised when they engage 
in speech to display and verify their equal intelligence, thereby including themselves in 
conversations as an emancipation for themselves. In this case they do not have to wait for the 
government or the other to include them. As difficult as Rancière’s thoughts sound, so great 
is the potential they offer to every individual, an invitation to engage, find a sense of 
belonging as a way to overcome marginalisation. In a sense, then, individuals begin to blame 
themselves for not being emancipated. The contention then is how are our voices being 
heard? Why are our voices included? Instead of waiting to be included, every citizen needs to 
be an active participant in democratic polity. 
Rancière’s intervention has implications for democratic education in becoming and is 
different from what Rawls, Habermas and Benhabib offer. From Rancière’s perspective, 
equality is presumed from the beginning, it is the certainty that each individual has equality 
of intelligence, which is displayed the moment an individual publicly engages in speech. For 
the former, equality is the outcome of every democratic action. In Rancière’s case, one can 
include oneself, one does not have to wait to be included; in the views of the former, ‘the 
well-positioned’ (elite) include those who are marginalised, meaning that one has to wait for 
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those who are believed to be more capacious to include one, for ‘one’ is incapacious to 
include oneself.  
Lambert (2011b) contends that Rancière views education as a question, not as an answer. 
Education is an unbounded process of becoming through which people explore and become 
equal subjects with the other. Education therefore is the connection between intellectual 
emancipation and democracy (Means, 2011:29). In the next section I provide an exposition of 
Ubuntu as an instance of DCE in becoming as a further manifestation of a thick conception of 
DCE. 
4.5. Ubuntu as an Instance of Democratic Citizenship Education in 
Becoming 
The concept of Ubuntu is a viable ideology that I want to synthesise with the emerging 
conceptualisation of DCE in becoming that has the potentialities necessary for African higher 
education, and for the emerging realities in Kenya in particular. At this particular stage, I 
want to unravel how this concept has been understood and what its implications are for policy 
in higher education. Ubuntu depicts the value of people and their cultural heritage. It also 
highlights how members of a society relate to one another in the midst of global trends.  
Following the challenges raised by Benhabib (2011a) [as seen earlier in Chapter 2] regarding 
talking back as a way of generative learning and a way of constantly thinking reflectively has 
enabled me to talk back to the understanding of humanity [humanness in Africa] that relates 
to the universal discourses on understanding humanity and democratic systems in education. 
Ubuntu is a concept widely considered in Africa, especially in South Africa and Rwanda, as a 
reconciliatory tool for the shared commonality of being human in relation to the other 
(Letseka, 2011; Ntamushobora, 2012). Some scholars dispute the validity of Ubuntu in 
resolving African problems [marginalisation] (Enslin & Horsthemke, 2004:545), while others 
find Ubuntu to be a viable African philosophical concept (Letseka, 2011) that can be used to 
revive education and humanity in general toward an ethics of care (Waghid & Smeyers, 
2012a; cultivate a pedagogy of hospitality (Waghid, 2014:92); and the implications these may 
have for reconciliatory purposes (Ntamushobora, 2012). 
In the African context, the definition of a person depicts ‘ubuntuness’. Mbiti, an 
anthropologist from Kenya, describes a person’s existence and identity as ‘I am because we 
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are’ (1970:141). Mbiti’s (1970) description of a person’s identity entails the existence of one 
person in relation to another. This prompts a communal sense of belonging, a collective 
participation, cooperative living and an African solidarity that capture the true African spirit. 
This concept exhibits the robust excellence of human potential in African identity and 
dignity. In other words, Mbiti’s description of an individual points to the fact that an 
individual’s source of humanity comes from synergy with the community of others. It frames 
the self in relation to others within a moral milieu (Menkiti, 2004:24). Menkiti (2004:24) 
advances personhood in a community as a normative stance and refutes its limitation to 
biological explanation, because that is superficial.  
I have in mind the lucid example of a diversity of people who exist either as tribes, races, 
languages, religions, ethnic groups or economic class, but still need others to survive. The 
fact that, in an African context, an individual realises that there is a common humanity for 
which they exist, and that this humanity is defined and depicted by the community, 
symbolises the source of their moral existence.  
I would like at this point to use the word ‘Ubuntu’ to refer to the relationship that exists 
between an individual person and the community [the other apart from self]. It is this 
relationship that leads to the moral sense of the description of a human person in the African 
context (Menkiti, 2004:330). This understanding reveals the worth that is attached to a person 
not only by the ‘African context’, but also by all humankind – this also is a concept similar to 
Nussbaum’s (1997) cultivation of humanity. As examined in Chapter 2, John Rawls (1971), 
Seyla Benhabib (2011a) and Jürgen Habermas (1978a &b) [Euro-American contexts] display 
some universal concepts that resemble the African identity, inter alia humanity. Both the 
African perspectives and the Euro-American perspectives illuminate this recognition of our 
common humanity as a relevant concept to begin with in dealing with issues of justice and 
human rights. The recognition of our common humanity is the thrust and force that compels 
the thirst for justice and respect for human rights and dignity: the right to life and to freedom 
of speech. 
Community here depicts the spaces that the community provides, whether in abstract form or 
in tangible human behaviour, the norms, rules, mentors and authority figures from which an 
individual ethically generates his/her moral being and grounding. An individual person 
cannot be an island, but ‘ought to’ exist with others to survive. For this survival to occur, the 
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individual ‘ought to’ learn the rules of the game of existence in the world in which he/she 
does not exist alone, but with others. This therefore brings to the fore the fact that there are a 
myriad of things attached to the existence of an individual. Thus, learning about others, with 
others, by others and for others inevitably forms the potential for and possibility of DCE. 
Wiredu’s (2004) and Gyekye’s (1987) expositions of the concept of a person from an Akan 
worldview - culture is worth considering here. Wiredu (1996) indicates that a person is a 
result of the union of three elements, which are not necessarily sharply disparate 
ontologically, although each is different from the other. The first, according to Gyekye, is 
body, and according to Wiredu is the blood principle, which bear different names: Honam 
(Gyekye), and mogya (Wiredu); second is the soul/the life principle, to which they both refer 
as [Okra], and the spirit/personality principle, which they both refer to as [sunsum]. 
According to Wiredu (1996:157), okra is believed to have been given by god, meaning that it 
is inborn. On the other hand, Gyekye (1987:85) indicates that the okra is the self, the 
innermost being, the essence of self. According to him, okra describes the individual person. 
Okra is also understood to be associated with life. In this exposition it is somewhat unclear 
how the triune existence manifests in the person. And there also is controversy in their 
depiction of what okra is, i.e. the immortality of the soul. This notwithstanding, the essence 
of life is contained in this description. Without much ado, it is notable that both scholars 
agree that sunsum is the spirit or personality principle in a person. Sunsum is seen to have 
been inherited from the father of a person. It is not from the gods, as it dies with the body 
(honam). In the later explanation of sunsum it still is unclear whether the sunsum dies or stays 
with the soul. The third component is the honam, according to Gyekye, and mogya, according 
to Wiredu (1996:158). Wiredu shows that mogya depicts clan identity. The term indicates 
that the person is understood to have come from the mother and that this is the basis for 
lineage. Honam implies that the arrival of a new member of a family is the continuity of the 
characteristics of the parents. From this analysis it is clear that Wiredu (1996:158) is talking 
about the significance of understanding a person, thus the value that should be reflected when 
we are faced with understanding a person. It points to the value of human dignity and the 
entitlement it demands to an equal measure of basic respect. The interpretation of what 
Wiredu and Gyekye portray describes a person in an ecological manner, which can be used to 
analyse the complexity of a human person in the African context. As such, Wiredu and 
Gyekye reflect on the cyclic nature of the existence of the human person in Africa, and the 
cooperative lineages that play a role in building the human person. Their thinking also depicts 
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the concentric circles of the matrilineal kinship relation and neighbourhoods in the outmost 
reaches, which may include people in widely separated geographic regions (Wiredu, 
1996:158).  
Wiredu shows how the Akan community lived together to nurture power relations. Kinship in 
this community portrayed a political system [political rights]. In the Akan political system, 
governance was inclusive, in that individuals had a say in it. The community would gather 
under a tree and give individual opinions on how to run their town, which was headed by the 
chiefs and the elders. Leadership in this community was deliberative in policy formation, 
power and questions of citizenship.  
Linking Menkiti, Mbiti, Wiredu and Gyekye’s understandings of a person, the basic point is 
that, from an African viewpoint, a person has capabilities and dispositions that enable one to 
exist with others; this is contrary to the colonial depiction of the African man (cf. Chapter 3). 
These capabilities can be nurtured by a person’s existence in community with others. The 
above exposition indicates the value and synergy drawn from community and its ability and 
potential to mould a person’s being. It foreshadows DCE and is a process in becoming. This 
is because no one has an idea of whom or what one will become, but the communal norms 
and practices and the agency of the community give hope for democratic citizenry. This is the 
concern of an African philosopher of education. One is always conscious of the ultimate 
relevance of one’s thinking and for it to be practical in concerns of life, even though what it 
becomes is considered absent, since it is in becoming (Wiredu, 1980:16). 
The Akan understanding of a person reflects Ubuntu in the way it regards the human person 
and in the way it indicates the involvement of the father, the mother and god in the 
development of a person. It portrays a nurturing and pervasive spirit of caring, community, 
harmony and hospitality, with respect and responsiveness that depict an individual person and 
the person’s existence in society and for others. 
The question is, if Africa has/had such a nurturing and a caring attitude to and understanding 
of a human person, why is there so much violence? Violence has been depicted by 
Serequeberhan (1994:55) as a phenomenon that has been inadequately addressed by African 
philosophers, and rather as a fact that has clouded the African experience. The notion of 
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violence has received less attention in the philosophical literature, except in that of Wiredu 
(1980) and Oruka (1983; 1998). 
Furthermore, Ubuntu in university education in Kenya proffers a constructivist pedagogical 
approach to teaching and learning. That is, the way Africans live and value community calls 
for cooperative learning and group dynamics in educational endeavours. It also calls for the 
virtues of respect, hospitality and the respecting of difference for society to develop. Ubuntu 
means that education in Africa ought to embrace team spirit, with common goals to achieve 
moral outcomes in education. It also elevates the notion of individual reason (input) by 
contributing ideas and making practical contributions to decision making for the betterment 
of the community as a whole. Ubuntu has the potential to counter tribal wars and violence 
against the other, and to embrace morality in community development and educational 
endeavours. The question is: has this been the case in Africa?  
4.6. Summary 
This chapter has analysed the links between the three strands of liberal democratic citizenship 
education and Kenyan democratic higher education policies. The chapter’s findings show that 
there is a similarity between DCE in Kenyan higher education policy and the three liberal 
strands analysed in Chapter 2. The similarity is seen in how DCE is used to create a sense of 
belonging, human interaction and public engagement. It is also evident; however, that 
Kenyan higher education still struggles to create a sense of belonging, since ethnic violence 
has undermined liberal virtues such as equality, human rights, deliberation and justice. 
However, the realities in Kenyan higher education have been hampered by the colonial 
legacy, nepotism, corruption, inequality and poverty, and by ethnic violence – an indicator of 
the impotentialities of conceptualising DCE in a predetermined state. 
Further, I employed the perspectives of Agamben’s (1993) The Coming Community, and 
Agamben’s (1999) and Derrida’s (2000) notions of the ‘potentialities’ and ‘impotentialities’ 
of democratic community. I further explored the seminal work and method of Rancière on 
equality of intelligence and emancipation as viable concepts for DCE in becoming, and as a 
remedy for the liberal flaws in Kenyan higher education. Such considerations I find necessary 
to advance the liberal conceptions of citizenship to engender DCE as an endless form of 
learning and a concept in becoming. As such, the impotentialities exhibited in ethnic violence 
and other ills in Kenyan society, which undermine human dignity and weaken the higher 
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education system, call for a durable learning in becoming. Equal intelligence and 
emancipation provide space for individuals to engage actively in polity in speech, and also 
frames education as an explanation of society rather than an explanation of solutions. In this 
sense, education becomes an invitation for individuals to include themselves in conversations 
with others and not wait to be included. Also, education becomes an emancipatory process. 
I also reconsidered Ubuntu as an instance of DCE in becoming by contextualising education 
in Kenya, since the three liberal strands were dominated by Euro-American concepts [that 
show the universal/transcendental nature of knowledge]. Ubuntu is considered fundamental 
in its potentiality in relation to the identity and dignity of Africans [as humans] in order to 
redeem their sense of belonging in a human community. 
In the next chapter I will show the implications of DCE in becoming for ethnic conflicts and 
violence in Kenya. 
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  Chapter Five
DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION IN 
BECOMING AGAINST ETHNIC VIOLENCE 
5.1. Introduction  
In this chapter I will attempt the following: Firstly, show what a reconceptualised idea of 
DCE involves – that is, one that extends a liberal conception of DCE. Secondly, explain how 
the ideas surrounding a reconceptualised notion of DCE assist in thinking differently about 
higher education in Kenya. Thirdly, hint at what the implications for a reconceptualised DCE 
are for the conception of the university in Africa, and lastly, provide a different understanding 
of the African university – one that can be socially and intellectually responsive to political 
and ethnic strife on the continent. This chapter addresses the sub-questions: What space 
might there be for DCE in becoming (a reconceptualised one) to help Kenyan higher 
education institutions address ethnic divisions in the country? How can DCE in Kenyan 
higher education reshape ethnic identities and overcome ethnic tensions?  
The context of this chapter is linked to the analysis drawn from the previous chapters in an 
attempt to answer the main research question: How does a defensible deliberative conception 
of democracy help us to think differently about higher education in Kenya? In Chapter 2 I 
analysed the framework of three liberal strands (Benhabib, 2011a; Habermas, 1987; Rawls, 
1971) of DCE in an attempt to examine the meanings of a liberal DCE, setting the stage on 
which Kenyan education policies were analysed. Following this was Chapter 3, in which an 
analysis was conducted of the education system in Kenya in relation to policy texts and 
discourses. This provided an understanding of the context, history and development of higher 
education in Kenya. Chapter 4 identified some of the gaps, challenges and crises found within 
liberal DCE in Kenyan higher education, despite liberal conceptions of education policies. As 
a result, DCE was reconceptualised as ‘DCE in becoming’ as a way of thinking differently 
about education in the Kenyan context. DCE in becoming is a nuanced concept that emerged 
from my analysis of a liberal DCE in the previous chapters while attempting to address the 
main research question, which is still undergoing scrutiny in this chapter.  
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In sessional paper No. 14 of 2012, Kenya envisioned that university education would make 
the country a prosperous and competitive nation. To achieve this, Kenya relies on its 
education system as a sustainable resource for highly trained citizens who are ambitious and 
knowledgeable. In this vein, Kenya aims to cultivate skills that its citizens can apply to make 
the nation prosperous, just, cohesive and democratic (Republic of Kenya, 2012:4). This 
policy is an example of muteness that Kenyan higher education displays on the relevance of 
its education system, which seems improbable for such policy text to address real societal 
concerns such as violence. A question could be raised, how does prosperity and 
competitiveness resolve issues of violence? Kenya cannot achieve this goal if its education 
system and society are still characterised by ethnic violence, hatred, nepotism and 
ethnocentrism. I  argue that, when Kenyan university education can be constructed with an 
imaginary future, there could be a great potential for transformation and constant 
deliberations that can contribute to resolving the violence. I now turn to an examination of 
DCE in becoming as an extension of the liberal idea.  
5.2. The Nexus between Liberal Democratic Citizenship Education 
and Democratic Citizenship Education in Becoming 
Liberal DCE provides foundational and theoretical lenses that I argue can be used in re-
thinking/reimagining the concept of university education in Kenya. Although I argue for a 
democratic citizenship education in becoming informed by notions of critique, friendship, 
compassionate imagining and scepticism, I would like to show briefly how a liberal version 
of the concept ‘in becoming’ is actually an extension of the liberal idea. I will do so by first 
reaffirming a liberal understanding of DCE. This will help clarify the nexus of the 
imagination of university education for the hopeful feasible future that can resolve ethnic 
violence in Kenya. 
Liberal DCE is a theoretical/philosophical stance that I use in this dissertation to think 
through [conceptualise] higher education in Kenya so that it can address ethnic conflicts and 
violence. I believe that understanding the various philosophies of DCE is crucial to unlocking 
meaningful education, which could provide recognition of its significance in dealing with 
societal ills. This is because a liberal understanding of education represents individual rights 
and develops capacity to engage in collective action that respects those rights (Pearl & Pryor, 
2005:x). Doing this creates a sense of belonging and shapes interaction with and an 
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engagement in public concerns. Liberal education integrates values such as ‘liberty/freedom, 
justice as fairness, equality/equal opportunity, inclusion and provision of a knowledge base 
sufficient to meet the responsibility of citizenship in an ever more complex world into our 
teaching’ (Pearl & Pryor, 2005:ix). Liberal DCE as understood in this dissertation [from the 
perspectives of Rawls (1971), Habermas (1987) and Benhabib (2011a)] portrays the 
following: 
First, a liberal concept of DCE is understood to contain human rights and responsibilities in 
actuality. Rights are embedded in individual liberties such as freedom of association, speech 
and conscience, and freedom of choice on how citizens live their lives. Responsibilities refer 
to certain duties that citizens need to carry out, for instance the duty to tolerate difference, 
agree on political power, make decisions through public engagement and exercise individual 
power, and critical/public reasoning as a process of making judgement and as a way of life 
(cf. Chapters 2 and 4). 
The second aspect in which liberal DCE is considered in this dissertation is the way the 
concept is understood in order to contribute to a sense of belonging [collectivities], for 
instance in nationalism. In this sense, citizens are regarded as members of a political party, or 
government and girded and protected by legal constitutions. Liberal DCE also extends the 
nationalistic sense of belonging to include cosmopolitanism (cf. Chapter 2). 
The third consideration of liberal DCE is reasonableness. For citizens to engage in public 
decision making, liberals note that their ability to reason is primary to the decisions they 
make regarding public concerns (see Benhabib, 2011a; Habermas, 1987; Rawls, 1971; as 
analysed in Chapter 2). DCE’s underlying values of reason and civility enable citizens to 
imagine the life worlds of others in such a way that they temporarily forget their own 
perception/culture in order to understand others, who may be different from them. Civil 
education therefore encourages integration and fraternising with members of different groups, 
and this makes the breakdown of cultural barriers more likely (Kymlicka, 2003:51). On this 
assumption, liberal DCE sees university education as a place where students are exposed to 
alternative ways of living with others. 
Accordingly, the understanding of liberal conceptions of DCE in the seminal thoughts offered 
by Rawls (1971), Habermas (1987) and Benhabib (2011a) seem inadequate to counter 
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violence. This is so because, in a liberal DCE, deliberations, equality, freedom of speech and 
human rights are already actualised. The moment these deliberations are actualised, they 
cease to exist and at this point cannot resist violence. This explains why a liberal DCE is 
inadequate to resolve violence. Further questions could be asked, such as why is there still 
ethnic violence in Kenya despite the liberal DCE tenets found in policies, Vision 2030 and 
the education acts as major drivers of education?  
The Kenyan education system and constitution already bear some of the features described by 
these liberal views, yet violence, ethnocentric conflict, nepotism and other imbalances are 
experienced in society and in the universities (Eshiwani, 1990; Republic of Kenya, 1964; 
1976; 1981; 1999; Luescher-Mamshela et al., 2011:xvii; Ogot, 1995). This is why I find these 
liberal perspectives – those of Rawls (1979), Habermas, (1987) and Benhabib (2011a) – to be 
relevant, although they lack conceptual vigour since they are already actualised in the policies 
and standards of university programmes. They do not help solve the problem of violence in 
Kenya and are contradictory when the results they bring reproduce systemic bureaucratic 
power relations that are excluding. These liberal perspectives are reflected in Kenyan 
education policy, and yet (cf. Chapter 3) inequality still is prevalent, for example the unequal 
distribution of public goods such as infrastructure and educational opportunities that has led 
to the exclusion of some citizens. In Kenya in particular, the understanding of citizenship 
education as a nationalistic venture has raised a number of challenges, such as violence, 
nepotism, corruption, ethnocentric conflicts, inequality, poverty, exclusion and tensions in the 
country and in its learning institutions. 
The disposition of a liberal perspective (Rawls, Habermas and Benhabib) on how the features 
of DCE can be used to structure university education is a significant starting point to produce 
an egalitarian university/society (cf. Chapter 2). However, these features do not provide 
durable nuances for dealing with societal complexities such as the ethnic violence in Kenya. 
For this reason, DEC in becoming is a way of reimaging and extending the potentialities of 
the liberal idea. Subsequently, a DCE in becoming is an imagination that begins from where 
the three liberal views end – that is, it extends DCE to the feasible future. For example: 
belongingness is imagined beyond the already actualised national/ethnic borders, but as 
relating to a human community yet to come or that which is ‘in becoming’ [this is a 
perspective I borrow from Agamben’s (1993) seminal work on The Coming Community: 
Theory Out of Bounds]. Agamben’s perspective is used here to imagine the future of 
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university education better than it currently is – the future in a feasible, hopeful optimism. 
Morley (2012:26) shows that the future can be imagined based on the concerns and tensions 
of the present. This is so because the current state of the university in Kenya seems bleak, 
impossible, yet the future can be imagined in the light of the current violence and the 
potentialities of a liberal DCE. Thus, the future of university education in Kenya is full of 
possibilities yet to be fathomed. Since violence presently mires its prescribed mission, vision 
and policies, thinking differently can help Kenya evade the current dystopias (Barnett, 
2012:7). Barnett (2012) argues that imagining universities is an activity of the mind that 
shows responsibility – being sensitive to the forces that shape our universities. A becoming 
idea of DCE is an activity of philosophy – it carries an imaginative weight in the complex 
world and the global forces and realities that shape the future of our university education 
systems. Becoming here plays different kinds of roles, different kinds of imagination in 
extending ‘the in-becoming DCE’. It is actually the beginning of restructuring the liberal 
thought of becoming. The question is what kind of DCE can enable Kenyan universities to 
curb ethnic violence?  
I now lay the structure, if that is whatever it is to imagine ‘the becoming DCE’, as a pattern 
of thinking about the future of the Kenyan university. This process involves reflections and 
iteration that lie in the nexus of liberal DCE (as already analysed in Chapter 2) and the 
imagined DCE in becoming. Next, I will reflect on what DCE in becoming involves and how 
different kinds of extended imaginings reflect the futures of university education in Kenya. 
By doing this it is hoped that university education can reduce ethnic violence and cope with 
the complexities Kenya faces in different kinds of ways. Thenceforth I will indicate how this 
is a way of doing philosophy in education. Afterwards, I elucidate why I think Kenyan 
universities as they are cannot resolve violence unless they are reimagined for futures of DCE 
in becoming. Lastly, I will show the implication of the extended view of DCE for African 
universities. 
It can be argued that liberal DCE in Kenya is already actualised in the education policies. It 
could be argued that this actualisation is without consideration of the potentialities of the 
traditional African political structure, cultural organisation or way of life. As a result, ethnic 
violence remains problematic despite the liberal policies in education. Such complexes are 
necessary to imagine the future of higher education in Kenya [Africa] – even though the 
colonial legacy has tainted the African identity to an extent. For example, teaching citizens to 
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have the willingness to engage with and look beyond ethnicity holds the potential to curb 
violence, but liberal DCE does not tell us to do so. Linking this argument to ethnic violence 
highlights why various tribal groups in Kenya use violence as a means of finding recognition 
and opportunities to acquire political power and the equal distribution of public resources, 
such as education, land and property. This is so because the current political system and 
education have excluded some from national citizenship, even though education is regarded a 
national thing. Additionally, the distribution of national resources and infrastructure, as well 
as deliberative opportunities, is not equal. Kymlicka (2003:47) rightly notes that the liberal 
conception of education and citizenship is a contested one. He points out that nationalism as a 
sense of belonging has presented many challenges throughout the world, where diversity and 
difference are seen as uniform, hence the neglect of minority ethnic groups. If DCE is to 
become a vital part of university education, then the mission of universities needs to reflect a 
culture of cultivating, incorporating and imagining the potentialities of democratic values in 
public university education, not only as an actualised practice, but as a constant process of 
maximising potential [and not the actualisation of it] (Pearl & Pryor, 2005:x). 
The tensions between the possibilities and the impossibilities of liberal DCE are manifest in 
the instability of the Kenyan higher education system. This is specifically evident in the 
liberal policies in Kenya that promote the virtues/tenets of democracy for Kenyan higher 
education. For instance, in sessional paper No. 14 of 2012, values such as equality of 
opportunity, education for all, freedom, liberty and national solidarity describe the kind of 
education universities ought to provide in tandem with the Bill of Rights and the Constitution 
of Kenya (Republic of Kenya, 2012:8). Yet, the possibility of such concepts is proven 
inadequate in the ethnic conflicts, inequalities, poor governance and poverty levels in the 
country (cf. Chapter 3, section 3.6). It can be argued that the education acts and policies in 
Kenya reflect a liberal view of DCE that is already actualised in the policies. This view 
places constraints on those who practise education, because education policies as actualised 
in Kenya are prescriptive and define education outcomes, and this limits the ability to be 
imaginative or be critical – which means that, in liberal DCE, deliberation ceases the moment 
it is realised. Liberal DCE addresses notions of connecting people, but neglects to show that 
people could be in a position of violence. This view fails to educate people on the 
potentialities of their willingness to engage continuously and to look beyond ethnicity as a 
way of constantly avoiding violence. This explains why violence in Kenya persists despite a 
liberal view of education. So, the political elite in Kenya hold the cultural capital, which is 
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deeply entrenched in the national policy of education. As shown in Chapter 3, these kinds of 
policies have not resolved problems in Kenya in relation to the nationalism agenda. This 
partly could be because most Kenyan citizens are excluded from deliberations, or that the 
deliberation on and planning of education stop with the ruling class. A question could be 
raised: What might DCE in becoming offer in reconceptualising Kenyan higher education to 
deal with inequality, exclusion and ethnic violence? 
From a different perspective, Rancière’s (2009) equality is presumed from the beginning; it is 
the certainty that each individual has equality of intelligence, which is displayed the moment 
an individual publicly engages in speech. From the liberal perspectives as shown in Chapter 
2, equality is the outcome of every democratic action. In Rancière’s case, one can include 
oneself, as one does not have to wait to be included; in the former, ‘the well-positioned’ 
(elite) include those who are marginalised, meaning that one has to wait for those who are 
believed to be more capacious to include one, for ‘one’ is incapacious to include oneself.  
Lambert (2011b) contends that Rancière views education as a question, not as an answer. 
Education is an unbounded process of becoming through which people explore and become 
equal subjects with the other. Education therefore is the connection between intellectual 
emancipation and democracy (Means, 2011:29). It is a process out of bounds [a process 
without borders]. 
5.3. Democratic Citizenship Education in Becoming as Philosophy 
That DCE in becoming can disrupt higher education is a claim I make constantly in this 
dissertation. I now would like to substantiate/show how it indeed is the challenge of doing 
philosophy. Philosophy of education is an approach employed in this dissertation in the 
deconstruction, synthesis of conceptual analysis and interpretive analysis of DCE in 
becoming for university education in Kenya to resolve violence (Biesta, 2009:81; Carlson, 
2011:11; Cavell, 1979:191; McKenna, 1992:28; Wainaina, 2006a:124). Wainaina 
(2006a:127; 2006d:146) notes that the nature of philosophical investigations can have the 
philosopher engaged in explaining the goals of investigation on the one hand, and on the 
other hand the philosopher would be involved with what ordinary people can gain through the 
process of investigation. The becoming philosophy fits in with deconstruction as a reflexive 
paradox that retains the critical potential of a liberal DCE – a process of reconstruction 
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(Biesta, 2009:89; Carlson, 2011:11). The deconstruction philosophy creates space for 
conceptualising and imagining the possibilities of the university as a critical and democratic 
institution. This means that a DCE in becoming as a deconstructive idea examines the present 
state of what is already actualised (metaphysics) in universities so as to imagine universities 
for a hopeful future – that which can contend with ethnic violence. This idea fits in with a 
DCE in becoming as an extension of the liberal idea. Biesta (2009:9), in a Derridian way, 
asserts that ‘deconstruction is an openness towards unforeseeable incoming … of the other’.  
In this dissertation, philosophical inquiry in education is concerned with the deconstruction of 
educational values, skills, knowledge and the nature of human beings (learners and teachers) 
in the context of university education. Educational policies mostly are analysed for a deeper 
understanding of ourselves and the world around us. Philosophy of education, as used in this 
dissertation, employs deconstruction as a method and reflexive tool to understand and 
critique the critiques of the policies that inform the procedures of teaching and learning and 
related issues in university education. In expanding what philosophy of education is, 
Wainaina (2006b:138-146) notes that there are four dimensions in which philosophy of 
education is significant. First, he notes that values in education are concerned with the 
question: ‘Why do we have’ universities? Second is the concept of knowledge that raises the 
questions: ‘What is to know? How do we know what we claim to know?’ and ‘What are the 
sources of knowledge?’ The third aspect is concerned with human consciousness in this 
pursuit; educators explore the concepts of ‘I’ and the ‘other’ in participating in the process of 
becoming human. The process of becoming human reveals how experiences outside of the 
self enable one (educators and learners alike) to discover the outer self in others, and thereby 
discover the importance of co-existence. The ‘I’ in self is embodied in the concept of 
personhood. The fourth aspect of philosophy of education that Wainaina depicts is human 
creativity (Chege, 2006a:167). Wainaina notes that creativity and critique in education are 
processes of humanising the world. These probe active inquiry, imagination, invention, 
innovation and originality in the way human beings express themselves. Such an 
understanding of education creates opportunities for appreciating the nature and the world of 
culture. This brings into focus conceptual understanding in terms of democracy, citizenship 
and dialogue as a way of framing/constructing university education. Therefore, university 
education consists of human beings who are in the process of being human with the other 
(Chege, 2006d:173). This process involves dialogic learning, which includes two or more 
people speaking with each other constantly to construct knowledge. Scholars (Benhabib, 
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2011a; Chege, 2006b; Habermas, 1987; Rawls, 1971; Waghid, 2014) consider speaking to 
each other as one of the ways human beings create a cultural world. This concept can be 
enriched by certain values, such as equality and respect for persons. This understanding of 
education is foundational to liberal university education. In terms of this pattern, this 
dissertation arrives at the philosophical thought of DCE in becoming as a way of thinking 
differently about university education (Rancière, 2006).  
5.4. Democratic Citizenship Education in Becoming  
In this section I will show what a reconceptualised idea of DCE involves – that is, one that 
extends a liberal conception of DCE. DCE in becoming bears potentialities – potentialities 
that shed light on the virtues that such a concept presents and how such potentialities address 
problems in education. One such example of the problems faced by higher education in 
Kenya is ethnic violence. The occurrence of such problems indicates that the liberal DCE 
found in Kenya is in a state of infancy – meaning that it is in the making. Such thinking about 
education considers education as always in the making [since potentiality is never actualised].  
Agamben (1999) notes that there are two kinds of potentialities: first is a generic potentiality 
similar to that of a child. That is, the child has a potential to know or the potential to become 
a head of state. This, he notes, is an Aristotelian sense of potentiality (Agamben, 1999:182). 
The generic view of potentiality indicates a becoming other, in the sense that the child is 
prone in his/her potentiality to become other that he/she is through learning. However, the 
child at the same time has a potential not to learn. The becoming lies in the ongoing activity 
that constantly changes or alters the generic potential. The second aspect of potentiality that 
he notes is the potentiality that belongs to someone; for example, that someone has 
knowledge or ability to do and not to do. Similarly, an architect has the potential to build; the 
existing potentiality is different from the generic potentiality. However, the potential (ability) 
of the architect to build a house becomes meaningful in the process of building [being 
involved in the building of a house]. 
Using the analysis of potentiality by Agamben I can argue that the potentiality of liberal DCE 
to curb violence and the potentiality of it not to curb violence lie in the possibility of DCE in 
becoming. At present, the liberal DCE in Kenya appears to be in a stage of infancy (as in the 
case of the child) in that both its impotentiality to curb violence and its potentiality not to 
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curb violence are the forces that compel DCE in becoming. However, its potentiality to curb 
violence is in the essence (a possibility), such that being involved in the activity (energesia) 
of reformulating innovations presents a possibility that violence can be other than it is [in the 
future]. This implies that the potentiality and possibility of DCE in becoming have the 
potential to curb violence in whatever singularity – without actualising DCE in becoming, 
since it is always in motion (dynamic). When DCE is realised or prescribed it becomes 
actualised, and then it ceases to curb violence since it conserves itself and saves itself in 
actuality – potentiality survives actuality in the way it gives itself to itself (Agamben, 
1999:189). 
Following Agamben’s idea that potentiality ceases to exist when it passes into actuality, the 
notion of liberal DCE as a potentiality would no longer be if it is actualised in relation to 
shared identities (national education) and a common sense of belonging on the part of those 
things that constitute liberal DCE (Waghid, 2013:27). To consider DCE as a potentiality is to 
consider it in a state of becoming. 
In his book The Coming Community, Agamben (1993), a philologist, paradoxically represents 
community in an obscure depiction in which it is postulated as an idea of ‘whatever 
singularity’. In this book, Agamben describes whatever singularity as a form of being that 
fundamentally discards any manifestation of identity and exclusively appropriates being to 
itself. According to Agamben, the coming community is conceptualised in terms of 
potentiality. He imagines a community that is not tied to any common property or by any 
identity. This community is being in ‘such a way that it always matters’ (Agamben, 1993:9). 
The coming community in whatever singularity means that it has no identity; it is not 
determinate with respect to a concept, but neither is it simply indeterminate; rather, it is 
determined only in relation to an idea, that is to the totality of its possibilities. Agamben 
(1993:34) notes that it is ‘being that is properly whatever is able to not-be; it is capable of its 
own impotence’. This signifies that the coming community becomes apparent in the balance 
between the potentiality to be and potentiality to not-be. That is, the singularities form a 
community without affirming an identity, such that humans co-belong without any 
representable condition of belonging. Agamben’s coming community is pictured ‘from 
limbo’, a kind of sacred space that emerges in his analysis as a space of ease where all 
destinations are suspended. Limbo is represented as an indeterminate and an impossible space 
that exists despite attempts to separate the sacred and the profane (Tyson, 2014). 
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In addition to ‘limbo’ and ‘whatever singularity’, Agamben (1993:62) uses ‘without classes’ 
to illustrate the potentiality and actuality of the coming community – here, he shows by 
example that the fortunes of humanity in terms of the stratification of society in classes 
resulted in fascism and Nazism, yet such stratifications still exist in different forms today. He 
argues that such stratifications are attached to a false popular identity in which dreams of 
bourgeois grandeur are an active force. He notes that such stratifications pose destruction to 
humanity. Hence, a false sense of belonging (that which attaches identity to a proper identity 
holds impotentiality) can lead to a cut-off of human communication. In his words, 
…[i]instead of continuing to search for a proper identity in the already improper and senseless 
form of individuality, humans were to succeed in belonging to this impropriety as such, in 
making of the proper being-thus not an identity an individual property but a singularity 
without identity, a common and absolutely exposed singularity… (Agamben, 1993:64).  
Elsewhere, Agamben indicates that the communicative essence of humans serves 
fundamental politics (spectacle); however; humans are separated by the same 
communicability itself. He notes that a presupposed communication can be destructive. 
Hence he argues that the first citizen of the coming community will be one who ‘brings 
language itself to language’ (Agamben, 1993:82). Referring to the events of Tiananmen 
Square and presaging the abstruse war and terror, Agamben claims that the future struggles 
will not be between states, but between state and humanity. According to Agamben 
(1993:54), the coming community is mediated neither by any condition of belonging nor by 
simple absence of conditions, but by belonging to itself. In light of the Tiananmen Square, 
one would argue that education can become other than it is in focusing attention to the human 
struggle, identity and dignity. Which points to the shift that the coming community 
[university] will be more focused on becoming human rather than belonging to a particular 
nationality?  This may also mean that the purpose of education may shift to become central to 
students critical participation rather than being recipients of knowledge in whatever 
singularity.
26
 
In order to distinguish the juxtaposition between liberal DCE and DCE in becoming, 
Agamben’s proposition of potentiality is crucial in disrupting liberal DCE to rethink 
                                                 
26
 I use whatever singularity in this dissertation equals what iever it can turn out to respond to a problem of 
violence and ethnic conflict. 
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education’s potentiality to resolve violence in the future. In the sections that follow I will 
show how Agamben’s potentiality stretches and disrupts the liberal idea of DCE to the 
potentialities of DCE in becoming for the future of humanity in whatever singularity in its 
becoming. In this case, even though violence clouds the Kenyan community at present, the 
present formulation of its resolution is in potentiality, which even though not realised in 
actuality, provides an optimistic future. This means that what we reformulate now about DCE 
is only in becoming, because it has the potentiality to be and not to be. However, there is an 
optimistic future (messianic time) that may not be actualised, for actuality will cease its 
reformulation. 
In contrast, Agamben (1993:9) uses the idea of ‘whatever singularity’ as a notion of 
potentiality in contrast to Derrida’s potentiality as an aporia. He notes further that potentiality 
in Derrida’s work is obscured by Derrida’s utopia – a desire for a humanised utopian future 
that negates the present as a mere moment within a large deliberation leading towards the full 
realisation of human potential. For Agamben, ideas such as those of Derrida erase the radical 
interdependence of impotentiality and potentiality that offers human freedom in the present 
time. Agamben is concerned with the temporality of progress as the actualisation of 
potentiality in the form of measurable outcomes that can be organised and interpreted 
according to logical development. Accordingly, Agamben’s reformulation of potentiality and 
equality is deferred to the future. In this case, utopia for Agamben is a critique of the present 
through the imaginative reconstruction of the future and the affective opening up of the 
possibility for hope, for desiring differently. Thus, there is a distinct closure to the present 
that must be rejected in full as a negative totality in order for the future to emerge. 
Derrida’s potentiality is always absent in the present and is only realised in the future. 
Derrida claims that difference makes possible all modes of presence, including the binary 
categories of concepts. For Derrida, dialogue is a presumed moment without qualification. 
For Agamben, potentiality is temporarily present in whatever singularity, but its potential 
never comes to actuality, it is never realised – the realisation is based on the progress and 
reconstruction of the present for the messianic future. Agamben’s logic of potentiality lends 
the liberal DCE a potentiality in becoming, for at present the presence of liberal DCE in 
Kenya is mired by violence, but its potentiality is being reconstructed in the presence of 
violence towards a future of DCE in becoming in whatever singularity. 
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I now shall refer to the seminal thoughts of Waghid and Davids (2013), following on 
Agamben’s potentialities of becoming. Waghid and Davids (2013:21) note that Agamben is 
well known for radical politics, ethics and law. My interest in following Waghid and Davids 
is spurred by their explication of the philosophy of potentialities in relation to education and 
violence. 
First, a reconsidered view of DCE suggests that higher education needs to help students to 
speak and think. Speech in this sense signals students to voice things differently, it involves 
suspending judgment on the way knowledge is presented so that students can learn something 
new, a way of acknowledging that learning is always in potential and never comes to 
actuality – the becoming is always in the making (Waghid & Davids, 2013:24). It is only 
when learning is considered as a potentiality that learning is in becoming, and any judgment 
of learning is never made in a rush. This means that an education in the becoming state is a 
formation process in which students will never be allowed to be in their comfort zones; 
students will be challenged constantly to give account of themselves, and then challenged 
continuously in speech and reason to uncover, recover and discover their voices, yet act 
differently – not in a rush to judgement (Barnett, 2007:54). This way of thinking enables the 
student to have confidence and involvement in her/his learning and becoming. 
Secondly, a reconsidered view of DCE is connected to the practice of seeing things 
differently. Seeing things differently means seeing things not as they always appear to be. 
Waghid and Davids (2013:25) say that seeing things differently conveys the notion that 
things will present themselves in different and multiple ways, which prevents one from 
rushing to judgement. This means that education has the potential to enable students to see 
things strangely, since it provides the place where students are in becoming. Seeing things 
differently is in tandem with Agamben’s (1993) potentiality in the becoming. That is, when 
we see things in the same way there is room for redundancy, yet the becoming state enables 
innovative thinking; it encourages radical thinking and new ways of knowing and seeing 
things. 
I have explained an instance of democratic citizenship education in relation to Ubuntu as a 
consideration of humanness (being human) – with more specific emphasis on considering the 
other in relation to the self (cf. Chapter 4). In this section I use a number of concepts to 
stretch and advance DCE in becoming so that it presents potentiality that can be used in 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
155 
 
encountering ethnic violence. First, I employ Agamben’s potentiality to disrupt Derrida’s 
concept of friendship to stretch DCE in becoming so that it can guide the imagining of the 
feasibility of the future of education that can relentlessly sustain human relationships in 
whatever singularity [with considerations of privation and individuality], since education 
involves relational encounters with the other. Secondly, I use compassionate and narrative 
imagination to stretch the liberal idea of DCE to potentially describe how a pluralistic society 
can actively be engaged dialogically with the other. Imagination as an act of the mind can be 
a potential way in which humans can enter into dialogue with the other. Thinking and 
speaking can be a way of being responsible without actualising. For instance, in diverse 
contexts, compassionate imagining and narration can be potentials for possible deliberative 
futures (Agamben, 1993; Green, 2012; Nussbaum, 1997). Thirdly, Agamben’s potentiality is 
used in reconstructing responsibility and critique so that they can be used as potential moral 
accounts for withholding judgement for a later time (not rash judgement) in education as 
opposed to the liberal actualised perspectives – a demand for a response that arises through 
our relationality and being addressed by the other in whatever singularity (Agamben, 1993; 
Butler, 2005). Fourthly, Agamben’s potentiality offers a different way of thinking about 
scepticism – not only as an assumption that not everyone cares – and that enables students to 
think radically, suspiciously and differently before making any rash judgement. The 
potentiality of being sceptic in Agamben’s view is one that is capable of being in constant 
scepticism – this means that scepticism never becomes an actualised idea but is an ongoing 
practice in education, for if scepticism is actualised then dialogue and education cease to take 
place. Responsibility as being caring indicates how humans (students and teachers) co-
belong. Caring as giving an account of oneself becomes a daily practice that is never 
actualised, but that sustains caring in DCE in becoming. This way of thinking (Agamben’s 
way) will show how caring can be a potential for engendering DCE in becoming in 
countering issues of ethnic violence and other societal dystopias that are incommensurate for 
education [as being caring] (Agamben, 1993; Butler, 2005; Cavell, 1979).  
5.4.1. Friendship as a Potentiality for Democratic Citizenship 
Education in Becoming  
In line with the reconceptualised view of DCE in becoming, speech and thought are 
possibilities that can advance education in becoming. Since education stems from 
pedagogical encounters, relationships in whatever singularity become a potential for DCE in 
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becoming (Waghid, 2014; Waghid & Davids, 2013). This is why I consider Derrida’s (1988) 
deconstructive overtones in his seminal work on the politics of friendship – a potential for 
speech and thought in education, as well as Agamben’s (1993; 2004) philologic and 
disruptive potentiality in The Coming Community to rethink liberal DCE. I will first explain 
how Derrida conceptualises potentiality in his work ‘The politics of friendship’, and then 
show how Agamben’s potentiality in relation to friendship is a disruption of Derrida’s 
potentiality of friendship that ameliorates liberal DCE to DCE in becoming.  
Derrida’s exposition of friendship is derived from the Aristotelian quote, ‘O my friends, there 
is no friend’ (Aristotle, in Derrida, 1988:632). In keeping with this quote, Derrida notes that 
Aristotle suggests a possibility for friendship. This is so because the subjects of wonder in the 
first part of the quote, ‘O my friends…’ (Derrida, 1988:632, citing Aristotle), are his friends. 
However, in the next part of the quote, ‘…there is no friend’, Aristotle shows that friends do 
not actually exist. Thus, Derrida pre-empts that friendship is possible based on the possibility 
and potentiality that human beings can participate actively with the other through speech and 
thought in relation to what he calls friendship; however, he notes that being passive negates 
friendship. This means that human beings have the potential for affective relationships in 
which they can speak and think. According to Bryan (2009:736), Aristotle’s perspective of 
friendship is proper friendship that makes decision making possible, although such decisions, 
according to Waghid and David (2013), need not be made rashly – a way in which the 
becoming is possible. Bryan (2009) likens the Aristotelian conception of friendship to a 
contemporary understanding of democratic practice. In Bryan’s thinking, it is through 
constant engagement [speech and thought] with the other that human beings become human 
beings. It is in this constant interaction in decision making without rash judgment that DCE in 
becoming is possible. 
Derrida (1988) explains issues of critical friendship in his seminal work, ‘The politics of 
friendship’. He begins his analysis by iterating Aristotle’s view of friendship and advances its 
meanings to deconstructive overtones. He explains that Aristotle’s conception of friendship 
denotes virtues and the capacity they provide to describe being human (Derrida, 1988:757). 
Friendship also holds the essence of good love. In this sense, friendship is not good because 
of what it leads to, but rather because of the excellence it shows in people being able to 
constantly think and speak as part of becoming human with the other.  
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Derrida (1988) presents friendship as a strange affirmation. He notes that friendship as 
depicted in Aristotle is more in loving than in being loved. According to Derrida, friendship 
is something being desired, something that has not yet occurred. Derrida (1988) says that 
friendship has an essence that provides its possibility, but the friend is missing. He notes that 
the possibility of friendship is encountered through our conversations and dialogue. In this 
sense, friendship is shaped through conversations, but the formation process is always in the 
‘making’ – in becoming. 
Derrida (1988:638) notes that the moment we think we have established friendship it ceases 
to be friendship, because we will begin to question and become dissatisfied with the form of 
an existing friendship, if there was any form of friendship in the first place. He notes that 
friendship is impossible, but that its possibility is in the essence of dialogue and the 
encounters we have with one another. Accordingly, the possibility of becoming lies in our 
speech and thought with the other in a relation of encounters for a possibility of DCE in 
becoming. 
Respect and responsibility are two notions that Derrida uses in describing the manner in 
which speech and thought can advance DCE in becoming and the possibility of friendship. 
According to him, respect and responsibility can help enhance the essence of thought and 
speech for friendly encounters. Respect and responsibility offer potentialities that can provide 
friendly platforms for speech and thought, even if such encounters do not portray a sense of 
belonging or agreement. Friendship as a possible relational human encounter can enable 
students to speak and think and can demand a response from the other as a way of becoming 
and learning more about the other without making rash judgements. 
In contrast to Derrida’s view of friendship, Agamben (2004) describes friendship as a form of 
life, not as the difference between two binaries (for example between friend and enemy). 
According to Agamben, friendship is closely linked to the definition of philosophy, for 
without it philosophy will not be possible (Agamben, 2004:1). For Agamben, to recognise 
someone as a friend means not to be able to recognise him as ‘something’. He notes that one 
cannot say ‘friend’ as one says ‘white’. For him, friendship is not a property or quality of a 
subject (Agamben, 2004). 
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Agamben (2004:1) illustrates friendship in the analogy of his friendship with Jean-Luc, 
which ended incomprehensibly when they had hoped that it would lead to a project. This 
shows how an actualised form of friendship ceases when we prescribe the nature of 
friendship. In this sense, their friendship was actualised for a particular purpose, which then 
ceased immediately and the possibility for a project was thwarted. Why this ended is not 
necessarily the point here. Agamben further criticises Derrida’s aporia of absence in relation 
to friendship using the Aristotelian traditional roots of friendship. Agamben explains that, 
during his encounter with Derrida while the latter was working on his project, ‘The politics of 
friendship’, they had discussed the philological problem of Aristotle’s phrase as used by 
Derrida. That is, according to Agamben, Derrida’s use of the Aristotelian phrase to formulate 
his book was not original. He notes that the original writing in the manuscripts read ‘he who 
has (many friends), has no friends’ (Agamben, 2004:1), and not ‘O my friends, there is no 
friend’ (Derrida, 1988:632, citing Aristotle) – Agamben claims he confirmed this through his 
library search on traditional writings. For this reason he finds Derrida’s use of the phrase as 
‘O my friends, there is no friend’ to be problematic. He asserts that he informed Derrida of 
his findings, and that he was astonished that Derrida went ahead and published his book 
anyway. For this reason he affirms and distrustfully revokes the book. 
Agamben (2004:2) notes that ‘friend’ as used in the above phrase is predicative and is not 
possible to construct a class of objects. Thus, friend is a ‘transcendent’ existence. This means 
that friendship is not a property or quality of a subject. Friendship, for Agamben, is the 
insistence of this concurrent perception of the friend’s existence in the awareness of one’s 
own existence. This means that friendships has an ontological presence and, at the same time, 
a political dimension. Friendship names sharing and is identical to itself. He posits that the 
friend is another self. The friend is not another ‘I’, but an otherness immanent in self-ness, a 
becoming other of the self. Friendship, according to Agamben, is de-subjectivisation at the 
very heart of the most intimate perception of self. 
Agamben (2004) explains that friendship is concurrently perceived in living together, 
conversing and sharing thoughts. Friendship is simultaneously a perception of the pure fact of 
existence. How this original political perception – synaesthesia – could come about in the 
course of time is a concern for Agamben. The consensus to which democracies entrust their 
fates in the latest extreme and exhausted phase of their evolution is, as they say, another story 
– one upon which Agamben is yet to reflect (Agamben, 2004).  
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Agamben’s view of potentiality in the coming community clarifies the potentiality of 
friendship in Derrida’s work (as I have discussed). In Derrida’s work, friendship becomes 
obscured by utopia, a desire for a humanised utopian future that negates the present as a mere 
moment within a larger deliberation, leading towards the full realisation of human 
potentiality. Such a narrative of becoming erases the much more radical interdependence of 
impotentiality and potentiality, which (as I have been arguing) offers fundamental human 
freedom in the present time. The potentiality of friendship that Agamben presents is a critique 
of the present friendship through an imaginative reconstruction of the future and the 
sentimental possibilities of hope – for desiring differently. Thus, friendship is a potential 
space between a friend and the being a friend. This means that friendship is an impossible 
accord for the possibility of the future. 
From the two philosophical dimensions of understanding potentialities, two Aristotelian 
scholars seem to be at loggerheads with what potentiality is, even though they both arise from 
Aristotelian roots. First is Derrida’s potentiality, which resides in negation between binaries 
and which also rejects potential presence (as found in Derrida’s formulation of friendship). 
Derrida denies presence in potentiality, which is only realised in actuality. On the other hand, 
Agamben (1999) argues for potentiality that exists in the present (ontological), although in 
whatever singularity – autonomous presence, in relation to which its potentiality does not 
only lie in the present, but never comes into actuality in the future, yet constant activity of 
‘being’ determines its becoming. The complexity of deconstruction (Derrida) and 
philologism (Agamben) presents the contemplation of potentiality in becoming. In this sense, 
friendship as an in-becoming concept has potentiality at present, which, when enacted in 
being, can survive the potentiality of DCE in becoming as a way of curbing violence in the 
future that never comes to actuality. 
5.4.2. Compassionate Imagination as a Potentiality for Democratic 
Citizenship Education in Becoming  
Thinking differently, speaking and withholding rash judgement are potentialities for a 
reconsidered view of DCE in becoming. For one to engage in speech, and to think differently 
while withholding rash judgement, requires imagination in whatever singularity [that is 
compassionate, according to Green (2012:420)]. In line with Agamben’s (1999) potentiality, 
imagination in whatever singularity is never actualised, but is always in the making. It is not 
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identified by passion or compassion, but in whatever singularity. In this sense, for Agamben, 
being in imagination is autonomous – imagining the unimaginable. However, passion is what 
Green (2012:420) uses to describe the affinity one needs in a pluralistic society. He provides 
an example of how a pluralistic society can be strengthened to avoid division and 
misunderstanding during encounters. He uses the American community to describe his sense 
of a pluralistic community. Accordingly, I find his exposition of a pluralistic community 
descriptively similar to what is already obtainable in the Kenyan community, in that it bears a 
similar humanistic essence of being human and is already actualised. The commonality of 
being human is exemplified in societal structures, classes, culture, ethnicity and 
bureaucracies. Green (2012:420) uses passion to describe ‘the realm of face-to-face 
relationships’ in human encounters, and emphasises that compassionate imagination can help 
a pluralistic society build how they think, speak and withhold judgment within societal 
encounters. He pictures a pluralistic society as a human society consisting of persons who 
have a variety of needs. Some may be young, others old, some may suffer from 
powerlessness or poverty, some from ignorance, exclusion and boredom, yet they all need to 
speak, think and act differently as a way of co-learning and of becoming. He uses 
imagination as a metaphor to describe the capacity that the past has to imagine the present 
and the future of a pluralistic society. 
Green suggests that compassionate imagination through engagement in acts of speech and 
thought can expand a diverse community. He refers to Hannah Arendt’s description of 
plurality as a condition of human action because we all bear a common humanity. Despite the 
fact that we bear humanness, we are not all the same. Each individual is different and unique 
in many ways. For this reason, each person is a participant in ongoing dialogue in different 
ways, but is still open to the perspectives of those who may have different ideas, even though 
they share the same space. 
This kind of speech or dialogue is inclusive and cannot neglect the voices of others while 
including those of some. Green imagines the unimaginable, thinking of something as though 
it has happened [can happen], yet is absent and not yet a reality – a way of thinking 
differently. As such, imagining the unimaginable could entail suspending judgement for a 
later time, thereby enabling constant learning. In Green’s (2012:421) words, for education [as 
imaginative passions] we have to  
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[o]pen up our experiences (to curriculum) to existential possibilities of multiple kinds to 
extend and deepen what we think of when we speak of a community. If we break through and 
even disrupt a surface of equilibrium, and uniformity, this does not mean that a particular 
ethnic or racial tradition ought to replace our own… Individualism, masculinity, social 
engagement versus historical isolation, acute and ambiguous moral problematic, the thematic 
innocence coupled with an obsession with figuration of death and hell… 
Similarly, Green (2012:424) notes that cultural backgrounds play an important role in how 
we engage in speech and thought and how we make judgement [shaping our identity], but 
they do not determine our identity. In this sense, our culture or ethnicity only affirms our 
humanity and how we relate to one another, not only because others are from our tribe, but 
because they are citizens of a world republic. 
Nussbaum (1997:85), like Green (2012), argues that narrative imagination as a process can 
enhance speech [dialogue] among various ethnic groups as a means to eradicate violence. For 
Nussbaum, cultivating a sympathetic imagination will grant students [citizens] the capacity to 
‘comprehend [the] motives and choices of people different from ourselves, not seeing them as 
forbiddingly alien and other but as sharing many problems and possibilities with us’ 
(Nussbaum, 1997:85). Inculcating imagination [thought] in learning is fundamental to DCE 
in becoming, although not as Nussbaum puts it. In the coming community, to put 
Nussbaum’s idea differently, narrative imagination is a potential for DCE, which can and 
cannot resolve societal ills; however, in an optimistic sense, the possibility of narrative 
imagination to resolve violence relies on narrative imagination as a form of life, which means 
that imagination becomes a living process in becoming that continually sustains deliberation 
toward non-violence. Narratives [speech] can be used to educate students by exposing them 
to an array of literary work, not as an actualisation, but as a sensation that can expose them to 
imagining [thinking about] others’ worlds in whatever singularity. Nussbaum suggests that 
such imagination is capable of enhancing the capability of students to have compassion for 
the other. Compassion involves the recognition that another person, in some ways similar to 
oneself, has suffered some significant pain or misfortune for which that person is not, or not 
fully, to blame. In other words, compassion enables us to be aware of our common ability to 
suffer. In this sense we will be able, in turn, to imagine the suffering of others as though we 
are the one suffering, and hence to show compassion with them and suspend rash judgement. 
Green’s and Nussbaum’s view of imagination is already actualised and does not consider 
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individuals’ privation. In DCE in becoming, imagination should be freed from any properties 
or identity, but should be imagination in whatever singularity. This means that individuals 
will be autonomous in their imagination, and compassion does not become a means to an end 
but is a living process in whatever issues faced by society. Imagination in whatever 
singularity has the potential of triggering speech without actualising it, for if imagination and 
speech are realised then deliberation will cease and the education process will come to a halt. 
In line with Nussbaum (1997) and Green (2012), education first needs to consider the 
humanity of everyone and anyone, in which case others’ speech and thought can be regarded 
as a way in which students participate constantly in learning as a way of becoming. Education 
needs to be concerned with new ways of knowing, that is thinking differently. Imagining and 
being in dialogue can enable students to venture into the unknown. In this way, education can 
be said to be in the making and never attained, something we keep working toward. We 
cannot assume that we know when we have not explored or exhausted different ways of 
knowing, as knowing is always in becoming and is never to be actualised, lest it terminates. 
In this sense, our passions and imagination can drive our learning to unimagined boundaries 
(beyond borders). Accordingly, entering into dialogue about histories, and the differences 
present in humanity, can enable students and learners alike to enter into the realm of knowing 
the unknown, for instance ways in which a society can live together by appreciating humanity 
through speech and imagination that transcend our differences, and by acknowledging the 
uniqueness of others.  
Under DCE in becoming, there currently is plurality in Kenya that is actualised. The presence 
of poverty, violence, classism, ethnicity and political instability, in Agamben’s way of 
thinking, is in whatever singularity. Agamben describes the coming community as one 
without classes, since classism has resulted, for example, in Nazism, fascism and violence. 
For Agamben there is potentiality in DCE in becoming that progressively and concurrently 
reformulates/imagines itself for a hopeful future. Even though this future may not be realised, 
the potential acts of being in deliberation and active imagining in whatever singularity can 
lead to (compassionate) imagining in whatever singularity for a hopeful future in becoming. 
That is, DCE in becoming involves an active imagining of the present in whatever singularity 
for an optimistic future – the act of living in constant (compassionate) imagining itself holds 
potentiality and a possibility for eradicating violence, although the eradication itself is in 
whatever singularity – that violence in Kenya can become other that it is through living in 
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constant imagining of self in otherness. Accordingly, compassionate imagining is in 
becoming, not as in Derrida’s potentiality, nor in Agamben’s potentiality, but other than it is 
in whatever singularity – compassionate imagining without borders – in becoming. 
Accordingly, DCE in becoming should educate students about the potentiality of imagining 
(in the dynamic sense) – bringing students into an imagining without the imaginable. In this 
sense, students are taught not to reserve their imagination for any matter (privation), but that 
nothing should remain unimagined in DCE in becoming. Through imaginings in whatever 
singularity, students are initiated into practices of imagination that stir up speech and thought 
in which students can practise ‘free use of self’ (Agamben, 1993:28; Waghid & Davids, 
2013:28) to speak what their imagination yields, not as a finality and also without rash 
judgement, so that potentiality in imagination and speech does not cease, but is sustained. 
Constant imagining has a potential for DCE in becoming to go a long way in addressing 
issues of violence and other societal concerns. 
5.4.3. Responsibility and Critique as Potentialities of Democratic 
Citizenship Education in Becoming 
In addition to friendship, compassionate and narrative imaginings, responsibility and critique 
are potentials that can help speech, thought and rash judgement to stretch the conceptions of 
DCE in becoming. I will employ Judith Butler’s perspective on moral philosophy to extend 
conceptions of a DCE in becoming, and Agamben’s potentiality to disrupt responsibility and 
critique from a liberal idea of DCE in becoming. 
Butler’s (2005) seminal contribution to moral philosophy, especially her work on subject 
formation, provides a springboard for my argument on responsibility as an act of speech and 
thought in response to the other. In this way, responsibility as a concept can stretch DCE in 
becoming to constantly deal with the occurrences of ethnic violence. I argue for responsibility 
and critique as key concepts in reimagining nuances for DCE in becoming against ethnic 
conflicts and violence. 
According to Theim (2008:5), responsibility is ‘a demand for a response that arises through 
our relationality and being addressed by another’. Theim’s claim is different from the 
conventional understanding of responsibility as accountability for the past as a consideration 
of the present. Theim (2008) does not denounce the notions of accountability as attached to 
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responsibility, but considers a more nuanced and potential perspective of responsibility and 
the future it offers to education in becoming. Theim’s understanding of responsibility is 
aligned with Butler’s (2005) understanding of responsibility as a consideration of the future. 
Responsibility is drawn from human relational encounters with another [human being] – for 
the preservation of what is to come, and also as a response to that encounter with the other 
(Theim, 2008:5). Butler’s mode of critical thinking provides a critique of the subject. The 
question of subject formation is crucial to education for critical citizenship. Butler’s idea is an 
intervention of realistic questions on the political and social problematic, like ethnic conflicts. 
Her work questions how bodies and subjects depend on socially produced and administered 
realities (Theim, 2008:9).  
Theim (2008:11) notes that, for Butler, ‘the process of becoming a subject is a process of 
becoming subordinated by norms through which power relations work and to exist socially as 
well as self-consciously requires not only relating to norms but also to become subjected to 
them’. In her book, Giving Account of Oneself, Butler (2005:30) notes that norms and power 
are made known to us through the encounters we have with one another – without the 
dialogue and conversations we have with one another, norms are unknowable. This means 
that the possibility of knowing is found in the possibilities of encounters we have with one 
another. In this sense, the ways in which DCE in becoming can deal with ethnic violence, 
bias or tensions is through constant encounters (being in dialogue with self and the other 
without actualising it) with others, which has the potential to increase citizens’ know-ability 
and which cannot be actualised, because when knowing is actualised, then there will be 
nothing else to know. In order to sustain knowing, withholding the knowable is crucial to 
knowing (rather, being in knowing). In this sense, knowing is always in becoming and norms 
in society are always in potential, since they are incomplete and in the stage of infancy – in 
becoming. So: the norms in becoming are always altered in the encounters we have with one 
another on issues that bring conflict and from the problematic that comes about as a result of 
outdated (impotentiality) norms or norms that do not help in dealing with problematic 
situations. On the other hand, some of the norms that exist and those we come across in our 
encounters with others can be limited to dealing with the ever-changing societal terrain, as 
well as to forming the coming community of critical citizens. So, being responsible is a 
possibility, since it involves being critical as a potentiality that can sustain speech and 
thought without actualising speech or thought for in-becoming solutions to societal ills.  
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Elsewhere, Butler (2005:206) notes that norms are very essential to our co-existence with the 
other. Norms are helpful in guiding human action, living and knowing. Without norms it is 
difficult to know in which direction to transform society – norms are constantly constructed 
in speech, thought and action. However, norms can also create situations of violence; in this 
sense, social justice becomes necessary to protect our becoming. It is from this understanding 
that Butler suggests critique as a way of constantly questioning the norms to overcome 
instances of violence and inhumanity in human encounters. 
Critique, according to Butler (2005:303), aspires to understand and cross-examine how 
questions of moral conduct are constructed by social and historical settings and frameworks. 
More specifically, critique becomes crucial to higher education in Kenya in relation to social 
and historical contexts and how they acclimatise the form of moral conundrums, which in 
turn are determined through social norms and structures of power. In this sense, DCE in 
becoming as a concept of moral philosophy is a critical inquiry that examines how education 
policies and power structures determine how ethnic anomalies and imbalances in the Kenyan 
education system and society raise questions on justice and how justice becomes available 
and urgent. In this sense, responsibility means insisting on critique as a means of raising 
questions and responding to others in terms of the realities that exist in society. One such 
specific reality is the issue of ethnocentrism, how it influences educational circles in Kenya 
and what structures are in place to deal with the divisive aspects of ethnicity. So: the constant 
culture of a critique of norms and structures of power can enable critical citizenship to deal 
with ethnic violence in a more non-violent way and can improve education in becoming in 
Kenyan higher education institutions. 
In contrast to Butler’s (2005) views on responsibility and critique, Agamben’s perspective on 
responsibility and critique can be considered as a present potentiality in whatever singularity. 
It is not attached to a subject. The act of being responsible and being critical lays the potential 
for human relationality in whatever singularity that can resolve violence or not resolve 
violence. However, the act of being critical or being responsible can make violence other than 
it is. Again, what makes critique and responsibility to be in becoming is active living in 
critique and being responsible, and these never come to actuality, because if this happens then 
people stop being responsible and violence becomes actualised and critique ceases.  
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5.4.4. Scepticism as a Potential for Democratic Citizenship in 
Becoming 
Similar to Butler (2005), Cavell’s (1979) articulation of moral philosophy and scepticism 
provides ideas that can aid the constant construction of nuances in education [DCE in 
becoming] to deal with situations of conflict. However, these ideas are already actualised. 
Some of Cavell’s work in relation to pedagogy can be found in the seminal work of Waghid 
and Smeyers (2010) and Waghid (2014:49-55). I would like to affirm Waghid’s views and at 
the same time argue that scepticism and responsibility as moral virtues in philosophy can 
contribute to nuances in DCE in becoming that can address issues of ethnic violence through 
subject formation. 
Cavell (1979:312) describes moral arguments as ones with the direct aim of determining the 
positions we are willing to take responsibility for, especially in the discussions we have with 
the other. He notes that this responsibility takes place in the dialogical discussions we have 
with others as an extension of the self – as a sign that we care about others. For Cavell, 
responsibility in this sense includes what we care for, what we are committed to and how this 
affects how we conduct ourselves in relation to the other. According to Cavell, responsibility 
is being answerable for our actions. 
How we view others informs us who we are. We do not know ourselves until we are able to 
approve of ourselves in the other. Cavell (1979:331) notes that being sceptical of our own 
human nature, to the point of doubting who we are rather than suspending what we think we 
are and finding who the other is, can help us discover who we really are. In Cavell’s 
(1979:433) words,  
Being exposed to my concept of the other is being exposed to my assurance in applying it … I 
have to acknowledge humanity in the other, and the basis of it seems to lie in me. But what do 
I know of that basis of it seems to lie in me. ... I thought that there could be no sufficient basis 
in me, that only an outsider, one free of human nature, could tell me what I would have to 
know to be assured of the other’s humanity. But I also came to think that if there is an 
outsider he is in me, in each of us. 
Cavell shows that, when I am able to recognise human nature in others, I also will be able to 
know the human nature in me. This process requires one to suspend the knowledge of self 
and consider self as a stranger until we discover self in others, and then we come back to self 
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and verify the human nature in oneself. Thus, acknowledging the human nature in others 
enables one to discover oneself in unimagined ways. The responsibility here is seeking to 
encounter the other in order to locate, and understand, the self. 
In this way of thinking, which is in Cavell’s (1979) perspectives on responsibility, scepticism 
and the other, lies the potential for solving problems in education. Education, in terms of 
Cavell’s thinking, ought to suspend what we think we know until we encounter others, when 
we can make better judgement of ourselves; that is, when we can claim with reasons that we 
know or that we are knowing beings. Accordingly, DCE in becoming can be a process of 
encountering others in being caring in committed ways to discover their humanity, which is 
richly present in the self. In addition, doing this will delay acts of violence, because no one 
would like to be violent to self. Education in this sense will recognise humanity wherever it 
occurs. DCE in becoming therefore will engender/imagine the potentials and future impacts 
of responsible acts on humanity against ethnic violence by being constantly sceptical, since 
responsibilities lie in the feasible future.  
In contrast to Agamben’s (1999) thought on potentiality, Cavell’s scepticism and 
responsibility is already actualised. This is because, when we approve of ourselves in the 
other as an indicator of being responsible, then responsibility ends when the approval is 
actualised. In Agamben’s sense, responsibility does not begin with the caring for the other, 
but a consideration of being responsible begins with self for itself as an act of co-belonging. 
Thus, scepticism that is commensurate with the notion of in becoming involves whatever 
singularity, in which case scepticism is not attached to any prescribed quality or identity, but 
being involved in scepticism without actualising becomes a continuous responsibility – that 
of being sceptical in matters that affect society and of not becoming actualised. In DCE in 
becoming, being sceptical has the potential to enable and not to enable violence or education 
in Kenya to be other than it is. However, living in scepticism and being responsible have the 
potential for DCE in becoming to resolve violence in whatever singularity. Being sceptical or 
being responsible in whatever singularity autonomously has the potential for DCE in 
becoming to resolve violence. This means that, in DCE in becoming, the potential to resolve 
violence depends on the relentless form of life of being sceptical and being responsible in 
whatever singularity. 
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5.5. Re-thinking Higher Education in Terms of the Potentiality of 
Democratic Citizenship Education in Becoming 
In this section I will consider how the ideas surrounding a reconceptualised notion of DCE in 
becoming can assist in imagining and thinking differently about higher education in Kenya. 
For students to think, speak and see things differently, higher education should be 
conceptualised to do so. I argue that to think of higher education as a community in becoming 
renders a different way of thinking about higher education.  
First, DCE in becoming will teach students not only as those who share a sense of belonging, 
but as individuals with their own privations (Agamben, 1993:1; Waghid, 2013:28). In this 
way, students are not forced to identify with a particular sense of belonging, but to present 
themselves as autonomous individual beings – what Agamben refers to as ‘whatever 
singularity’. Students are freed from any identity to enable them free use of self. Being in 
whatever singularity allows students to become other than they are. This is because the liberal 
idea of education already actualised students’ sense of belonging, for example being an ethnic 
other, a citizen of a particular nation or belonging to a particular group or society, or even 
being an actualised friend. Such an understanding of a sense of belonging annuls the 
conception of DCE in becoming. For if a particular sense of belonging is actualised, students’ 
sense of belonging ceases to be in becoming. DCE in becoming allows students to be such 
that their sense of belonging is hidden. Accordingly, DCE in becoming will enable students 
to construct/negotiate their sense of belonging according to their privation. This is because 
DCE does not rely on meanings that are already prescribed, but rather on ones that are 
constantly constructed and are not always actualised (Waghid, 2013:28). For example, 
friendship can be a potentially relevant possibility for DCE in becoming in institutions of 
higher learning. Friendship as a form of life has the potential to allow free use of self in living 
and sharing ideas. As a form of life, friendship can provide spaces where being in 
deliberation and co-belonging in whatever singularity can advance education without 
actualisation. Instead of students sharing a sense of belonging in friendship as actualised 
terminology, they will strive towards friendship as a way of life that cannot be realised, 
although it offers potential essence to the optimistic future – not to belong, but to co-belong. 
Friendship as a form of life can provide potential spaces [in whatever singularity] for 
imagining the future of university education in Kenya. The complexes and the convergence 
of ethnic violence presently portray the impotentiality of liberal DCE in Kenya. It is hoped 
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that the potentiality of friendship can provide possible encounters for educating students on 
their in-becoming as citizens of a coming community – by being human. This is contrary to 
the liberal notions of educating students to become democratic citizens; this latter way of 
understanding education actualises education as in the prescribed outcomes and policy 
documents. In line with Agamben’s (1993) perception, liberal DCE as found in education 
policies (Kenya) actualises what education should do or achieve; it does not have room for 
‘whatever singularity’. A presupposed notion of education annuls innovation, creativity and 
critical thinking. If education in becoming is to resolve ethnocentrism, then education should 
free itself from a sense of belonging, a property or an identity, or even from prescribed 
outcomes. The possibility of friendship offers a platform for potential interaction on whatever 
singularity, including being in dialogue about the impotentiality of actualising education and 
the resultant ethnic violence; this dialogue does not have to lead to agreement, but will be 
such that it allows privation (autonomous thinking). Accordingly, ethnic conflict (an 
actualised sense of belonging) as an ontological problem in Kenya in whatever singularity 
affects (impotentiality) how universities are being run at present, and ultimately interferes 
with education as a process that aids our becoming human. It could also be said that 
education in Kenya is already actualised, in the sense that it has been achieved; particular, 
prescribed outcomes cannot resolve ethnic violence. One could argue that violence in Kenya 
is as a result of an actualised education. In this way of thinking, friendship has the potential to 
offer education-oriented relationships and the potential not to offer education-oriented 
relationships. The potential for friendship to offer education-oriented relationships lies in 
being involved in speaking and thinking without making rash judgment. Friendship as such 
signifies potential critical interaction. In this respect, how one speaks, thinks and withholds 
rash judgement are crucial for the possibilities of relation to the other. This is because speech 
without critical thinking and with rash judgement can result in conflicting circumstances, 
which may hinder how we relate to the other and consequently may hamper our becoming 
human. In other words, conflicts are unavoidable in circumstances of plurality; however, how 
we engage with one another in times of conflict can either lead to more problems/conflicts or 
can provide instances for solutions to problems.  
In a similar manner, to construct discourses of ethnic conflict is almost an impossible task. 
However, the possibility of doing this lies in the potentialities of friendship [as a form of life], 
which, in whatever singularity, offers optimistic feasibility for the future. Accordingly, the 
potentiality of friendship lies in the everyday acts of speech and thought that are not 
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actualised in our becoming human. In this regard, a constant and intentional deliberation on 
violence and ethnic conflict among university students and their lecturers has the potential to 
limit, and the potential not to limit, the extent of violence and conflicts as experienced in 
Kenya. It is being in conversation/dialogue [constant and relentless] that friendship is in 
becoming. Thus, higher education cannot be considered as an actualised solution to human 
problems, but rather as a potential resolution of societal ills, and cannot be actualised. 
In education, friendship as a form of pedagogy accords students and lecturers the 
responsibility of dialoguing, criticising and sharing as ways of reconstructing the future of 
ethnic ills without actualising in whatever singularity. It also educates students not to cling to 
a false/actualised sense of belonging like ethnic inclination, but to free them to self and 
privation for whatever they may become. Constant and critical dialoguing can create 
possibilities for altering the human condition and freeing humans from the necessity to cling 
to a particular sense of belonging.  
Waghid (2014:19) acknowledges Derrida’s exposition of friendship as providing a relational 
invitation to learning. He notes that politeness, as found in friendship, encourages students to 
get together to learn beyond boundaries that can be imagined, but not actualised. They can 
take risks because DCE in becoming has the potential for students’ learning, since the 
environment of learning encourages free self-use and co-belonging. In this sense, students 
will not be afraid of criticism, for they know they are safe and free to learn beyond 
containable borders – to learn that which is yet to come but is not actualised. Similarly, 
Waghid (2014:19) notes that a friend expects nothing in return, because friendship is 
concerned with equal opportunity for everyone. In this manner the students would have equal 
opportunities for learning in the best way possible, and this will encourage enthusiasm. 
Therefore, a friend loves and at the same time critiques. Friendship creates conditions for 
potentialities by expecting nothing in return; it encourages risk taking, hence provoking one 
another to think better to become ‘someone else’. 
In this sense, friendship potentially sustains reimagining education to be other than it is. It is a 
non-violent way of inviting the other and respecting their privation and potentiality to 
deliberate and not to deliberate. In contrast, deliberation in a becoming community is not 
defined by particular properties or identity; nonetheless, being in deliberation contains 
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possibilities that can resolve issues of concern in human society in whatever singularity and 
keep judgment for later. Students are free to negotiate their form of life.  
In a nutshell, on the first point, DCE in becoming has the potential to educate students to 
cultivate communities in becoming without the claim of belonging to any particular 
community, but rather as humans who co-belong as they continue to tackle daily issues such 
as violence in society. It also encourages students to think of the potentiality of speech 
without rash judgement as one way of negotiating solutions to problems without actualising 
speech. When students potentially are prepared to think, see and speak differently on a 
constant basis, and to suspend hasty judgement, then DCE in becoming can address violence 
and other societal dystopias.  
Second, DCE in becoming is not determined by a sense of belonging. This suggests that 
students will be introduced to practices on the basis of undisputable allegiance to bringing 
about change without favouring any hegemonic ethnic/cultural community or idea, since they 
are freed from their self and their identity [privation]. In this case, students will be 
encouraged to participate in communication without bias or predisposition of belonging. This 
is important in the sense that they will be communicating on neutral ground on the basis of 
being human. This also means that students’ imagination will be a form of life, through 
which they will negotiate the coming community on a continuous basis. For instance, the 
plurality that exists in Kenya is an ontological reality that has potential for Kenyan higher 
education in becoming. The problem that exists is that universities in Kenya have actualised 
education by constituting it to contribute to a sense of belonging. Kenya has various tribes 
[about 60 tribes] and, apart from this, it is a centre for refugees from East Africa; it also has 
diplomats, Indians who remained in Kenya after the colonial regime, as well as British people 
who remained as Kenyans after the colonial epoch [just to mention a few cases of diversity] 
(Branch & Cheeseman, 2008:18) – this makes Kenya a pluralistic society with a potential for 
DCE in becoming. One of the most striking difficulties faced by Kenya is the aftermath of 
ethnic politics that transcends all sectors of national planning, including education. Education 
in Kenya has been actualised, and nationalising education and regionalising education has 
naturally sensitised ethnocentrism in the learning institutions (Branch, Cheeseman & 
Gardner, 2010). These tribes [plurality] consist of various individuals who already make up 
an existing community, as well as the nation. The expectation that university education would 
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prepare university students for particular things in society is blurred by the view of DCE in 
becoming. 
Unless education in Kenya is freed of a sense of belonging or predispositions, or is instituted 
towards imagining, critiquing and communicating, education will become an actualised 
practice and ethnic violence will become imperative to education, as is currently the case. 
DCE in becoming potentially can educate students to imagine societal problems and concerns 
in whatever singularity to bring about potentiality without actualising it. This means students 
will be engaging in dialogue about public matters that are concerned with the coming 
community, not as though there will be instant solutions to the problems, but rather continual 
deliberations that potentially can contribute to the coming community. However, this is not 
what happens in the Kenyan reality. So, in this sense, higher education in Kenya will become 
an invitation for students to live a life of dialoguing with the self and the other, and at the 
same time create a place where nothing remains unsaid. In keeping with Waghid (2005b), 
compassionate action in relation to Green’s proposition can enable university students to 
create a space in which teachers and students in higher education institutions can look at 
things afresh. In DCE in becoming, students will resume imagination as a form of life – for 
being in imagination has the potential to make violence other than it is. Imaginative action in 
this sense will enable us to imagine the different voices of our students and how they react to 
what is taught in the classroom. It will enable teachers and learners to connect with students 
[the other] from different backgrounds without singling out identities or difference. It will 
allow students chances to participate actively in building cohesion with the other. 
Third, DCE in becoming potentially will educate students to intentionally become a part of 
the becoming community through communication. This in-becoming communication is 
contrary to the Habermasian (1987) type of communication, which leads to understanding 
through agreement. DCE in becoming is concerned with bringing students into 
‘communication with the incommunicable’ (Waghid, 2013, citing Agamben, 1993:7). This 
means that students will be taught not to stay silent regarding anything, even if it will lead to 
disagreement. It is in relation to such being in communication that violence in society can be 
renounced. If students are taught to speak their minds, they should also be taught not to rush 
to judgement, as this may actualise communication and may render null the DCE in 
becoming. One of the problems Kenya faces is ethnic violence. If students speak their minds 
and rush to judgement there increasingly will be violent situations, since speech will already 
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be actualised. Thus, being in communication should entail practices that continuously guide 
students in negotiating innovative solutions to solve violent occurrences in society. 
DCE in becoming, in a philological sense, can prepare students potentially to participate and 
responsibly to communicate in public space/life with privations, without actualising speech. 
Accordingly, being in continual speech can contribute to fresh ways of thinking about 
societal ills and concerns (Agamben, 1993). This means that, while students are prepared for 
their future careers, university education needs to prepare them also with potential skills, 
knowledge, purposes and attitudes in whatever singularity that will continuously sustain their 
becoming (as form of life) – as a possibility of a feasible future. Such knowledge may 
include: ability to continuously deliberate in public spaces, being responsible, a willingness to 
tolerate, being respectful, and being fair in whatever singularity.  
The complexity of the violence in Kenya gives rise to the question of moral education. In 
keeping with Theim (2008:1), ‘moral conduct cannot be reduced to what we owe others, to 
duties and obligations and not to virtues which can have equality restraining effects’. What 
Kenyan education requires is an education that can enable students to undertake the task of 
learning to live together with others without interfering with their privation. The violence and 
ethnic tensions have given rise to a problematic situation in Kenya, thereby resulting in an 
increase in poverty, social decadence and hatred among citizens, which lead to defeat and 
dogmatism. How can education thrive when it is actualised? 
I argue that responsibility as a concept can provide nuances for DCE in becoming in the 
sphere of moral education. In line with Cavell (1979:441), responsibility is the capacity or 
ability to act on a situation, and also the ability to amend a situation. Being responsible for 
what happens to others means that their opinions are acknowledged, even though one might 
not be in agreement with the other. One shows concern for the other. According to Cavell 
(1979:9), being responsible means that an individual will negotiate his/her relations with the 
other, because lack of responsible action would mean a collapse of society. Violence is both 
an ethical and a moral issue. It is concerned with making judgement on what is right and, at 
the same time, what is good for the self and the other in considering living together with the 
other without actualising belongingness. On this basis, DCE in becoming is considered a 
normative viewpoint from which education constantly can be in the making/reviewed. The 
provocative view posed by responsibility for DCE in becoming is the potential for critical 
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citizenship that can expand opportunities for justice for all people without rash judgement. In 
other words, responsibility as a concept potentially suggests the possibility of embedding it in 
DCE in becoming in whatever singularity. It also gives way to a potentially just education 
system that can tackle issues of violence and humane practices in our universities. 
Responsibility and self-formation can provide a relevant ethics for developing a critical 
citizen; however, this does not mean that responsibility is going to solve all ethnic violence 
problems in Kenya, just that it persistently can emancipate citizens [students and teachers] to 
be responsible for the actions of violence. In this sense, my concern will be more with the 
problem (question) of ethnic violence, rather than the solution. 
In times of ethnic conflict, scepticism can help us to assume that not everyone can care about, 
or can be committed to, a moral course; consequently, denial may be the norm. In this case, 
Cavell (1979:326) suggests a moral relationship, which he says does not always happen or 
may not even be possible, but he notes that confrontation of the other may be a better option, 
not because we do not like the other, but because it is a moral way to engage with the other, 
rather than being silent. It is our willingness to encounter the other and bear the consequences 
of our relational encounter that makes responsibility a worthwhile course in addressing issues 
of violence. It is in moral or relational encounters that we may discover the unimaginable. 
In a manner, then – if, through the narration of the historical past, students in Kenya can read 
about, comprehend and imagine the suffering that the past has brought to the nation, they 
potentially can live in compassion in whatever singularity, while ontologically they can 
imagine the experiences in Kenya for whatever future. For instance, the post-election 
violence that erupted in Kenya in 2007 should be a point of reflection to revisit citizenship in 
Kenya. This phenomenon should enable students to imagine the suffering of those who died, 
and those who were orphaned or affected by the phenomenon, and to begin to think 
differently about their belonging – as co-belonging rather than belonging to a particular 
identity. In this respect, students can free themselves from belonging, so that they assume 
living in their privations. They can deliberate on the basis of being human, without 
particularities of belonging. This could enable students to empty themselves of a presupposed 
sense of belonging that blocks their thinking and living innovatively with respect to their 
privations. In addition, imagining the poverty, the exclusion and the marginalisation of 
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certain citizens in Kenya is another focal narrative that students can reflect on as they think 
anew in reconstructing self for itself in whatever singularity. 
In a nutshell, DCE in becoming has the potential to educate students to combat violence. 
Such an education is one that is not yet arrived at, but one that is in becoming. This means 
that students will be taught how to handle their everyday experiences as individual and 
independent thinkers. For instance, such an education in becoming will teach students to 
enter into speech with others concerning the issues they face. When in speech, students are 
taught not to actualise speech, but to suspend a rush to judgement, as they will value 
humanity. This means that a relation that entails to co-belong is essential for speech in which 
the coming community is nurtured. In this sense, students will value human relations 
(friendship) in whatever singularity and take responsibility in speech and critique without 
actualising speech as a way of countering everyday life experiences and challenges. For 
example, concerning violence in Kenya, students can be taught to see things other than they 
are. That is, if they view violence, or the violated, as part of the coming community, students 
will take responsibility in speech without making rash judgement, but will reconsider the 
values of humanity such as respect, human dignity, self-respect and respect for the other – 
seeing others ‘within an outside’.  
5.6. Why Current Kenyan Higher Education Might not Resist 
Violence 
In connection with Agamben’s (1993) idea of the coming community and the account of 
DCE in becoming, it is significant to ask whether university education in Kenya is potentially 
viable in becoming. That is, would it be possible for Kenyan higher education in becoming to 
potentially resist violence (impotentiality)?  
Kenyan higher education in its current form might not resist violence. My contention is that 
the current forms of higher education, more specifically university education in Kenya, are 
unresponsive to the political and ethnic tensions and conflict in the country. The expectation 
that university education in Kenya would prepare university students for specific things in 
society is weakened by this view of DCE in becoming. University education aims to equip 
students in Kenya to ‘realise socio-economic development … achieve manpower 
development … promote the discovery, storage and dissemination of knowledge, encourage 
research, innovation and application to development and contribute to community service’ 
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(Republic of Kenya, 2012:121). This process is guided by specific values such as equity, 
rights, culture, ethical behaviour, national values and national interests, enhanced equity and 
access, the promotion of inclusive, efficient, effective and transparent governance systems 
and practices, and the maintenance of public trust (Republic of Kenya, 2012:122). Following 
the in-becoming idea, universities in Kenya teach students to conform to presupposed notions 
of education and pre-existence. They do not prepare students to think independently. Notions 
such as effective, efficient, realised and achieved, and specific preconceived notions or 
thinking, do not allow creativity and independent thinking, which nullifies DCE in becoming 
as a process. 
Following the identities/properties attached to what education is to do using terminology such 
as ‘to realise’, the ‘achievement of’ or the ‘effective’ and ‘attainment of’ prompts mastery. 
Mastery of such ideologies actualises university education and has a repercussive impact on 
society as a whole. No wonder then that, despite such preconceived ideas of education, 
Kenya is still characterised by: inadequate facilities and an inappropriate teaching and 
learning environment; inadequate staff; weak collaboration with professional bodies; a lack 
of external quality assurance; large class sizes; weak linkages between the acquired 
competences in some programmes and the demands of the market and inadequate research 
funding; and intolerance, violence, poverty, inequality and poor management of universities 
(Republic of Kenya, 2012:125). An education in becoming only has potentialities for 
education, not the actuality. The actualisation of education has stifled  innovation that 
potentially can contest violence in societies, in universities and the world over. Like Waghid 
(2013), I argue that unless university education moves to in becoming, there is no point to 
trust universities to resolve violence and other societal concerns. 
First, I argue that the massification of university education has become a phenomenon in 
Kenya as an actualised liberal DCE idea. It has actualised human capital to reduce the 
inequalities and poverty that exist in the country (Mohamedbahai, 2008:11). However, 
massification has posed drastic challenges to teaching, learning and research (Oketch, 2009). 
The increased enrolment does not match the available facilities for academic development. 
These include infrastructural aspects such as lecture halls and laboratories and the 
student/teacher ratio, leading to a lack of individual attention and dialogic learning. Dialogic 
learning in becoming has the potentiality to enable students and teachers to enter into speech 
with the other. This process can sanction stakeholders in education to become understanding, 
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appreciating and respecting of each other as they create a coming community [a cultural 
world] (Chege, 2006b:173). Since education is a humanisation of self and the world, Chege 
(2006b:173) argues that human beings have the task to co-exist – to co-belong. Thus, 
university education has the potential to enhance interpersonal relationships that can 
encourage dialogue as a means of building the coming community – massification in Kenyan 
education as implemented hinders this potential interaction. 
Second, governance in Kenya potentially can lead the country into a coming community. 
However, governance as it currently is causes the impotentiality of university education in 
Kenya. This is because university education faces undue interference from government on 
how the institution should be run. The reason for this is the rigid governance models and 
management practices, which hinder institutions from incorporating change and innovation 
(Mohamadbahai, 2008:11). Mohamadbahai (2008) points out that the government at times 
selects people who do not necessarily have managerial competence for the ‘effective’ running 
of universities and places them in management positions, which leads to poor governance, 
mostly because this was of leading is subjective - autocratic. University education in Kenya 
runs parallel to the universities’ missions to pursue democratic endeavours. Otieno and Levy 
(2007:24) point out that Kenyatta University is an example of this. One of the missions of 
this university is to contribute to national cohesion; however, this is in contrast to what is 
obtainable. Otieno and Levy (2007) explain that university administration is ethnicised. They 
note that administrative posts have been allotted to one ethnic group, which then follows the 
political pattern of power in the country. He also notes that these appointments are made so 
that the politicians can have loyal academics in the universities for favourable politicisation 
in the country. They explain further that this ethnicised leadership pattern also influences the 
student leadership and elections. As such, the universities’ mission to achieve diversity is 
thwarted by highly politicised and ethnicised bureaucratic administration, which counters the 
mission to pursue democratic practices.  
The third challenge in Kenya is the actualised sense of belonging. The Kenyan education 
system contains the complex realities of nationalism and ethnocentrism. Citizenship 
education in Kenya is demonstrated in the tensions between civic citizenship and ethnic 
citizenship. Civic/national citizenship in Kenya shows potentialities for democratic 
education. These can be found in the education policy documents and include national unity, 
national development, freedom, the right to economic resources, equality, social justice and 
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the right to education (Republic of Kenya, 2014; cf. Chapter 3). However, the impotentialities 
of the liberal outcomes of the policy documents suggest predetermined policy stipulations 
that are not achievable and cannot meet or address Kenyan problems [dual loyalties to 
citizenship in Kenya]. This is because, in Kenya, there are two or more identities to reckon 
with – keeping tribal citizenship and at the same time observing civic citizenship, which 
means that national citizenship is controlled by the civic laws and ethnic citizenship is tamed 
by tribal loyalties. Alwy and Schech (2004:267) note that Kenyan education policy advocates 
for equal opportunity and access to educational institutions; however, access to institutions 
has been ethnicised. They explain that the ethnic group that rules politically in Kenya dictates 
the level of access to educational institutions. To contend with such complexity, citizenship 
education in Kenya requires reconsideration. This reconsideration, I contend, entails viewing 
Kenyans first as human beings with their own privations in whatever singularity, before 
noting their national loyalties, which prompt a predisposition of a sense of belonging. In 
addition, ethnicity should become an important policy discourse, since it influences decision 
making and plays a vital role in relation to achieving equal opportunities. I believe that the 
potentiality of DCE in becoming can help Kenyan universities to teach students independent 
thinking and the fluidity of co-belonging. This means that the students will not have to relate 
to the other because of the differences or commonalities that Kenyans share, but because they 
(he or she) can be other than they (he or she) are. This can enable students to make an 
autonomous choice in their own privation about how or what direction to take as they co-
belong. This way can provide ample space for constant imagining and dialogue on 
reconstructing DCE that could help Kenya deal with the loyalties brought about by 
nationalism and ethnocentrism.  
The fourth reason is the prevalence of violence in the country. The aftermath of ethnic 
politics and the post-election violence experienced after the recent general election, among 
other violent experiences in the country, reflect how actualised Kenyan higher education is 
conceptualised to deal with political differences and humane education. On the other hand, 
some scholars depict violence as having deeper historical roots in the colonial legacy of 
divide and rule (Branch, 2012:19). This has extended to the post-independence period to date, 
in which ethnocentrism has become central to educational leadership, and to political and 
power relation discourses (Branch, 2012:19). Kenya’s fetishisation of order and authoritarian 
leadership has hindered the state’s development policies and has violated human rights 
(Branch, 2012:118). The result of this process is nepotism, corruption, hatred, un-forgiveness, 
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division and emotional torture – for instance by those who lost their loved ones as well as 
those who were humiliated and marginalised because of their tribal affiliation [cf. Chapter 3]. 
These experiences have developed among Kenyans the vocabulary of a sense of belonging in 
terms of ‘we’ and ‘them’. We rule so we get all the benefits. The seminal work of Branch et 
al. (2010) illustrates how Kenyan politics is central to ‘Our turn to eat’. These authors 
illustrate how independence in Kenya was held in high esteem and was expected to bring 
freedom and democracy to the nation. However, independence only makes freedom and 
democracy possible; it does not instantly create them. As a result, Kenyan politics has been 
ethnicised, favouring the ethnic group from which the ruling class comes. The book, Our 
Turn to Eat (Branch et al., 2010:1) illustrates how the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin had their 
turns to eat in the sense that they had access to the best educational institution, jobs and 
economic opportunities, leaving the minority tribes to fend for themselves. Equality becomes 
hindsight, something that was only inscribed (actualised) in policy documents but appears 
impotent in practice in Kenyan politics and education. Wainaina (2006b:173) notes that 
education institutions are perceived as spaces of micro-political organisation because it is in 
these institutions that human beings ought to learn and practise how to adapt to life as 
citizens. Thus the life of a learner and a teacher should thoughtfully reflect coherence in the 
way power relations [ethnic relations and diversity] are addressed. However, this is in 
contrast to what is obtainable even within university education, let alone in society, which 
integrates the citizenry. 
The foregoing suggests that Kenyan education policy is in becoming, since it has not resolved 
ethnic violence, poverty, disease and corruption in the country. Ethnic citizenship recognises 
one’s right to belong to a particular ethnic/tribal group, with loyalties to what the group 
demands. On this assumption, the possibility that ethnic citizenship bears potential for 
imagining Kenyan higher education suggests that it is in becoming [in the making]. However, 
the impotentialities that ethnic citizenship displays in the ethnic conflicts and post-election 
violence in the country suggest the solidity, actuality and inadequacy of the liberal view of 
DCE in the Kenyan higher education system. Consequently, DCE in Kenya is in becoming. 
Re-imagining DCE in Kenya demands that liberal DCE, as contained in policy documents, be 
reviewed in terms of potentialities and impotentialities, so that education in Kenya becomes 
fluid and durable to contend with ethnic violence – DCE in becoming. 
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I argue that, unless university programmes are reconceptualised and restructured in terms of 
the potentialities of teaching, learning and management to constantly address the social ills in 
Kenyan society, university education would not be enacting a responsible public role. I am of 
the opinion that DCE in Kenya demands a re-imagining of citizenship education that 
transcends the boundaries of possibilities and impossibilities in order to enhance education as 
a process of becoming in relation to human experience, interaction and/with ethnic relations. 
Since ethnic rights have the potential to influence the development that the country 
predetermines in policy documents, these documents could be viewed as being in a stage of 
infancy and having the potential to solve higher education problems. Also, students should be 
freed from their sense of belonging so that they can choose or rethink self for itself. That is, 
students should be free to co-belong. This is a choice that is not determined by an a priori 
sense of belonging to whatever singularity. 
5.7. Implications of Democratic Citizenship Education in Becoming 
for the Conception of the University in Africa 
In this section, DCE in becoming is examined for its implications for university education in 
Africa. I argue that a liberal conception of DCE needs to be augmented (extended) on the 
basis of certain gaps within the liberal tradition(s). Drawing from Agamben’s (1993) account 
of the coming community and its implications for DCE in becoming, I argue in defence of 
DCE in becoming and its concomitant link with African thought and practice in the form of 
Ubuntu. In this way, Kenyan higher education and the university in Africa have a better 
chance to respond to ethnic tension and public violence, and hopefully the university’s public 
role can change into it becoming more accountable to a Kenyan (African) citizenry.  
Earlier I argued for a reconsidered view of DCE along the lines of potentiality and in 
becoming. This view is concerned with teaching students to co-belong to a university 
community as humans in whatever singularity, without considering or insisting on their sense 
of belonging. That is, students will be freed from a common or shared sense of belonging. In 
this case, students will be left to choose as independent thinkers how to co-belong without 
being prescribed to. Through DCE in becoming, students will be introduced to practices of 
dialogue (speech) in which they can think and speak independently; speaking here is not an 
actualised idea, but speaking as not to speak and thinking as not to think. This means that 
speaking and thinking become a form of life in which the fluidity of education is in 
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becoming. DCE in becoming is a reconceptualised idea, and can only educate students to 
internalise learning from the in-becoming community – that is a community that is potentially 
possible and is yet to be, and that can contend with the everyday societal challenges that 
universities face, including those challenges that come as a result of speech as actualised idea. 
As illustrated in Chapter 4, Ubuntu provides a significant and relevant understanding of being 
human, that is, recognising human beings as speaking, thinking and rational beings. In this 
sense, education conceptualised by Ubuntu as a philosophical approach potentially configures 
students and lecturers as human beings in becoming, and their education and being as always 
in the making. Such an education therefore considers a constant unfolding of an individual’s 
potential in becoming human with other human beings to whom they co-belong. A potential 
aspect of Ubuntu considered by some scholars is the possible viability of communality as an 
African philosophy. Ubuntu’s relevance to/potentiality for African universities is its possible 
conceptual understandings rooted in community and belonging to a community as a way of 
life (Mbiti, 1970:108; Van Wyk & Higgs, 2012:162). Ubuntu in the Agambenian way is in 
becoming. Accordingly, Ubuntu potentially is not an actualised idea of communality, but one 
that can be. This means that Ubuntu can be freed from any properties and can be other than it 
is. Ubuntu possibly can render students’ needs to function as free human beings in becoming 
who co-belong. Communality, according to Agamben, does not have a shared or 
intersubjective identity; that is, a community that can free itself from any description or 
difference. It can be argued that such a community (Ubuntu) can be possible but does not yet 
exist. If such a communality exists, then issues of violence could have been dealt with. This 
means that Ubuntu can be in the fluidity in the life forms of our everyday experiences. In this 
sense, how we live every day with one another (co-belong) can have the capacity to resolve 
violence in society and be a possibility for a non-violent society, yet this is in becoming. 
Following Agamben (1993), the thought community can be freed from any property or 
identity. Communality, according to Van Wyk and Higgs (2012), should trigger how research 
is conducted in African universities. That is, researchers in universities can recognise the 
values/potentialities of communality to enhance research that can counter African problems, 
in which case both the community and the university lecturers form part of the research – not 
as subordinates, but as co-researchers who will aid in solving societal problems – a 
democratic practice in becoming. One aspect that communality can contribute to is 
brainstorming on how to counter the violence and imbalances in society that arise as a result 
of ethnocentrism.  
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The community becomes an active agenda setter for research in higher education rather than 
just a passive data provider and consumer of research results … The future university 
research in Africa should develop appropriate research methodologies based on conceptions 
of communality … [that entails] common interests, goals, values, intellectual, emotional and 
ideological attachment, interpersonal bonds, grouping of persons, association, communal 
beings and interdependence (Van Wyk & Higgs, 2012:183, 185). 
In its public role, a becoming African university education can teach students to become 
human with others – that is, seeing the other from within an outside, which means to respect 
and value human dignity. In this regard, universities can be structured in such a way that their 
potentials are always in becoming, so that individuals can be taught to speak, think and make 
decisions regarding their becoming without making any rash judgements. Such an education, 
as discussed in previous sections of this chapter, considers friendship (Derrida, 1988; 
Waghid, 2014; Waghid & Davids, 2013), responsibility (Butler, 2005; Cavell, 1979), 
compassionate imagination (Green, 2012; Nussbaum, 1997) and caring through scepticism 
and critique as a form of life, not as an end or actuality, but as a potentiality for DCE in 
becoming (Butler, 2005; Cavell, 1979).  
Universities as constitutive of and instituted by society can be spaces where the potentialities 
of responsibility and humanity can be cultivated primarily in pedagogical practices. Waghid 
(2013:76) notes that the value to humanity of co-belonging is embedded in its potentiality to 
recognise the otherness of others. This means that we act responsibly and enact our humanity 
when we recognise our differences and yet acknowledge our co-belonging. Waghid (2013) 
further contends that cultivating humanity is an understanding that one has to engage with 
others by doing the improbable; in this instance, learning to forgive and temporarily forget, 
and doing the unexpected, even though it goes against the grain of one’s beliefs. Accordingly, 
forgetting and forgiving (as acts of being responsible) elicit all kinds of emotions or violence.  
Judith Butler (2005) contends that responsibility potentially involves accountability in 
relation to the embodiment, caring for and enactment of the good life. Butler notes that giving 
an account of oneself is a way in which one shows that one cares about others. According to 
Butler, the intellectual ability of speech is inbuilt in all humans. For this reason one can 
express care and show care by being able to think, speak and make decisions about matters 
that concern others – seeing others ‘from within an outside’ (Waghid, 2013:27). For instance, 
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Butler explains that one way in which we show that we care is by taking responsibility for the 
critique of another’s ideas as a way of showing love and concern. For if one does not take 
responsibility to critique the other, then one fails to care for the other. In this way, education 
conceptualised for a public role, as that of the university, ought to cultivate a culture of caring 
by enabling, teaching and creating environments that allow students to develop their speech 
potential so that they can critically analyse situations of self and others in order to provide 
solutions, and a space for others to enter into dialogue on public issues that affect society and 
their becoming human in whatever singularity. If one does not exercise or develop students’ 
potential of thought and speech within the educational settings, then such individuals 
(citizens) will be doing injustice to teaching and learning.  
The re-imagined idea of DCE in becoming suggests that universities in Africa are constantly 
evolving. This means that the university in Africa can be imagined for future feasibility in 
becoming. Thinking about universities in terms of fixed or predetermined missions or visions 
limits what universities can be or are in becoming. This way of thinking means that 
universities should constantly seek to counter societal complexities while maintaining their 
academic competencies not in actuality, but in potentiality. Besides, university policies 
potentially can be imagined not as fixed ideas, but in fluidity – encapsulating the future of 
universities beyond what exists and to what the university is becoming. That is, university 
policies and educational practices can be imagined within the impotentialities and 
possibilities of the future of an in-becoming university. According to Barnett (2011:1), 
‘universities could be other than they are’. As such, universities need to be seen as ideas 
(imaginaries) and also as real social institutions, not as actualised ideas, but as institutions in 
becoming. To imagine universities in Africa in relation to DCE in becoming calls for 
thinking about universities within the ironic realities of universities not as actualised, but as 
possible social institutions, as well as within ideas of an ideal future or of imaginaries of 
universities yet to come. 
A university is an institution in public life and potentially can report its results. DCE in 
becoming has implications for the university in the dimensions of relationality and how 
universities arrive at decisions. This means that the university in Africa needs to think about 
community in becoming. Such communities strive to become responsible and rational 
(especially with regard to pedagogical encounters), not in an actualised state but in being 
such other than it is. The form of teaching should be that of a dialogue, potentially in which 
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speech and thought can be primary in developing ideas of a becoming university (supported 
by Ziembiñski, 1997:25). This also means that the university potentially can value the place 
of reason in whatever singularity, especially in thinking and speaking as possibilities of 
imagining the idea of a becoming university. Speech and thought as potentiality of DCE in 
becoming can help universities in Africa to construct the roles, policy and place of 
universities in public space without actualising these roles and policies. As such, decision 
making becomes crucial in the way universities make decisions without rash judgement. A 
rational university withholds rash judgement and allows speech and thought to drive decision 
making and to portray the potential for a becoming university in whatever singularity. 
Pedagogically, universities need to imagine teaching and learning as relational encounters. 
This brings to mind universities as social institutions (relational) consisting of a becoming 
community that can comprise responsible citizens who, through rational encounters, seek to 
think, speak and carefully make judgement on the potentialities of the African university. 
This means that notions of friendship can be considered as imaginaries that can provide a 
bond in the relationship between university students and lecturers to guide the teaching and 
learning process. In this way, universities can save ‘personal bonds between those who teach 
and those who are being taught and especially within the strict sphere of the university 
corporation’ (Ziembiñski, 1997:23).  
On the concept of a university, Minogue (2005:xvi)
27
 notes that  
[A] university is an association of persons, locally situated, engaged in caring for and 
attending to the whole intellectual capital which poses a civilisation. It is concerned not 
merely to keep an intellectual inheritance intact, but to be continuously recovering what has 
been lost, restoring what has been neglected, collecting together what has been dissipated, 
repairing what has been corrupted, reconsidering, reshaping, reorganising, making more 
intelligible, reassuring and reinvestigating. In principle, it works undistracted by practical 
concerns; its current directions of interest are not determined by any but academic 
consideration; the interest earns it all invested. 
Universities in Africa are in crisis, facing numerous challenges, and Kenya is no exception. 
Some of the realities portrayed in Kenya are explained in Chapters 3 and 4. What emerges 
                                                 
27
 Minogue uses Oakeshott’s view, to which the concept of a university is dedicated (see Oakeshott, 1962).  
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from these realities is an enormous struggle within the complexities of globalisation and the 
local needs of the country. For instance, universities in Kenya framing education policies in 
line with the Millennium Development Goals, as found in Vision 2030 and the University 
Act No. 14 of 2012, aim towards global requirements, yet local unrest, poverty and ethnic 
unrest remain problematic in the country. This indicates that universities are not yet what 
they can be and may not become what they ought to be if we actualise them; yet the 
potentiality of imagining (dynamic and fluid sense) universities is a possibility with endless 
potentialities for universities in Kenya and in Africa as a whole. The potentiality of 
imagination carries with it possibilities for resolving societal demands in whatever 
singularity. 
Critical thinking and reasoning as potentialities of DCE in becoming can play a significant 
role in shaping an academic community in becoming that can produce honest and scholarly 
innovations in whatever singularity. With its present-day bureaucratic structures, academic 
life is hampered by obsessive opinions on applications for promotions and grants, and in 
totalitarian states this is socially destructive instead of being stimulating (Ziembiñski, 
1997:25). This is so because an academic university in becoming can nurture academy that is 
potentially relevant to local needs, yet it also can be globally compliant in whatever 
singularity. For instance, where is the place of reason in Kenyan universities in relation to 
responsible actions, thought or contributions to counter the anomalies within Kenyan 
universities and the entire Kenyan society? What reasons are guiding scholarship in ethnic 
squabbles? 
To imagine the possibility of an in-becoming African university, students and lecturers can 
reflect on the unfolding of universities. This means that iterating the historical (past) ideas of 
universities and the realities of universities (including the impotentialities) can aid in the 
imagining of future universities in Africa and Kenya alike. Barnett (2011:2) notes that, to 
think of universities as becoming, means understanding universities ‘as being-possible’. That 
is,  
[t]o comprehend their being implies their sense of becoming, their possibilities and their 
movement over time towards their possibility’…. [Barnett notes that the] university’s 
becoming implies full realisation of its potentialities. So in front of us must lie a search for 
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what it might be for universities – albeit in a broad-brush-sense – to realise their possibilities’ 
(Barnett, 2011:2) 
This begs the question, what might it be for a university to fully be a university in becoming? 
Ziembiñski (1997:22) notes that universities potentially can preserve the idea of being a 
university by dedicating themselves to the study ‘of fundamental problems and transmission 
of theoretical knowledge, and not only solving problems that have practical applications … it 
is too late to think about making dressings when there are wounded people whose lives are in 
danger’. 
The university potentially is a scientific and a teaching institution, which means that a 
university consists of those who are being taught and those who are teaching. The university 
teacher therefore prepares the students to maximise their potential in the way they think, 
speak and make judgement. DCE in becoming means that universities would provide students 
with learning spaces that are logical and rigorous in thinking, and with acquaintance with 
reasoning about the specifics of various disciplines for career development for both the 
individuals, and for nations. This kind of teaching is associated with open attitudes. This 
means that students should not accept research results uncritically or treat findings as final or 
changeless. It demands constant rigor and thinking differently without hasty judgement. 
Universities therefore have the responsibility to shape themselves towards becoming 
academic communities, with integral scholarship that can imagine and become innovative in 
building a coming community of Africans who can think, speak and act without rash 
judgement. Such thinking about the coming university community can help universities to 
rectify their narrow focus on achievability/actualisation and focus instead on stimulating the 
becoming process – the in becoming of the university in Africa.  
5.8. Towards a Different Understanding of the African University  
Universities in Africa face multiple challenges. Waghid (2011:231) notes that African 
universities experience great instability, especially arising as confrontations between 
students, faculties, administration and the government. These challenges become even more 
complex as a result of economic failure, stagnation and regression, which have an impact on 
the pace of development in universities. African universities still lag behind universities in 
the developed world in meeting the social needs of citizens. Some of the factors suggested by 
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Waghid (2011:231) to be responsible for this retrogression are alienation from the broader 
society, and the actualised state of the university administration, organisation and 
management. 
Universities in Africa potentially could tackle locally occurring problems. This could become 
possible if university education is commensurate with an extended view of DCE in becoming. 
This means that even though global pressures predetermine what African education should 
look like, the university in Africa can be reimagined in whatever singularity, in its own 
autonomy. African universities can become autonomous in making choices about the kind of 
university they want to be on whatever singularity for the sake of humanity. Ubuntu 
potentially provides a possibility for African thought and community encapsulating a 
nurturing of DCE in becoming for university education in Africa in whatever singularity. 
African universities are in becoming, that is, universities in Africa are in a stage of infancy 
and are always in the making. This means that the public roles of universities in Africa are 
constantly evolving and require constant research that can tackle the crises and challenges of 
humanity on the African continent (and in Kenya). Such challenges are exemplified in the 
Kenyan case, for example, in local problems such as poverty, ethnic violence, corruption, 
inequality in university access, and inadequate conceptualisation and implementation of 
policies to serve the needs of the citizens. However, African universities contain greater 
potentialities and possibilities for a democratic African society. For instance, Ubuntu 
potentially can engender a humanistic education that is commensurate with the coming 
community; that is, an education that can educate student on their becoming human. Being 
human bears the potentialities of being caring, taking responsibility and creating relational
28
 
encounters that can encourage dialogue, imagination and critical (not rash) judgement. 
Universities can serve the public in whatever singularity in their in becoming other than they 
are to respond to the state of violence. For this reason the university’s public mission 
potentially can be essential to its development into an in-becoming university. Waghid (2011) 
notes that the public missions of universities ought to help improve social problems, such as 
protecting the natural environment, preserving human rights and cultural diversity, resolving 
conflicts and crises of governance and promoting democracy. Yet this has not been achieved. 
This could be because the universities’ missions are already actualised, which annuls their 
                                                 
28
 Relational encounters can be informed by potentialities of friendship and imagination discussed in chapter 5, 
5.41. 
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becoming such. In addition, universities in Africa need to rethink the way they steer their 
public roles, especially the way they conduct research. Research in African universities can 
focus on the potentiality of thought and its possibility for research, teaching and learning. 
This can be possible when students and lecturers or research practitioners render reasons for 
what they do (Waghid, 2011). For instance, in conceptualising national policy on education, 
universities in Kenya can render reasons for university education potentially to cultivate 
willingness for deliberative engagement, critical responsibility and caring and compassionate 
education as potentialities that can free Kenyans to participate in whatever singularity, 
regardless of ethnic background, race or economic status. Reflecting on the discussion in 
Chapter 4, violence, poor governance, corruption, inequality, nepotism and poverty are some 
of the impotentialities of actualised education, and these possibly can be revisited to amend 
the university’s mission to serve the public in whatever singularity. 
Another contribution that provides nuances for the African university is DCE in becoming, 
building from my earlier analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 – that which is drawn from Ubuntu as a 
concept that depicts the becoming community. Ubuntu can be configured as a potentiality for 
the understanding of education as a human process. Ubuntu bears the potential forms of 
deliberative constructions possible for African university education in becoming. This is 
because, if African universities are to deal with their public roles to resolve particular 
problems that are local to the African experience, then education potentially can be 
reconstructed to counter a predetermined sense of belonging. These African problems include 
ethnic violence, poor governance, poverty, favouritism, nepotism and corruption, amongst the 
other ills on the continent in whatever singularity. For universities in Africa potentially to 
serve their public role, they can build potentially responsible missions/policies that can 
propagate a culture of responsibility and critique in relation to the way knowledge is 
produced. This also relates to the relevance of the knowledge produced to the African 
community in becoming, and the global network in becoming in whatever singularity. One of 
these crucial issues that universities need to focus on is how to equip citizens to have the 
potential to tackle societal issues in their own privation in whatever singularity. Being human 
connotes potentialities of thought and speech not in an actualised sense, but as possibilities 
that can help us think through and generate knowledge about how to overcome violence, and 
can create a sense of responsibility towards the other – as they co-belong. 
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To enact one’s humanity (Ubuntu) requires that one enacts caring as a humanistic potential. 
A caring university education considers comfort zones as antagonistic to the development of 
a DCE in becoming. Such a university potentially cares for its students’ lives, research and 
learning in such a way that each student can become constantly critical and sceptical and look 
for solutions to the problems they face, especially those of others to whom they co-belong. In 
this way they can care for one another and can consider another’s care, and constantly seek to 
care for and about others in whatever singularity. 
Universities in Africa have the potential to be critical and responsible institutions. This means 
that a university can be a place where students’ potential is stretched to being responsible/ 
answerable and critical as a way of educating potentially responsible citizenry in whatever 
singularity. Butler (2005) notes that responsibility is the ability to think, speak and see things 
differently beyond their existing state. If students can be taught to think and speak differently 
about the state of poverty, violence, education and inequalities found in Africa, we potentially 
will build rational citizens in becoming who can participate actively in changing their world 
view and that of others with whom they co-belong in a potentially non-violent manner. 
In relation to a potential relational university, universities in Africa can provide potential 
friendly spaces for their students who co-belong to relate to one another as they respond to 
change/amend situations in which others (with whom they co-belong) find themselves. This 
potentially could happen if students are taught dialogue so as to love, respect and reciprocate 
in whatever singularity without denying others their individuality. This means that 
universities can be potentially dialogical spaces in which students and lecturers can share 
(mutual/non-mutual) teaching and learning encounters in whatever singularity. Potentially, 
dialogue, rational thinking and reciprocal critique can be a way of caring for one another 
without necessarily agreeing, but being in whatever singularity. In so doing, the university 
potentially can become a safe place to nurture difference, manage critique and undertake 
open dialogue with fair and just approaches in whatever singularity.  
Universities in Africa need to rethink potential values of communality as a possibility for 
organising, conceptualising and conducting research. Communality is a value derived from 
Ubuntu as a sense of interdependence (Van Wyk & Higgs, 2012:186), and as such it can help 
in conducting relevant research to counter African problems, such us ethnic violence and 
other ills, to engender the coming African community. 
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5.9. Summary 
This chapter has demonstrated that a reconceptualised idea of DCE in becoming extends a 
liberal conception of DCE and has the potential to counter ethnic violence. The chapter 
reveals that a reconceptualised notion of DCE is one in becoming. The difference in this 
extension lies in the potentialities of liberal DCE and its imaginings of the future of Kenyan 
universities to curb ethnic violence. Liberal DCE sees actuality as the aim of education, while 
DCE in becoming sees liberal DCE as a potential for education. An illustration of DCE in 
becoming is one that can enable students to speak and think differently and suspend rash 
judgment. Such an education potentially can be relational in whatever singularity. This 
relation is possible in friendship as a potential projection of co-belonging. Its potentialities 
are being loving, being caring, trusting/mistrusting and respecting the humanity of the other 
in whatever singularity. Universities as constituted by the coming community have to be 
spaces where the cultivation of responsibility and humanity is fundamental. Being 
responsible means that one potentially has the capacity to respond to the conditions of others. 
Responsibility potentially denotes being sceptical and critical in problem solving; it requires 
relentless imagination of the futures that are yet to exist; and bears compassion that moves 
citizens away from self to imagine the plight of others in the spirit of Ubuntu.  
This chapter has disclosed that current Kenyan higher education cannot resolve violence and 
is unresponsive to societal ills such as ethnic violence. This is so because liberal DCE is 
already actualised in the policy and regulations of university education in the country, yet 
ethnic violence and other societal ills are on the increase. Subsequently, the chapter has 
described how imagining education in terms of DCE in becoming hopefully can counter 
ethnocentrism and ethnic conflicts in the unforeseeable future. On this assumption, university 
education can constantly grapple with the complexities of violence and other anomalies and 
imbalances in Kenya. Within liberal DCE, deliberation is already actualised. Yet DCE in 
becoming considers the potential of deliberation as willingness to engage, and not 
engagement itself, and looks beyond a narrow sense of belonging, such as ethnocentrism, to 
co-belonging in whatever singularity.  
In addition, the chapter emphasises the implications that DCE in becoming can have for 
universities in Africa. That is, universities need to reconceptualise education in terms of ‘in 
becoming human’, since education is a social process. DCE in becoming can be central to 
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reconceptualising university education in Africa. Accordingly, university education 
potentially can be relevant for the African context in the way it conducts its teaching, learning 
and research. Universities potentially can be conceptualised as a coming community. This is 
so because Ubuntu potentially provides space for possible humanistic education. The idea of 
communality drawn from Ubuntu in becoming can become a potential philosophy of and 
approach to research, teaching and learning in African universities. Ubuntu as a concept has 
the potential that can help rethink the African university. Communality also recognises the 
significant other, and at the same time values the democratic participation of all citizens in 
tackling African problems in their co-belonging relation. In the next chapter I will show what 
the implications of a reconceptualised notion of African university mean for pedagogy in 
Kenyan universities. 
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  Chapter Six
A RECONCEPTUALISED VIEW OF AN AFRICAN 
UNIVERSITY: ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR PEDAGOGY 
IN KENYAN UNIVERSITY  
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter will explain the implications of a reconceptualised African university for 
teaching, learning and governance on the continent and how such a university can be more 
attentive to the debilitating social and political conditions in Kenya. The chapter will consider 
how university classroom encounters can be transformed into spaces for democratic 
pedagogical practices in which students and their instructors can constantly learn to think 
differently and innovatively about societal and educational challenges that the 
country/continent faces, especially in higher education.  
This chapter begins with the premise that university education can be a place for pedagogic 
transformation towards a democratic society in becoming; this, I contend, can happen in an 
environment in which education is potentially viewed as an ‘in becoming’ process. 
According to Bourdieu and Passeron (1997), political socialisation takes place in one’s 
surroundings, through ‘habitus’ [which may include family, peers, the school and the media], 
in which case I consider the classrooms in a university as a potential space for pedagogical 
encounters in whatever singularity. Universities are potential locations for socialisation, 
which possibly can be stratified to potentialities for educating students about their potential 
co-belonging in order to transform universities against violence in whatever singularity.  
In a pluralist society like Kenya, universities are viewed as places and sites where different 
social forces and ideologies struggle for domination and hegemony. This is the case in a 
democratic dispensation, where civic society rises and becomes a dominant feature in politics 
in various public sectors, including university education. In university education, students are 
socialised concurrently with their initial habitus, such as their family. DCE in becoming bears 
the potentialities that can enable students potentially to determine the choices (in their own 
privations) they make regarding how they co-belong. I argue that the kinds of socialisation to 
which students are exposed potentially can determine who they are becoming. Therefore, the 
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idea of citizenship and of a university to which we potentially expose students can help 
students potentially to think critically, create relational encounters of responsible friendship, 
think radically to emancipate themselves, and value the humanity of the other so that they can 
enter into dialogue [in meaning making] to continuously address societal challenges in 
whatever singularity – a case for DCE in becoming that is commensurate with the 
reconceptualised view of the African university. This kind of conceptualisation can enable 
students to integrate their cultural experiences into what they learn in the classroom with 
others – with whom they co-learn to co-belong. 
In this vein, classroom encounters in a reconceptualised African university potentially can 
allow students to think differently in their own privations. This means that, in the teaching 
and learning process, students’ independent ability to think and speak is a potential aspect in 
their learning. For this reason, teaching in the university classroom potentially can cultivate a 
culture of speaking and thinking anew – that is, thinking differently about innovative ways 
that potentially can deal with new problems or conflicting situations that students encounter – 
without rash judgement. Biesta (2009:20) affirms [in deconstructionist thought] that 
pedagogy ought to allow students to be different, in which case students’ understandings 
might be teachers’ misunderstandings, and teachers’ understandings and students’ 
misunderstandings. In this manner, education ought to open windows or spaces for the other 
– who co-belong, and for the new – fresh ways of thinking about particular problems that 
affect humanity. 
The challenges depicted in Chapter 4 point to the fact that Kenyan universities face 
impotentiality – pedagogical challenges. This is so because the liberal ideologies are 
actualised in policies that influence pedagogy in the universities in Kenya. For if it were not 
so, then issues of violence and other ills in society would not arise. This suggests that Kenyan 
higher education is wanting, and that it requires potentially innovative pedagogy that can 
disrupt such anomalies and imbalances in both the education system and in society, in 
whatever singularity. Violence is one of the challenges faced by Kenyan society, and this 
disrupts the running of the universities. Second are challenges of access to institutions of 
higher learning. Third are the challenges of leadership, actualised deliberation and inequality; 
for instance, the distribution of infrastructure and educational resources is biased and full of 
favouritism – in terms of priority being given to individuals from certain socio-economic 
groups at the expense of others, classism and corruption (Alwy & Schech, 2004:267). All 
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these seem to be problems that arise as a result of an actualised sense of belonging, and 
actualised speech and thought, which hinder the enactment of potential responsible human 
action. 
The analysis in Chapter 4 sheds more light on these challenges (impotentialities) faced by the 
Kenyan education system, and Chapter 5 hints at the implications this has for Kenyan/African 
universities. Consequently one would argue that liberal DCE in the Kenyan system of 
education is already actualised and contains impotentiality, such as injustice, violence, 
inequality and corruption. In deconstructionist thinking, such challenges signal the absence of 
something, something that is different, yet something that would provide possibilities for a 
more humanistic Kenyan/African education system. Despite the fact that the present system 
is characterised by actuality and impotentiality, there still is optimism in the reconsidered 
view and the in potentialities of DCE in becoming. This view of education potentially 
promises future possibilities, despite the tensions that linger between the possibilities and 
impossibilities of a ‘better Kenya’. However, the absence of something better [a just 
education system] is the force that pushes us to think differently about the Kenyan education 
system. This is put better in Biesta’s (2009:21) words:  
Presence cannot present itself but needs ‘help’ of what is not present, of absence. This puts 
non-presence in a kind of double position. On the other hand, the non-present is what is 
totally different from what is present. And yet the presence upon which its definition depends 
can itself be articulated only with the help of that which is not.  
Against this background, this chapter examines the implications of a reconceptualised view 
of the African university in becoming as a framework for a becoming pedagogy in university 
education in Kenya – more specifically in teaching and learning in the universities in 
whatever singularity. Pedagogy is generally understood as what happens in the classroom. 
Bartlett (2004) explains that pedagogy is a description of a set of complex interactions that 
occur in the classroom between the instructor and his or her students, between and among 
students, between the instructor and the subject matter, and between the students and the 
subject matter. 
In the literature, pedagogy has been described in various ways to illustrate what pedagogy 
may mean to different people, namely as inclusive pedagogy (Danowitz & Tuitt, 2011; Lawy 
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& Biesta; 2006; Osberg & Biesta, 2010), public pedagogy (Biesta, 2012), critical pedagogy 
(Biesta, 1998; Durkin, 2008; Kapitulik, Kelly & Clawson, 2007; McArthur, 2010), 
transformative pedagogy (Fetherston & Kelly, 2007), pedagogy of change (Collier & 
O’Sullivan, 1997), nurturance pedagogy (Perumal, 2007) and innovation pedagogy 
(Kettunen, 2011). Others describe pedagogy in terms of teaching and learning – as relational 
learning (Pearce & Down, 2011), as friendship and responsible teaching (Sinha, 2013), as 
cooperative and dialogic learning (Jenkins & Jenkins, 2010), and as reflective pedagogy 
(Butvilofsky, Escamilla, Soltero-Gonzalez & Aragon, 2012), and still others as the pedagogy 
of poverty (Thadani, Cook, Graffis, Wise & Blakey, 2010). This chapter will consider 
pedagogy in the light of the reconceptualised view of an African university that is 
commensurate with DCE in becoming. 
6.2. On the Possibilities of a Reconceptualised View of an African 
University in Becoming for Pedagogy 
A reconceptualised view of an African university in becoming, as considered in this chapter, 
is concerned with pedagogy [as it happens in university classrooms] in whatever singularity 
for various reasons. First, such a view of university presupposes that most students’ 
experiences in the classroom alienate the students and confuse their sense of belonging; and 
that they are exposed to negative experiences in the education system that propagate and 
contribute to violence, inequality, injustice, prejudice, hatred and poverty. In this sense, a 
DCE pedagogy in becoming is concerned with how the equality and rights of students and 
instructors [teachers] are evolving within classroom practices in whatever singularity with 
respect to their independent thinking, speech and decision making without rash judgement 
(privations). In this case, pedagogy potentially is considered a relational (co-belonging) 
practice that includes the teleological communicative aspect of learning and the rights of 
students as being significant in the learning environment in whatever singularity (see 
Benhabib, 1996; 2011a; Habermas, 1987a & b; Rawls, 1971). Such pedagogy (in becoming) 
potentially can encourage students to participate and be responsible (not in an actualised 
sense) in the teaching and learning process in whatever singularity with respect to their own 
individuation. 
Second, a reconceptualised view of an African university in becoming considers universities’ 
pedagogy as a potential process in which students and teachers potentially and dynamically 
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can be in becoming. This becoming process potentially can provoke critical interaction that 
occurs and continues to occur between the students and their instructors in the classroom, and 
between what they both become through these encounters of teaching and learning in 
whatever singularity and in respect to their privations. The becoming process is essential to 
the concern of this chapter. This is because it holds a potential that is yet to become – that 
which Agamben (1993) would describe as being in limbo – a place where judgement in 
whatever singularity is suspended as a potential optimism in becoming. How can the 
reconceptualised view of a university shape classroom pedagogies in Kenya to counter ethnic 
violence and the challenges faced by Kenyan society?  
Third, the reconceptualised view of an African university questions the neutrality of 
positivism and objectivity and challenges the hegemonic actualisation of knowledge. In 
addition, an African university in becoming reviews the potentiality of being responsible, of 
being a friend (a form of life), and the possibility that compassionate imaginings can hold for 
cultivating humanity [i.e. the human right to life] in universities in whatever singularity. In a 
university in becoming, pedagogy potentially can be considered as being in becoming, and as 
humanistic. Such a university educates students to think, speak and make judgement without 
being rash and to respects students’ independent initiatives (privations) in whatever 
singularity as a potential for education against violence. Consequently, within classroom 
practice, pedagogy in becoming potentially values humanity not in an actualised sense, but in 
relation to what the students can become in being human – co-belonging. DCE in becoming 
can contend with the impotentialities of actualising education, as well as the complexities that 
an actualised pedagogy (predetermined/fixed) brings to current misconceptions of human 
commonality and difference, and how the other is regarded or can be regarded in the spaces 
of learning. When a student frees self, such that he/she can make use of free-self to co-belong 
or to co-learn, then students can be said to have portrayed the potentiality of in-becoming 
pedagogical learning. Instructors in the reconceptualised view of university, I argue, value 
education as a potential process of becoming and, at the same time, utilise potential 
pedagogies in becoming to realise conscious potential impacts that humane practices and 
humane pedagogies may have on the complexity of representations within classroom spaces 
in whatever singularity. For example, teaching students to co-belong erases the 
impotentialities that a predetermined sense of belonging brings. When students potentially 
can free self of any identity or property, they potentially can choose afresh in their own 
privation to co-belong in whatever singularity. Freeing self potentially can challenge the 
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ideas of conforming to presupposed ways of making judgement – especially in relation to 
difference or commonalities, and rather to choose whatever singularity in which to co-belong 
for the sake of humanity. This means that students or lecturers will not make judgments based 
on their present sense of belonging (such as their ethnic group of economic class), but from 
within the potentialities of their own reimagined co-belonging in whatever singularity. 
Accordingly, university pedagogy can be said to be in becoming, since it potentially can 
educate students to think independently in whatever singularity, and this potentially can 
counter violence.  
Fourth, in the reconceptualised view of the African university, the instructor sees pedagogies 
as methods that are used to transform classroom practices to provide an environment in which 
students and instructors can engage critically, responsibly and constantly with one another, 
and with the subject matter, as they strive to possible potentialities of whatever singularity 
they can become as they co-belong or co-learn (human with another). This kind of pedagogy 
grows from my discussions and analysis in the previous chapters. In addition, transformative 
educational thought, as exemplified by Cavell (1979), emphasises scepticism, responsibility 
and the other as potentialities for democratic education. According to Cavell, classroom 
pedagogy should recognise the composition of students as consisting of human beings, who 
are strangers [scepticism] with whom they engage [through dialogue] in order to understand 
the self. Being sceptically responsible potentially means to take an initiative to dialogue with 
the other stranger [human being]. Becoming sceptically responsible can help students to co-
learn and co-discover self in the other to co-belong. It is through such a process that Butler 
(2005) notes that we can learn to take responsibility to critique the other in order potentially 
to know what/who the other is, in which case this can aid our becoming process with the 
other in whatever singularity.  
It is impossible to engage with the other unless we recognise that human beings potentially 
can become equal, since equality is in becoming. This means that equality cannot be achieved 
by mere actualised deliberation, but by being in deliberation, since equality is only a potential 
for education and cannot be realised. Since students and teachers potentially can engage in 
dialogue with the other they can bridge the gap of the (im)possibility of equality. 
Accordingly, dialogic pedagogies [in becoming] potentially value humanity. For this reason, 
the pedagogical experiences in becoming potentially recognise that equality cannot be 
actualised, but is a potential of our communicative potentialities in whatever singularity. 
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Every human being has an equal intelligence (only in potentiality) to communicate with the 
other so as to co-belong, co-learn and co-teach in whatever singularity (Agamben, 1993; 
Davis, 2010; Rancière, 1991). The capacity/potentiality of equal intelligence can enable 
students and instructors potentially to emancipate themselves. Such practices depict that the 
teacher and the student are co-learners and co-teachers, in the sense that each of them can 
claim potentialities of being equal and capacious in intelligence to engage with the subject 
matter in the classroom and with one another in the process of their becoming in whatever 
singularity. Viewing pedagogy in this way potentially portrays the classroom as a place and 
space where students and instructors can form a community in becoming in whatever 
singularity. This potentially demonstrates the possibilities for conscious encounters of human 
beings in becoming. In view of such a community in becoming, the humanity of one another 
is foremost, thus respect and the value of humanity potentially can become a priority in 
whatever singularity. Green (1998; 2012) suggests that such a pedagogy should also 
recognise the uniqueness of every human being. To his mind, students’ and instructors’ 
uniqueness are recognised in order to balance and recognise unique humanness in each 
student, along with the unique contributions they offer or bring to the classroom to 
necessitate their becoming humans. Each student becomes a participant in the classroom in 
his/her own independent thought and speech in whatever singularity. 
Another aspect considered by a reconceptualised view of an African university in becoming 
is the potential content of university education in becoming. Even though students and 
instructors engage dialogically within their learning and teaching spaces, the outcome of their 
dialogue is not predetermined; the content of the discussion is guided by their histories, 
predispositions, presuppositions and the background knowledge that both the students and the 
teachers independently carry into the conversations in whatever singularity. In Waghid’s 
(2014) view, the content of their discussion is in its infancy [it is not yet known] until they 
engage in dialogue with one another. One example could be that the students want to find 
solutions to or deliberate on the ethnic conflicts in Kenya. The outcome of their conversation 
is only known when they all engage independently of their own privation, either through 
potential questioning, critiquing and arguing to come to a consensus, and at times none, in 
whatever singularity. However, such an engagement potentially provides relatively possible, 
innovative solutions for the task at hand, yet there also can be no actualised solution. 
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In the sections that follow I will use philosophical approaches to argue how a 
reconceptualised view of an African university [DCE in becoming] potentially can enhance 
and improve pedagogical encounters in the university classroom in becoming in order to 
potentially enrich critical citizenship and to grant students potential opportunities to think 
differently about the problems Kenya/Africa faces as a result of inequality, injustice, ethnic 
violence, political instability, lack of access to education, and lack of respect for human 
dignity and human rights, including the right to life. 
6.3. On The Potentiality of Critical Pedagogy for Kenyan 
Universities in Becoming 
Higher education in Kenya, especially the public university sector, is in crisis. The analyses 
in Chapters 3 and 4 show how violence, inequality, poverty, politics and ethnocentrism have 
complicated the state of university education. For example, the massification of higher 
education has resulted in the neglect of small-group teaching, which can encourage dialogue 
and interaction; rather, higher education is characterised by poor learning conditions and 
inadequate facilities, an increased teaching load and problems of student assessment, and thus 
has reduced opportunities for access by low-income citizens and unequal access due to 
funding demands (Mohamedbahai, 2008:41). At the same time, ethnic violence in Kenya, 
especially the post-election violence, has created friction and a confused sense of belonging 
for the various students and lecturers in the universities (cf. Chapter 4). Such a scenario of 
actualised education suggests impotentialities in the education system that in turn affect 
society. 
In this section I argue through the eyes of students and teachers [university lecturers] that 
opportunities should be provided in university classrooms for students and lecturers alike to 
systematically voice their thinking [democratically and deliberatively] to deal with instances 
of injustice and inequality in the university education system in Kenya. Doing this provides 
spaces for pedagogy with nuances of DCE in becoming for sustainable university education 
(see Cho, 2013:1, 19; Monchinski, 2011:45). Biesta and Stams (2001:57) suggest that 
criticality should be driven by concerns for justice. 
Accordingly, critical pedagogy offers students and lecturers potential opportunities for 
becoming critical citizens. Kapitulik et al. (2007:135) note that critical pedagogy can provide 
a chance for students and lecturers to study, think and talk about the social-political 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
200 
 
transformation in university education for justice. In addition, critical pedagogy can 
encourage university students to act against inequality and undemocratic changes in 
universities, in which case lecturers can provide students with information as a starting point 
for conversations on what kind of university they have and what they want their university to 
become (McAuthor, 2010:304).  
In critical pedagogy, students can become active, not passive, participants in their learning. 
This means that students potentially can contribute to criticality in meaning making when 
they can transcend the given. Being critical potentially can enable students and teachers to 
find their own voice and privations in whatever singularity. According to Waghid (2014:23) 
and Green (1995:34), students are considered critical when they do not just look at 
themselves as passive recipients of information, but rather when they are able to demonstrate 
a willingness ‘to tell their stories, to pose their own questions, to present – from their own 
perspectives – to the common world’ (Waghid, 2014:23). One example is that a student from 
a Kenyan university who is able to learn about the violence others face in their own country 
[or on a university campus] not only imagines the consequences and effects [or the trauma] 
that come with such encounters, but also thinks of how s/he might react to [or experience] 
similar violence, and then considers ways to alleviate the vulnerability of others so that s/he 
offers a response to the suffering of others. In this way, students demonstrate a critical 
attitude by looking for meaning beyond their current situation and finding solutions for future 
problems in case they reoccur. In this way, students find the motivation to act differently 
should they face a similar situation of suffering. I have in mind university students in Kenya 
– as explicated in Chapters 4 and 5 – regarding the violence in the country and the subsequent 
challenges this has posed to the democratic vision the nation aspires to attain. I challenge 
university students to reimagine or think critically about the suffering of individuals who 
have incurred loss, a university education system that entertains the effects of such violence, 
individuals who have suffered ethnic violence, and citizens who suffer access issues – either 
due to their economic situation or to a lack of political connectedness, and to imagine anew 
by responding critically to the disruptive actions of others and perhaps to come up with new 
ways to divert or deal with the challenges the country faces. 
Secondly, in relation to Waghid’s (2014:24) concern that ‘many students do not consider it 
their right to question what they are being taught, since teachers often treat academic texts as 
encyclopaedic as authorities that cannot be questioned’, I argue that critical pedagogy should 
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enable students to actively become part of the inquiry alongside what they are taught. In other 
words, students should find their voices in relation to their contexts and everyday experience. 
For instance, teaching DCE in a classroom from a liberal perspective [one example: Rawls’ 
justice as fairness to a university student in Kenya] should allow students equal opportunity 
to question such ideas, and allow this to resonate with their contexts and cultural experiences. 
In this way, students are able to reimagine and think afresh on how their everyday 
experiences relate to what they are learning so that they can and are able to think anew as a 
way of solving new problems. It (critical pedagogy) bears the potential to encourage students 
to be critical about what they are learning in relation to how they participate in society, 
thereby finding their voices and constantly becoming participants – critical citizens (active 
ones). 
6.4. On the Potentiality of Cultivating a Culture of Friendship and 
Responsible Pedagogy in Kenyan Universities 
I use friendship in a philosophical sense to show that relationality as a potential can enrich 
teaching encounters in university education in whatever singularity. I highlighted earlier how 
Derrida (1988) explains the concept of friendship (Chapter 5, section 5.3.1). Accordingly, 
Derrida (1997) notes that friendship takes on an active role of loving, rather than of being 
loved [passive]. That is, friendship is an ongoing action of loving. This kind of active/fluid 
form of friendship that Derrida explicates can provide students and teachers with the potential 
responsibility of being loving, which means that students or teachers will not wait for 
teachers or students to show them love, but will love as an act of being a friend (friendship), 
since friendship is always in the making. This suggests that, when friendship informs 
pedagogy, both students and teachers take up the active role of loving. Waghid (2007:200) 
notes that such kind of love may mean evoking the potentialities of students in such a way 
that they (students) will come up with possibilities that teachers do not even think of. Waghid 
notes that this kind of friendship does not expect anything in return. However, the active role 
students play in deconstructing knowledge and finding new ways of knowing is crucial to 
cultivating a DCE in becoming that potentially can address the social, political and 
educational problems faced by universities and society in Kenya in whatever singularity. 
Such an understanding of friendship can advance critical learning. In this section I will be 
concerned largely with how friendship can extend pedagogy [for teaching and learning] in 
Kenyan universities for the sake of justice. 
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Elton (2005:113) suggests that love provides pedagogy a concept/language of ‘intellectual 
love’. This kind of concept he explains claims the love of one’s discipline. This presents 
teaching and learning with two kinds of pedagogical love. That is, the love for students and 
the love for academic discipline. This kind of love that Elton (2005) suggests bears 
potentialities that can advance pedagogical in becoming for the love not only for students but 
also the love academic discipline. This means that pedagogical friendship as potential for 
love can spur the love for academic discipline and for students. Such a provocation can 
provide university curricula with the language for teaching and learning that influences not 
only how students learn but also what they learn to overcome violence in whatever way. This 
according to Elton (2005:115) can return hope for research-teaching nexus in traditional 
teaching into practical ways that can be used with the current potentialities in education 
systems with student (as citizens) central to the education unfolding. 
Waghid (2007) notes that literature on cultivating DCE in university education abounds, but 
that little is known about friendship and its significance in continuing democratic societies. In 
this section I argue that friendship is another way of cultivating DCE in becoming within 
teaching and learning encounters in university education. Waghid (2007) notes that friendship 
understood in terms of mutuality and love can be used normatively in pedagogy to nurture 
friendship, in which case mutuality and love can encourage both students and teachers to take 
risks in inculcating justice. Friendship therefore professes possibilities for the educator to 
nurture students to become human with others. This kind of thinking about education 
reshapes the sense of duty and responsibility that is possible during teaching and learning 
processes in higher education. Derrida (1997) explains that these ways of teaching have not 
yet been achieved and only are possible when educators and students engage in critical 
questioning, constant learning and association in becoming humans who are capable of 
democratic citizenry. 
Waghid (2007:200) notes that friendship can signify ‘mutual attachment – as a matter of 
doing things together’. This reflects the schooling environment, in which teachers and 
students can demonstrate their willingness to give priority [time and resources] to one another 
without dismissive attitudes. In this way, students and teachers can listen to one another with 
respect and trust so that, when they participate freely in teaching and learning activities, they 
do this with flexibility and the willingness to be corrected or critiqued, since mutuality is a 
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binding commonality. Mutuality therefore encourages students and teachers to appreciate one 
another in their efforts of teaching and learning for democratic justice. 
Mutuality in friendship also potentially can ensure that teachers and learners are attuned to 
each other. This is so because, when both teachers and learners are aware of their co-
belonging in whatever singularity [mutuality], they are able to relax and be willing to engage 
in arguments without necessarily becoming violent with one another, a way in which the 
university community can model democratic dialogue. Such dialogue should extend to 
include all learners in the classroom by considering their various capacities. I have in mind 
Young’s (1996) proposition of using rhetoric, stories and greetings as a way of including all 
learners, as this is necessary for those who might be silenced by the eloquence of other 
students in the classroom (see also Waghid, 2007:200). 
Waghid (2007:200) notes that mutuality has the potential to enable teachers to introduce 
students to new ways of thinking [knowing] – that is, being able to see things differently. In 
this manner, students, in turn, will learn in such a way that they are able to make sense of new 
ways of knowing and being able to think differently. This point to the fact that, in a mutual 
sense, friendship can enable both students and teachers to engage in new ways of knowing 
that can sustain constant ways of learning. Therefore, friendship as mutuality points to the 
fact that DCE in becoming can enable students and teachers to nurture their sense of 
belonging to a community of learning/teaching [and knowledge production] to deal with new 
ways of knowing. In this sense, teachers and students can connect with one another to 
deliberate in whatever way – to argue, narrate and deconstruct knowledge in new ways, for 
instance – to counter imbalances and anomalies in Kenyan universities/society by just 
alternatives. 
Friendship provides potential nuances for responsible teaching. Friendship, understood in 
terms of mutuality and love, provides pedagogical understanding that potentially can be 
nonviolent for DCE in becoming. The potentialities displayed by friendship make friendship 
possible, yet the impossibility of this in the Kenyan higher education system points to the 
constant search for nuances that can deal with the challenges faced by Kenyan higher 
education so that justice becomes the motivation for education.  
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6.5. On Potentialities of Emancipating Equal Intellectual Agency - A 
Radical Pedagogy for the Kenyan University  
In relation to the analysis in Chapter 4 (section 4.5.2), Rancière’s (2009) seminal work on 
democracy brings in the elements of emancipation and equal intelligence as possibilities that 
can advance and disrupt democracy as it is conventionally understood (actualised). Rancière 
notes that democracy in its existing state is distinguished by the police in contrasting ways 
(Davis, 2010). This is so because the police imply an authoritarian agency that imposes on 
and insubordinates some while favouring others. Rancière hints that understanding 
democracy in this way restricts instead of frees. In view of this, Rancière argues that 
democracy [as a potential pedagogical encounter] does not need to be freed from regulations, 
for instance the justice system. However, the justice system should consider the potentialities 
of intellectual equality of opportunity for all citizens [students and teachers] to be active 
participants in meaning making [education] in whatever singularity. The logical connection 
Rancière makes is that human beings [citizens] bear potential equal intelligence and have the 
capacity to exercise their potential intellectual agency in a democracy. Therefore, every 
student and teacher bears potential equal intelligence that can enable them to participate in 
the teaching and learning environment to determine whatever they may become through such 
democratic (pedagogical) encounters. It follows that the justice system and democracy within 
university settings should enable each citizen [students and teachers] to be active participants 
in their democratic [pedagogic] encounters in whatever singularity in respect of students’ 
individual thought, thereby recognising their own potential intellectual agency for their 
becoming (own privations). In contrast, the police (policy) should not restrict (actualise) 
participation, but encourage it in whatever singularity. 
Accordingly, radical pedagogy, says Rancière, should be arranged in such a way that it 
allows the teaching and learning process in the university to be emancipatory. In other words, 
classroom spaces in the universities can be organised so that they potentially can enable 
students and teachers to have spaces in which to encounter the intellectual agency of 
everyone in a co-teaching and co-learning environment. Such a process provides 
opportunities for both the learner and the teacher in a university classroom to emancipate 
themselves. It follows that the intellectual emancipation found in encounters in university 
classrooms [with one another] is the signification of equality – it symbolises equality of 
intelligence in all humans. Such a kind of university education can enable both the student 
and the teacher to play the role of activist. Despite Rancierè’s controversial position, his 
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views provide the nuances necessary for DCE in becoming that opens pedagogical spaces to 
restructure/reconsider laws, rules and policies in university education or justice systems to 
counter societal ills. Rancierè’s thought also accords equal opportunities to the voices of both 
the teacher and the students, and recognises their capacity and possibilities for seeing things 
differently [anew, afresh]. 
Even though Rancière seems sceptical about the state of justice systems, he notes that such 
structures are necessary to guide society – as in university education. However, such 
structures sometimes act as police rather that politics. This implies that structures/policies can 
limit the intellectual agency of people. If such hierarchies were altered it would enable people 
to deal with the ever-changing contests of politics [decision-making processes]. In view of 
this, equality, in Rancierè’s thought, finds its meaning through expression. In this way, 
pedagogy in university education ought to be engendered through the in-becoming thought. 
This will mean that such an education will consider the fundamental capability [capacity] of 
all people to think, speak and act as equals. Rancierè’s thought signifies absent realities that 
require encounters [political ones] in order to actualise them. In other words, Rancière shows 
how university education can be a process of learning the unknown. That is, the unknown can 
be knowable only when students and teachers [citizens] potentially are able to engage with 
one another in their equal intellectual agency to make decisions – decide – and to learn 
together as a process of emancipating themselves without actualising learning. Emancipation, 
according to Rancière (1991:51), is ‘the will to question and express thought outside a 
position of mastery … it is not a key to any science but a privilege relation of each person to 
the truth, the one that puts him in his path of power to know’. ‘Knowing is an intellectual 
labour’ – this entails interrogation, translation and communication. Such a process must be 
shared through either spoken or written works by which communication with thinking beings 
is possible (Rancière, 1991:62) 
Rancierè’s underlying argument is that all human beings possess uniform qualities to think 
and speak as equals. These he refers to as qualitative capacities that enable people to engage 
with and act meaningfully in the world. University pedagogy therefore ought to reflect 
pedagogy as disruptive encounters for just practices. Radical pedagogy indicates that 
pedagogical encounters should be disruptive ones in the way they contribute constantly to 
meaning making. Rancière suggests that human intelligence is capable of communicative acts 
that can disrupt teaching and learning to break away from old ways of doing for better 
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practices. This kind of thinking stretches pedagogy from non-prescriptiveness to pedagogy 
beyond boundaries. 
6.6. Pedagogy and Ubuntu: An Encounter with ‘The Other’ 
With reference to the discussion in Chapter 4 (section 4.5), I reconsider Ubuntu as a kind of 
ethic of care that potentially can contribute to pedagogical encounters that can transform 
university education for a just course (Waghid & Smeyers, 2012a). This is because Ubuntu, 
as explicated by Waghid and Smeyers (2012a), demonstrates a Universalist ethics that 
considers the condition of oneself in relation to the other. In this sense, ‘Ubuntu relies on 
human moral enactment such as forgiveness, hospitality and nonviolence to remedy some 
portraits of violence and hatred on the African continent … Ubuntu remains an ever evolving 
concept of human goodness which can hopefully act against the contextual malaise of aspects 
of African morality and politics’ (Waghid & Smeyers, 2012a:13). Therefore, Ubuntu mainly 
highlights humanity in oneself and in the other (Cavell, 1979:433). I use this concept to 
interrupt how violence and injustice in Kenya affect citizens, and how it (Ubuntu) can be 
undertaken pedagogically in university education. Therefore, I use Ubuntu to argue for 
pedagogical potentialities that can do justice to the situations that one finds oneself in and to 
caring and acknowledging the concerns of others. 
Noddings (2006:339; 2012:387) hints that caring is an ethical ideal in professions in which 
encounter is frequent and is unavoidable. Noddings (2006:339; 2012:387) notes that teaching 
is one of those professions in which care is needed. Thus a teacher becomes one who gives 
care. This kind of caring, according to Noddings, is not a romantic caring, but rather entails 
being receptive to the other [students]. This kind of caring commences with ideals of respect 
and regard for the other. In this sense, the teacher becomes responsible for probing, and for 
interpreting and clarifying, during classroom encounters. Thus the teacher seeks the 
involvement of the cared for [students] in whatever singularity. In caring relationships 
[encounters], the teacher recognises the student’s experiences, from which the teacher begins 
instruction not in an actualised sense; this can enable learners to find connections to what 
they learn and how what they learn offers solutions to their daily problems/concerns. Caring 
potentially requires the intrinsic interests of trust and inclusion. In this sense, teachers 
potentially can acknowledge the intelligence of students as a starting point from which 
student learning objectives begin. Caring encounters need the participation of both students 
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and teachers. In this sense, the teacher needs to encourage dialogue, model caring and 
encourage cooperative learning to mirror the moral ethical ideal. 
Accordingly, my use of Ubuntu shifts from just the idea of belonging or a collective act of 
care or co-care to undertaking an empathic act of care in relation to respect and concern for 
the other. This is because of instances, as Waghid and Smeyers (2012a) highlight, in which a 
collective act of Ubuntu has manifested the lack of considering the plight of the other. One 
example they proffer is the collective act of genocide in Rwanda, when a collective act 
among the Hutu tribe in the spirit of African Ubuntu led to the death [massacre] of many 
Tutsis (Waghid & Smeyers, 2012a:9). This kind of Ubuntu portrayed by the Hutus arouses 
scepticism about what Ubuntu really ought to be, and also triggers a re-imagination of 
Ubuntu. Similarly, the violence in Kenya has also been enacted by particular solidarities in 
order to forcefully cause harm to the other, a case that has left Kenya in a state of wanting (cf. 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5). These occurrences of violence in Kenya and Rwanda point out that 
some collective acts of solidarity (Ubuntu as an actualised sense of belonging) can impose 
negative care (immoral and egocentric behaviour towards the other, impotentialities) by 
terminating the life of others. 
The Cavellian (1979) moral sense of being human entails being sceptical – which potentially 
considers the other as a stranger first as one establishes oneself in the other. In this manner, 
Ubuntu as an ethic of care accommodates reimagining in order to re-establish potential moral 
and ethical behaviour and encounters with the other. Cavellian Ubuntu negates blind 
collectivity that acts against humanity [as in the Rwandan and the Kenyan post-election 
violence]. This is because both instances cited above led to the death of many citizens, which 
is in contrast to potential respect for the moral human right to life. In the same way, Ubuntu 
as portrayed in Kenya [the harambee spirit] entails actualised ethnic collectivities that impose 
harm on human life. An example is the violent reactions of a ‘group of citizens’ who 
consciously plan and tamper with others’ rights to life, which is essentially unbecoming. 
In order to reimagine citizenship education within university education and society in Kenya 
there is a need for students and teachers to think differently about collective acts that are 
actualised (Ubuntu, ethnic violence) to co-belong in whatever singularity. That is, ethnically 
imposed violence, or any other form of collective violence that is predetermined or 
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actualised, can be reconsidered and dealt with pedagogically within classroom encounters, 
since such acts and sense of belonging divide Kenyans and undermine human dignity.  
From a Cavellian point of view, Ubuntu should not be viewed as an actualised concept, but 
rather as a potential ‘Ubuntu in-becoming’. On the other hand, the ever-increasing conflicts 
and violent encounters potentially can empower students and teachers to constantly 
reimagine, and interrogate, their [our] collective acts to be of a more durable and humanistic 
kind in the spirit of an ethics of care. Waghid and Smeyers (2012a:9) note that 
acknowledging our own humanity, as found in our emotions, feelings and compassion 
towards those who are vulnerable, potentially can be ethically caring, since it valorises 
human life. If humanity (Ubuntu) means that we are answerable to the other, then ethnic 
violence negates the responsibility we have of taking care of and respecting the other. Violent 
riots by students negate moral approaches to the other. Encounters that may resolve students’ 
conflicts [especially at the university] differently are more necessary than violent ones. 
Pedagogical encounters within university classrooms ought to provide deliberative, respectful 
and non-violent encounters to enable students and teachers to speak and think differently 
about problem-solving mechanisms that are non-violent and that can enhance care for the 
other. This is because violent encounters have the tendency to spark distressing 
confrontations that may stir violence. 
So: reimagining Ubuntu as a pedagogical concept can promote moral philosophy [ethic of 
care], which potentially can necessitate being responsible by acknowledging oneself in the 
other (Cavell, 1979:433). This means that the encounters we have in university classrooms 
and university spaces potentially can evoke critique, respect, care and compassion, so that the 
encounter we experience can enable us to mirror others in ourselves. Students therefore can 
take on imagination as a way of constantly knowing and unveiling the humanity in the other, 
thereby establishing self-humanity. Such an exercise (praxis) potentially has the capacity to 
enable students to co-belong in whatever singularity, such that the essence of Ubuntu can 
constantly awaken students’ imagination to potential moral encounters with the other, thereby 
respecting others’ humanity in whatever singularity. 
Waghid and Smeyers (2012a) suggest that Derridian thinking on imaginative action, and on 
forgiveness, hospitality and non-violence, can enable students to think differently about their 
sense of belonging and their relations with the other, thereby reimagining their humanity 
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differently as to co-belong in whatever singularity. Based on the premise that violence in 
Kenya undermines the role of Kenyan higher education as a democratic space for propagating 
citizenship, I argue that forgiveness and hospitality potentially can enable students and 
lecturers to think differently about one another and about how they view and transform 
citizenship education, inter alia to co-belong, and their relational encounters with the other as 
a reflection of self. In this case, therefore, forgiveness – as described by Derrida (1997:44) – 
denotes forgiving the unforgivable (see also Waghid & Smeyers, 2012a:11). This means that 
the violence that was imposed on some Kenyan citizens may seem impossible to forgive, but 
in the Derridian sense the potentiality of teaching students to live a life of forgiveness can 
mediate the possibility of forgiveness. Similarly, it is possible within classroom encounters 
that students and teachers may cross others’ paths and that such act can create uncomfortable 
encounters and hinder learning and deliberation. In this case, Derrida’s proposition becomes 
necessary to avoid instances of violence. Secondly, hospitality as a potential act of 
compassion toward the other can provide nuances for stretching the possibilities for and the 
impossibility of Ubuntu to improve the encounter with the other. Derrida notes that every 
human being has a right to universal hospitality without limits. This suggests that those who 
face violence or discrimination need to be taken care of by the government and by all who 
understand universal hospitality – university education potentially can be a space for 
cultivating notions of universal hospitality.  
Waghid (2014:93) notes that stretching hospitality to ‘hostipitality’ provides grounds for 
democratic education that can avoid provocative and disruptive pedagogical encounters, 
especially those that exclude others and hinder engagement within such encounters. He 
explains that ‘both welcoming the other (hospitality) and suspicion towards the other 
(hostility) are pedagogical speech acts that potentially can function to avoid exclusion, as the 
possibility is always there to find a variation – that is – to including the other by making them 
more curious and attentive’ (Waghid, 2014:93). In keeping with Waghid, I argue that 
hostipitality offers nuances for deliberative action that provides universities with ideas to 
conceptualise safe speech in their various encounters and environments of learning, so that a 
reasonable and moral acceptance is shared within their community of practice. So that their 
pedagogical encounters become deliberative ones, those who can challenge complacency 
avoid compromise and provoke doubts about ethnic violence, exclusion and the lack of public 
reasonableness. Such a reconceptualised view of university education can transform how 
encounters in African universities characterise African society, citizenry and human dignity. 
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When the university community engenders pedagogical encounters as hospitable ones, then 
students and teachers potentially can counter, or tackle, issues that affect Kenyan society, 
such as ethnic violence. I contend that Ubuntu as a pedagogical encounter can embrace 
human dignity when understood in potentialities of hostipitality and responsibility (Butler, 
2005; Cavell, 1979:433 Waghid, 2014:96). This is because Ubuntu, as explicated in this 
section and in Chapters 4 and 5, illuminates the communal ecological relations that can 
promote the cultivation of the African spirit of humanness. Ubuntu potentially provides 
nuances of an ethics of care that can explain how pedagogical practices within the classroom 
can promote responsible, just, critical and humane university education in whatever 
singularity. 
Cosmopolitan education and hostipitality are potential concepts that can help the Kenyan 
university to reimagine teaching and learning. ‘Cosmopolitanism is a philosophy developed 
during the period of the Enlightenment, notably by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) It is an 
extension of liberalism, the moral philosophy underpinning liberal democracy, which is 
concerned with upholding the dignity and inherent rights of individuals, understood as 
instantiations of universal humanity’ (Berner, 1995:2, cited in Osler & Starkey, 2000:20; see 
(Gregor, 1996).). A liberal account of citizenship accentuates the equality of all human beings 
with regard to their rights. A cosmopolitan citizen is one who views her/himself as a citizen 
of a world community based on common human values (Anderson-Gold, 2001:1; Osler & 
Starkey, 2000:20). In view of the reconceptualised African university, cosmopolitanism can 
be other than it is. That is, freeing cosmopolitanism from properties or identities can refresh 
pedagogical encounters in the classroom. This is especially possible when students and 
lecturers choose to co-belong, co-learn and recognise the potentialities of those with whom 
they share the classroom (human beings) in whatever singularity. 
A cosmopolitan view of citizenship negates the nationalistic understanding of citizenship that 
emphasises a nationalistic community rather than one that considers a community of all 
human beings (Osler & Starkey, 2005:20). In this sense, such a community is guided by 
common human values. These values, which frame cosmopolitan citizenship, are delineated 
by international structures/bodies that constitute the standards that guide human rights. 
Human rights are based on the premise that human beings are equal, as are their entitlement 
to rights and the necessity to respect their basic human dignity. This does not mean that 
cosmopolitanism denies nationalism, but it does recognise that universal values as standards 
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for measuring the equality of human rights are common human values (Osler & Starkey, 
2005:21). Cosmopolitan citizens are not born; they become this through education (Osler & 
Starkey, 2005:25). 
For cosmopolitan citizens, university education enables students and educators [citizens] to 
learn citizenship as a whole, not limiting citizenship to students’ settings only, but expanding 
it also to global settings. This kind of education conscientises students to their common 
humanity – the connections they themselves make with the other – a community of human 
beings, rather than loyalty to their states of citizenship only. Thus, Ubuntu conceptualised in 
this way can promote non-violence, inclusion and deliberation in public universities in Kenya 
and in Africa. Human dignity should be fundamental in reimaging pedagogy in Kenyan 
university education.  
For a reconceptualised view of the African university, cosmopolitanism could be other than it 
is – a community in becoming, which does not bear any properties or identities in whatever 
singularity, but is one that is yet to become. Teaching students to be cosmopolitans is 
teaching them to actualise being cosmopolitan citizens. However, teaching students to 
imagine the coming community teaches them to imagine a community that potentially can 
comprise active participants in their in becoming, that is, to co-belong, co-learn and interact 
with others in whatever singularities.  
6.7. Summary 
This chapter has shown that, when pedagogical encounters are critical, bear mutuality and 
love [friendship], become radical and emancipative, and are hospitable, then students and 
teachers in universities in Kenya potentially can address the challenges facing the country. It 
is my opinion that potentialities in criticality, friendship, disruption, emancipation and 
Ubuntu, as conceptualised in this chapter, can steer university education in Kenya from a 
starting point toward democratic citizenry in whatever singularity, yet leave room for 
advancement, since education is always in the making [the becoming community]. 
Friendship is that which potentially is characterised by love and mutuality, and which can 
create relational spaces for trust in which students can be free to take risks and become free 
participants in their learning. Pedagogical encounters in this sense can become friendly ones. 
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Critical pedagogy potentially allows learners and teachers space to be active participants in 
resolving the problems facing Kenyan society for justice in whatever singularity. Critical 
encounters potentially look beyond comfort zones and can become uncomfortable with 
others’ discomfort and suffering, and imagine new ways of resolving such dilemmas. Radical 
pedagogy can enable students to maximise their potential by exercising their intelligence to 
disrupt traditional ways of understanding things, especially when the old ways do not solve 
conflicting challenges in our society. Disruptive pedagogy can support students to think out 
of the box and develop new ways of thinking, thereby becoming innovative as a way of 
solving new problems in society. In addition, Ubuntu is an underlying pedagogy that 
potentially emphasises human interdependence, with moral ideals of caring for the other. 
Ubuntu potentially provides a springboard for in-becoming education, since it potentially 
conceptualises human dignity and caring relations [hostipitality and forgiveness] that can 
contend with complex societies like Kenya in whatever singularity.  
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  Chapter Seven
AN EXTENDED VIEW OF DEMOCRATIC 
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION: POTENTIAL 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO KENYAN UNIVERSITY 
ACADEMIC PROGRAMMES 
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides an extended view of DCE and a possibility of what it potentially can 
offer to Kenyan university academic programmes. In this chapter I provide a synopsis of the 
research process and findings, and then elucidate the contributions this research makes to 
Kenyan universities and finally offer recommendations for further research. Thus, the chapter 
wraps up how the current curriculum potentially can be modified to address issues of an 
extended conception of DCE and a view of a reconsidered Kenyan university. The questions 
remain on what and how this consideration should be present for this modification. I argue 
that the considerations made in this research potentially can transcend the different 
disciplines offered in universities in Kenya.  
In considering curriculum, one thing that comes to mind is the content of curriculum that 
needs modification. DCE in becoming in this research does not offer any specifics of what 
Kenyan education will look like; rather, it provides potential principles, knowledge, 
epistemologies and philosophical ideologies that can guide Kenyan universities as they plan 
their programmes (curriculum) with the complexities that come within the various fields and 
contexts of study. The programmes offered in university education cannot be the subject of 
this chapter; however, the programmes offered in universities potentially can be 
conceptualised to reflect the principles of DCE in becoming. I argue that programmes in 
Kenyan universities potentially can be organised in such a way that they engage students 
[citizens] deliberatively. Barnett and Coate (2005:1) point out that students are human beings 
and should be inquirers after knowledge and, at the same time, possessors of skills. For this 
reason, programmes [curriculum] should be designed in such a way that they potentially 
encompass knowing, acting and being [becoming], which means that they constantly should 
seek to deliberatively know [speech], act rationally and relentlessly strive to ‘becoming 
human’. Even though the curricula that exist in Kenyan [African] universities already are 
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engaging, the extent to which they are engaging in terms of policy statements seems 
inadequate and questionable. This is because ills and inhumane acts still exist in the system 
and society at alarming levels. For instance: Ethnic tensions within society and within 
university faculties and the environment suggest that there is a missing link in the extent to 
and manner in which the university curriculum in Kenya is actually engaging and 
deliberative. If education is a process of knowing, acting and being, as suggested by Barnett 
and Coate (2005:2), then the curriculum process in Kenya needs a reconceptualisation. In 
addition, the cases of intolerance, violence, favouritism and nepotism within the university 
point to the opposite of what educational aims should be. Barnett and Coate (2005:3) explain 
that a designed curriculum ought to be a curriculum in action, that is, one that manifests 
knowing and engaging and is action oriented. 
Curricula in universities in Kenya need to be designed not as complete entities that end in a 
particular action (actualised), but rather should capture imagination to inspire students to 
think innovatively and constantly be engaged in knowing, acting and becoming [being], while 
at the same time recognising the humanity of the other. Put differently, universities in Kenya 
ought to enable students to discover themselves in relation to others as a way of knowing, 
engaging and acting in whatever singularity. In this chapter I contend that the design of 
university programmes should be attuned to the aims of education. The question that lies 
underneath this contention is what is it to educate in contemporary Kenya [Africa]? Barnett 
and Coate (2005:4) note that the framings of university programmes depend on the contexts 
within which a curriculum is designed. The Kenyan context, as explained earlier in Chapters 
3 and 4, poses challenges of violence, ethnocentrism, poverty, nepotism and a lack of 
criticality, which counter the understanding of education as a process of becoming human. It 
perhaps also suggests that being human is never a complete process, but one of becoming. 
This point to the fact that becoming human touches the matrix of human identity and, 
ultimately, relationships that influence the becoming process (education) in whatever 
singularity. 
This chapter therefore challenges what it means to be and to become human, which ought to 
define the educational aims and policies of universities in Kenya and in Africa. Thus, the 
becoming process is what this thesis engenders to be the aims of education and its purposes 
and implementation. Curricula should widen students’ sense of self and self-understanding of 
their being and becoming, mostly in relationships of co-belonging. University education 
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needs to develop the vocabulary essential for capturing the philosophical, sociological and 
cultural experiences and perspectives of students in their becoming human – who co-belong 
to a coming community.  
7.2. Synopsis of the Research Process 
In this section I will sum up the research process to provide a summary of and reflection on 
the research process. This research study examined how and why the notion of liberal 
democratic citizenship is central to university education in Kenya as an attempt to fight the 
tensions and imbalances resulting from ethnic politics and polarisation. The focus on liberal 
democratic citizenship was instrumental in clarifying the link between the politicisation of 
ethnicity and Kenya’s education system (policies and practices) (see Benhabib, 1996:69; 
Waghid, 2002:26; 2009:24; 2010:19; Waghid & Le Grange, 2004:1; Waghid & Smeyers, 
2012a). Building on this research, I explored the degree to which we can recognise 
democratic citizenship as a progressive concept (see Barry, 1989; Biesta, 2009:15; 2011:141; 
Enslin & White, 2003; Hirst & White, 1998:22, 38; Mafeje, 1995:6; Matlosa et al., 2007: 23-
26; Olson, 2011) that can assist researchers and policy makers to rethink counteracting the 
manipulation of ethnicity for private political and socio-economic ends. This research aimed 
to reconceptualise university education in Kenya so that it can deal with ethnic conflicts in a 
more vibrant way. 
The problem statement of this research underscored that ethnic tensions in Kenya signify 
undemocratic conceptions of citizenship education. According to Luescher-Mamashela et al. 
(2011), students in Kenyan universities consider their country as fully democratic, yet there 
are several indications that point to the opposite. One of these indications is politicised 
ethnicity, which, among other things, determines people’s access to goods, employment and 
public services such as health care and political office. This narrow and limited conception of 
democratic citizenship is further evident in three other instances. Firstly, students think that 
belonging to a particular ethnic group is not important; yet, in reality, the tribal clashes that 
followed the national elections in 1992, 1997 and, most importantly, in 2007, point to the 
opposite. Secondly, students reduce democracy to political rights and civil freedoms without 
linking these to good governance, equity, fairness and justice. Finally, a sizeable number of 
university students (77%) do not consider participation and deliberation as core attributes of 
democracy, and 13% do not understand what democracy is. Therefore they do not possess the 
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tools with which to judge if the government is democratic or not. This suggests that there is a 
need to reconceptualise university education in Kenya to broaden students’ understanding of 
what a working democracy is in order to develop a defensible conception of democratic 
citizenship that hopefully will improve, transform and reduce the ethnic tensions in the 
country and, in turn, cultivate potential education that can contend with the ethnic conflicts 
and other ills in Kenyan society.  
In order to address the above, this research posed the following main research question: How 
does a defensible deliberative conception of democracy help us to think differently about 
higher education in Kenya? This question was investigated using the following sub-
questions: What is democratic citizenship education? What space might there be for 
democratic citizenship education to help Kenyan higher education institutions address ethnic 
divisions in the country? What have been the findings/consequences of the implementation of 
democratic citizenship education elsewhere in the world? What are the current and past 
policies with regard to equality in access to Kenyan higher education? What role has ethnic 
identity played in Kenyan social, political and economic life? How can democratic 
citizenship education in Kenyan higher education reshape ethnic identities and overcome 
ethnic tensions?  
This study focused mainly on university education in Kenya and how it can be used to 
advocate for a more plausible conception of democratic citizenship education that potentially 
can contribute towards minimising ethnic violence and political dissension. I concentrated on 
university education in Kenya to examine its contribution to the cultivation of democratic 
citizenship. This approach helped this research to locate the conceptual ambiguities of 
democratic citizenship education in Kenyan institutions of higher learning in order to rethink 
the liberal conceptions of DCE to DCE in becoming, which potentially can address ethnic 
tensions. 
I used philosophy of education as research design to analyse and clarify the concept of DCE 
in relation to the conceptualisation of university education in Kenya (Hirst, 1974:1). 
Philosophy of education is used in a normative sense in this dissertation. This is because 
educational theory (philosophy) links pedagogy, curriculum, learning theory and the purpose 
of education and justifies these in particular metaphysical, epistemological and axiological 
assumptions.  
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In addition to this I referred to the work of some African philosophers and Kenyan scholars to 
examine the concept of politicised ethnicity – a context in which university education in 
Kenya is conceptualised (see Appiah, 1992:170; Barasa, 1997; Falola & Atieno-Odhiambo, 
2002; Gyekye, 1995; Imbo, 1998; Ogot, 1995a; Oruka, 1998 Waghid, 2011; Wiredu, 1996). I 
also used the work of western philosophers to examine, analyse and clarify the concept of 
democratic citizenship education (see Benhabib, 2011a; Habermas, 1987; Hogan & Smith, 
2003:165; Rawls, 1971). Such endeavours augmented my view of democratic citizenship 
education to enable a reconceptualisation of university education in Kenya.  
The methodology of this research was located within an interpretive paradigm as developed 
by Stanley Cavell. According to Cavell (1979:191), a word gets its meaning in different 
contexts and within particular interpretive communities. As a consequence of this, there is a 
need for reasonable doubt – what he calls ‘scepticism’ – in investigating the meanings of 
concepts. In this study, Cavell’s interpretive view helped this research to investigate the 
relationship between democracy and ethnicity as conceptualised in Kenyan universities. It 
also helped me to examine how liberal DCE problematises current conceptions of higher 
learning, thereby necessitating a reconceptualised view of DCE.  
I also used conceptual analysis and deconstruction as methods. Conceptual analysis helped 
me to analyse the meanings of concepts (DCE and DCE in becoming) (see Hirst, 1967:44 and 
Peters: 1967:1), and deconstruction helped me to search for meanings other than they were 
portrayed (Biesta & Egéa-Kuehne, 2001:8). The choice of deconstruction as a method 
provided a strong emphasis on thinking differently. According to Biesta and Egéa-Kuehne 
(2001:4), Derrida’s work on deconstruction is crucial to rethinking educational issues through 
the unravelling of the inadequacies, contradictions and ambiguities in our education policies 
and practices. Biesta and Egéa-Kuehne’s understanding of Derrida’s work helped me to 
reveal the inadequacies in the current conceptualisation of university education as far as 
democratic citizenship is concerned. Therefore, deconstruction served as a guide in 
rethinking/reconceptualising. Deconstruction philosophy created space for conceptualising 
and imagining the possibilities of the university as a critical and democratic institution. This 
means that a DCE in becoming as a deconstructive idea was used to examine the state of 
university education in Kenya and found that liberal DCE is already actualised. 
Deconstruction helped me to potentially imagine university education in Kenya as openness 
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towards unforeseeable in becoming – that is, education in Kenya potentially can be other than 
it currently is. 
Liberal DCE was used as preliminary philosophical foundation (minimalist view) in this 
study because it contains prominent ideas that emphasise the notion of community, humanity 
and responsibility, and interrelationships amongst people in the public sphere. These ideas 
potentially subscribe to dialogue, justice, respect, reasonableness, equality and the concern 
for co-existence in the public sphere. In addition, liberal conceptions contain potential values 
that can advance the coming community. Such values include liberty and equality and the 
underlying respect for human beings as autonomous individuals who can establish their 
entitlement to potential equal freedoms. This is possible if people cooperate and co-live 
together in peace, despite their differences in opinions and ideas (Charvet & Kaczynska-Nay, 
2008:10). I considered liberal democratic citizenship education to be an important concept 
that could engender reasonableness and collective dialogue in reaching a consensus to reduce 
ethnic violence, improve politics and ensure the distribution of public goods equally in 
Kenya. In addition, it was hoped that such a notion of democratic citizenship education could 
stimulate the Kenyan education system to produce critical thinkers and practical reasoners 
who would be politically mature to appreciate otherness. 
The aforementioned philosophical considerations served a number of purposes in this study, 
namely to assess the validity of the conceptualisation of university, and to measure the impact 
of university education on societal engagement and public reasoning. These philosophical 
foundations provided this research with a minimalist view and the language, concepts and 
vocabulary that are available in liberal DCE, which I used to analyse university education in 
Kenya.  
7.3. Synopsis of Findings 
In Chapter 2 I analysed liberal DCE as comprising three interrelated concepts, namely a sense 
of belonging, human interaction and public reasoning. First, the liberal concept of DCE is 
understood to contain human rights and responsibilities in actuality. Rights are embedded in 
individual liberties, such as freedom of association, speech and conscience, and freedom of 
choice on how citizens live their lives. Responsibilities refer to certain duties that citizens 
need to carry out, for instance the duty to tolerate difference, agree on political power, make 
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decisions through public engagement and the exercise of individual power, and the use of 
critical/public reasoning as a process of making judgements and as a way of life (cf. Chapters 
2 and 4; Benhabib, 2011a & b; Habermas, 1987; Osler & Starkey, 2000:4; Rawls, 1971).  
The second consideration of liberal DCE is understood to contribute to a sense of belonging 
[collectivities], for instance as in nationalism. In this sense, citizens are regarded as members 
of a political party or government with solidarity, and are girded and protected by legal 
constitutions. Liberal DCE also extends the nationalistic sense of belonging to include 
cosmopolitanism (cf. Chapter 2). 
The third consideration of liberal DCE is reasonableness. For citizens to engage in public 
decision making, liberals note that their ability to reason is primary to the decisions they 
make regarding public concerns (see Benhabib, 2011a &b; Habermas, 1987; Rawls, 1971, as 
analysed in Chapter 2). DCE’s underlying values of reason and civility enable citizens to 
imagine the life worlds of others in such a way that they temporarily forget their own 
perceptions/culture in order to understand others who may be different from them. Thus, 
liberal DCE encourages integration and association between members of different groups, 
and this makes the breakdown of cultural barriers more likely (Kymlicka, 2003:51). On this 
assumption, liberal DCE sees university education as a place where students are exposed to 
alternative ways of living with others. 
Research on higher education in Kenya in relation to DCE is relatively new, although there 
are many historical accounts of universities and higher education in Kenya. Chapter 3 showed 
that university education in Kenya developed from a nation-state that had been characterised 
by collectivities, such as organised groups merged on the basis of ethnic sympathy and 
political position, which provides constructive insight into the country’s traditions and 
education (Ochieng, 1995; Ogot, 1995b; Oucho, 2002). 
Research on education policy in Kenya potentially shows how policies have influenced the 
democratic citizenship processes and the state of university education in Kenya. The analysis 
in Chapter 3 also explained the concept of democratic university education and its underlying 
influences on the Kenyan citizenry and national development (Eshiwani, 1990; Falola & 
Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002; Luescher-Mamashela et al., 2011; Mwiria et al., 2007; Oucho, 
2002). Education policy, acts and universities’ policies describe missions and visions for 
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university education toward democratic education, but a systematic study of the development 
of these policies into actual university programmes is lacking. University acts and policies 
point out the commitment towards a number of important elements for democratic citizenship 
education (DCE), inter alia national development, national unity, socio-economic 
development, social justice, preparing and equipping the youth with the skills necessary for a 
collective role using their individual talents and for personality development, and fostering 
and developing cultural awareness and international consciousness. However, the policy 
documents indicate that partner policies are weak in planning for democratic citizenship in 
the light of ethnic bias, conflict management and ethnic violence (i.e. innovation). In 
addition, there is a notable lack of recognition and promotion of an alternative understanding 
of citizenship that enhances and equips university graduates with critical and creative abilities 
to engage and participate in public collectivities so as to exercise the equal opportunities, 
freedoms and pluralism that Kenya hopes for, as this is marred by ethnic violence. These 
appear to be areas in which additional innovation and reconceptualisation are needed to re-
imagine and improve sustainable education in relation to ethnic violence. 
Citizenship education in Kenya has developed as a form of political socialisation from 
colonial rule to independent Kenya. Citizenship education in independent Kenya stems from 
the local framework of national education, which is comparable to the Kenyanisation of 
education through the adoption of democracy as a component of educational policy in the 
framing of national policies in education to advance national identity and national unity 
(Eshiwani, 1990; Luescher-Mamshela et al., 2011:xvii; Ogot, 1995b; Republic of Kenya, 
1964; 1976; 1981; 1999). 
One such study conducted by Kenyan citizens hoped that post-independent higher education 
would provide spaces to improve their livelihoods, alleviate poverty, increase economic 
development, promote cultural heritage and increase intellectual capacity for the country’s 
development. In reaction to this hope, Kenya made efforts to raise access to and increase the 
number of universities and university enrolments over the years. Despite such efforts, and the 
country’s yearning to achieve democracy [better human rights standards] through its higher 
education system, Kenya has been confronted with the complexities characterised by its deep 
legacy of gender and ethnic inequalities embedded in the political structures and systems of 
university education. This continuing impact of unequal education in Kenya has its roots in 
the colonial epoch under British rule. University education in Kenya must be understood in 
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the light of its ethnic and political structures negotiated between the colonial masters and the 
independent movements (Alwy & Schech, 2004; Mwiandi, 2010). Mwiandi (2010:105) notes 
that ‘the distribution of universities in Kenya is uneven, with some parts of the country 
having [a] heavy concentration of universities while others have few or none at all’. The 
nature of political transitions in Kenya has determined the development and distribution of 
universities. 
The first university that was established in Kenya was the University of Nairobi in 1970. 
University education was established to engage in the discovery, transmission and 
preservation of knowledge and to stimulate the cultural and intellectual life of society 
(Mwiandi, 2010:110).  
University education in Kenya is currently envisioned in Sessional Paper No. 14 of 2012 to 
provide  
… a pool of highly trained human resource capital that underpins the nations’ ambitions of 
being a knowledge-based economy. To realise the country’s ultimate goal as a prosperous, 
just, cohesive and democratic nation, the Government will enable citizens to develop skills 
and apply the same, their knowledge and creativity to their daily endeavours. Kenya’s 
university education must be focused, efficient and able to create knowledge and deliver 
accessible, equitable, relevant and quality training to sustain a knowledge economy that is 
internationally competitive (Republic of Kenya, 2012:5). 
Following this broad expectation, universities have developed their own policies at 
institutional and departmental levels. What is alarming is that, in general terms, Kenyan 
university policy connotes an acquisition of skills. The question of skill is crucial to 
becoming human; in which sense Kenya has failed to educate citizens with skills to become 
human, mostly because of the inhumane violence and crimes committed against humanity. 
The evolution of the policy of education in Kenya suggests that much emphasis has been laid 
on equity, quality, relevance and the strengthening of governance and management, but this 
also has not been realised fully, which suggests an actualisation of liberal DCE (Alwy & 
Schech, 2004:267; Otieno, 2007:24; Republic of Kenya, 2005:6). 
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Other principles and values that frame university education in Kenya include the sharing and 
devolution of power, the rule of law and participation by people, equity, inclusiveness, 
equality, human rights, non-discrimination and the protection of marginalised groups, good 
governance, integrity, transparency and accountability and sustainable development 
(Republic of Kenya, 2012:6). How these policies are translated into the actual university 
programmes is contentious. The constitution recognises the role of science and indigenous 
technologies in the development of the nation, and the promotion of the intellectual property 
rights of the people of Kenya (Republic of Kenya, 2012:6), but how such ideas become real 
in university education is still contentious. 
In Chapter 4 I argued that liberal DCE in Kenyan higher education is thin on the basis that it 
entails distorted views of participation [including deliberation] and belonging. Kenyan higher 
education is limited in its conceptualisation of DCE because of its nationalistic inclinations 
that narrow education for national development and neglect any humanistic overtones. 
Despite the fact that the purpose of Kenyan universities is teaching, research and community 
service, including shaping a civilised and democratic society in order to liberate minds and 
contribute to shaping an inclusive society, the realisation of these remains unclear (Nyaigotti-
Chacha, 2008:7). For instance, in Kenya, the meaning of citizenship as leading to 
bureaucratic enterprise, the culture of capitalism, international aid and sovereignty has 
assumed centre stage in higher education.  
This research potentially demonstrates that the Kenyan education system and constitution 
already bear some of the features described by these liberal views, yet violence, ethnocentric 
conflict, nepotism and other imbalances are experienced in society and in the universities 
(Eshiwani, 1990; Luescher-Mamshela et al., 2011:xvii; Ogot, 1995a; Republic of Kenya, 
1964; 1976; 1981; 1999). This is why I find these liberal perspectives – those of Rawls 
(1971), Habermas, (1987) and Benhabib (2011a) – to be relevant, although they lack 
conceptual vigour since they are already actualised in the policies and standards of university 
programmes. They do not help solve the problem of violence in Kenya and are contradictory 
when the results they bring reproduce systemic bureaucratic power relations that exclude. 
Accordingly, the understanding of liberal conceptions of DCE in the seminal thoughts offered 
by Rawls (1971), Habermas (1987) and Benhabib (2011a) seem inadequate to counter 
violence. This is so because, in a liberal DCE, deliberations, equality, freedom of speech and 
human rights are already actualised in the Kenyan education system. The moment these 
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deliberations are actualised, they cease to exist, and at this point cannot resist violence. This 
explains why a liberal DCE in Kenya is inadequate to solve violence. A further question 
could be asked, namely why is there still ethnic violence in Kenya despite the liberal DCE 
tenets found in university policies, Vision 2030 and education acts as major drivers of 
education?  
Next, I argued for the potentialities of Derrida’s (1997) and Agamben’s (1993) ideas of the 
‘actuality’ and ‘potentiality’ of post-liberal democratic citizenship education to disrupt the 
liberal understanding developed in Chapter 2 for a thicker understanding, which offers a 
reimagined view of DCE that has the potential to advance Kenyan universities as democratic 
institutions in becoming – ones that propagate citizenry and curb ethnic violence in the 
country in whatever singularity. I borrow from Agamben’s (1993) seminal work in The 
Coming Community: Theory Out of Bounds. Agamben’s perspective is used here to imagine 
the future of university education better than it currently is – the future in a feasible, hopeful 
optimism.  
In Chapter 5 I argued for a DCE in becoming informed by notions of critique, friendship, 
compassionate imagining and scepticism, to show how a liberal version of the concept ‘in 
becoming’ is actually an extension of the liberal idea. I reaffirmed a liberal understanding of 
DCE and then explained how DCE in becoming can be considered as an extension of a liberal 
idea. This helped to clarify the nexus of the imagination of university education for the 
hopeful feasible future that can resolve ethnic violence in Kenya.  
DCE in becoming is commensurate with deconstruction as a reflexive paradox that retains the 
critical potential of a liberal DCE – a process of reconstruction (Biesta, 2009:89; Carlson, 
2011:11). DCE in becoming as a deconstructive idea potentially examines the current state in 
universities in Kenya so as to imagine universities for a hopeful future – one that can contend 
with ethnic violence. This idea fits in with a DCE in becoming as an extension of the liberal 
idea. DCE in becoming as a reconceptualised view of liberal DCE has the potential to help 
Kenyan universities to address issues of ethnic violence and the impotentialities of an 
actualised education. This is so for the following reasons: First, a reconsidered view of DCE 
suggests that university education in Kenya potentially needs to help students to speak and 
think. Speech in this sense signals students to voice things differently, and involves 
suspending judgment on the way knowledge is presented so that students can learn something 
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new, a way of acknowledging that learning is always in potential and never comes to 
actuality – the becoming is always in the making (Waghid & Davids, 2013:24). It is only 
when learning is considered as a potentiality that learning is in becoming, and any judgment 
of learning is never made in a rush. This means that an education in the becoming state is a 
formation process in which students will never be allowed to be in their comfort zones; 
students will be challenged constantly to give account of themselves and then challenged 
continuously in speech and reason to uncover, recover and discover their voices, yet act 
differently – not in a rush to judgement (Barnett, 2007:54). This way of thinking enables the 
student to have confidence and involvement in her/his learning and becoming. 
Secondly, a reconsidered view of DCE is connected to the practice of seeing things 
differently. Seeing things differently means seeing things not as they always appear to be. 
Waghid and Davids (2013:25) say that seeing things differently conveys the notion that 
things will present themselves in different and multiple ways, which will prevent one from 
rushing to judgement. This means that education has the potential to enable students to see 
things strangely, since it provides the place where students are in becoming (Agamben, 
1993). That is, when we see things in the same way there is room for redundancy, yet the 
becoming state enables innovative thinking; it encourages radical thinking and new ways of 
knowing and seeing things. Rethinking higher education in terms of DEC in becoming offers 
the following potential practical ways of university teaching: first, teach students not only as 
those who share a sense of belonging but as individuals with their own privations (freedom, 
individuality). This means that students will be introduced to practice on the basis of 
undisputable allegiance to bringing about change without favouring any hegemonic 
community or idea since they are freed from their self. Second, teachers will educate students 
to intentionally become a part of the becoming community through communication to 
respond to the problem of violence. Such an education is not yet arrived at, but one in 
becoming – so every day experiences – can enable students to enter into speech and thought 
without rush judgment. This process can be guided by potential values of respect, human 
dignity, self-respect and seeing others within an outside. 
Chapter 6 explained the implications of a reconceptualised view of African university for 
teaching, learning and governance on the continent and how such a university can be more 
attentive to the debilitating social and political conditions in Kenya. The chapter illustrated 
how university classroom encounters can be transformed into spaces for democratic 
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pedagogical practices for students and their instructors to constantly learn to think differently 
and innovatively about the societal and educational challenges faced by the country/ 
continent, especially in higher education. This chapter showed that, when pedagogical 
encounters are critical, bear mutuality and love [friendship], become radical and 
emancipative and are hospitable, then students and teachers in universities in Kenya 
potentially can address the challenges facing the country. It is my opinion that potentialities 
in criticality, friendship, disruption, emancipation and Ubuntu, as conceptualised in Chapter 
6, can steer university education in Kenya from a starting point toward potential democratic 
citizenry in whatever singularity, yet leave room for advancement, since education is always 
in the making [the becoming community]. 
A university that employs potentialities of critical pedagogy enable students in their 
becoming to be active participant in their co-learning. This means that students own 
perspectives of learning become crucial to university pedagogy and policy research. This will 
enable students to develop their own intellectual agency as they can be taught to question 
what they are taught and not treating academic text as encyclopaedic authorities.  
The concept of Friendship has implications to Kenya university, in the sense in which it 
provides the language and concept of ‘pedagogical love’ (Elton, 2005:113). Cultivating a 
culture of friendship, relationality brings to the fore the idea of a relational university driven 
by love potentials, not only for their students but also of the ‘intellectual love’ – the love of 
their discipline which can bridge the gap of pedagogical encounters to mutual attachment and 
attunement to the other and being aware of their co-belonging. 
Ubuntu as an African concept can provide an institutional culture of caring. Caring that is 
commensurate to DCE in becoming is one that is not yet arrived at but one that can respond 
the problem of violence in whatever singularity. Caring provides potential pedagogical 
concepts of being hospitable, imagining the state of others being other than they are. So such 
understandings can continually become part of a university curriculum, vision, and policy in 
becoming. 
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7.4. Contributions of This Research Study 
In Chapter 1 I indicated that reconceptualising higher education within a liberal framework of 
democratic citizenship can generate new ideas on why the problem of politicised ethnicity 
has continued to be a challenge, despite ‘sound educational policies’. This research found that 
Kenyan universities are already conceptualised by the identities and properties of liberal 
DCE. This means that liberal democratic citizenship is conceptualised in actuality, since 
ethnic violence and other societal imbalances remain despite the sense of being democratic – 
hence the need to reconceptualise what DCE is in the hope that students potentially will be 
able to understand what it is and expect better performance from their democracies. 
To a large extent, the motivation for this study also stemmed from the prevailing inequalities 
in Kenya that entail ethnic discrimination. Such widespread inequalities undermine the 
concept of nationhood and national unity that Kenyan education policy advocates (Eshiwani, 
1990:7). Other concerns of this research were the wide inequalities that exist in the country, 
and the loss of innocent lives killed due to tribal violence and political greed in 1992, 1997, 
2002 and 2007.  
As a study contributing to the philosophy of education, this study has reconceptualised a way 
of thinking differently about higher education in Kenya that potentially can address ethnic 
violence in the country. So, I extended the liberal DCE to DCE in becoming. This research 
has shown that DCE in becoming has the potential to educate students to cultivate 
communities in becoming without the claim of belonging to any particular community, but 
rather as humans who co-belong as they continue to tackle daily issues such as violence in 
society. It might also encourage students to think of the potentiality of speech without rash 
judgement as one way of negotiating solutions to problems without actualising speech. When 
students potentially are prepared to think, see and speak differently on a constant basis and to 
suspend hasty judgement, then DCE in becoming can address violence and other societal 
dystopias.  
Students can be introduced to practices on the basis of undisputable allegiance to bringing 
about change without favouring any hegemonic ethnic/cultural community or idea, since they 
are freed from their self and their identity [privation]. Unless education in Kenya is freed 
from a sense of belonging or predispositions, or is instituted to imagining, critiquing and 
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communicating, education will become an actualised practice and ethnic violence will 
become imperative for education, as is currently the case. DCE in becoming potentially can 
educate students to imagine societal problems and concerns in whatever singularity to bring 
about potentiality without actualising it. This means students will be engaging in dialogue 
about public matters that are concerned with the coming community, not as though there will 
be instant solutions to the problems, but rather in continuous deliberations that potentially can 
contribute to the coming community. So, in this sense, higher education in Kenya will 
become an invitation for students to live a life of dialoguing with the self and the other, and at 
the same time creating a place where nothing remains unsaid. In keeping with Waghid 
(2005b), compassionate action in relation to Green’s proposition can enable university 
students to create a space in which teachers and students in higher education institutions can 
look at things afresh.  
DCE in becoming potentially can educate students to intentionally become a part of the 
becoming community through communication. This in-becoming communication is contrary 
to the Habermasian (1987) type of communication, which leads to understanding through 
agreement. DCE in becoming is concerned with bringing students into ‘communication with 
the incommunicable’ (Waghid, 2013, citing Agamben, 1993:7). This means that students will 
be taught not to stay silent regarding anything, even if it will lead to disagreement. It is in 
relation to such being in communication that violence in society can be renounced. Thus, 
being in communication should entail practices that continuously guide students in 
negotiating innovative solutions to solve violent occurrences in society. 
DCE in becoming, in a philological sense, potentially can prepare students to participate and 
communicate responsibly in public space/life with privations, without actualising speech. 
Accordingly, being in continual speech can contribute to fresh ways of thinking about 
societal ills and concerns (Agamben, 1993). This means that, while students are prepared for 
their future careers, university education needs to prepare them also with potential skills, 
knowledge, purposes and attitudes in whatever singularity that will continuously sustain their 
becoming (as form of life) – as a possibility of a feasible future. Such knowledge may include 
the ability to deliberate continuously in public spaces, to be responsible, to have a willingness 
to tolerate, to be respectful, and to be fair in whatever singularity.  
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The complexity of the violence in Kenya gives rise to the question of moral education. In 
keeping with Theim (2008:1), ‘moral conduct cannot be reduced to what we owe others, to 
duties and obligations and not to virtues which can have equality restraining effects’. What 
Kenyan education requires is an education that can enable students to undertake the task of 
learning to live together with others without interfering with their individuation (privation). 
The violence and ethnic tensions have given rise to a problematic situation in Kenya, thereby 
resulting in an increase in poverty, social decadence and hatred among citizens, which lead to 
defeat and dogmatism. How can education thrive when it is actualised? Maxwell (2007) notes 
that the global crisis reflected in violence requires an entire structural overhaul and revolution 
of educational aims and methods of inquiry to contend with societal pressures.  
I argue that responsibility as a concept can provide nuances for DCE in becoming in the 
sphere of moral education. In line with Cavell (1979:441), responsibility is the capacity or 
ability to act about a situation, and also the ability to amend a situation. Being responsible for 
what happens to others means that their opinions are acknowledged, even though one might 
not be in agreement with the other. One shows concern for the other. According to Cavell 
(1979:9), being responsible means that an individual will negotiate his/her relations with the 
other, because lack of responsible action would mean the collapse of society. Violence is both 
an ethical and a moral issue. It is concerned with making judgement on what is right and, at 
the same time, what is good for the self and the other in considering living together with the 
other without actualising belongingness. On this basis, DCE in becoming is considered a 
normative viewpoint from which education can constantly be in the making/reviewed. The 
provocative view posed by responsibility for DCE in becoming is the potential for critical 
citizenship that can expand opportunities for justice for all people without rash judgement. In 
other words, responsibility as a concept potentially suggests the possibility of embedding it in 
DCE in becoming in whatever singularity. It also gives way to a potentially just education 
system that can tackle issues of violence and humane practices in our universities. 
Pedagogically, universities potentially can imagine teaching and learning as relational 
encounters. This signifies universities as social institutions consisting of a becoming 
community that potentially can exemplify responsible human beings, who, through rational 
encounters, seek to think, speak and make judgement carefully on the potentialities of the 
African university. This signifies that notions of friendship potentially can be considered as 
imaginaries that propose the relationship between university students and lecturers to guide 
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the teaching and learning process. In this way, universities can protect the teaching-learning 
relations between teachers and learners within the university.  
To enact one’s humanity requires that one enact caring as a humanistic potential. A caring 
university education considers comfort zones as antagonistic to the development of a DCE in 
becoming. Such a university potentially cares for its students’ lives, research and learning in 
such a way that each student can become constantly critical and sceptical and look for 
solutions to the problems they face, especially those of others to whom they co-belong. In 
this way they can care for one another and can consider another’s care, and constantly seek to 
care for and about others in whatever singularity. 
Universities in Kenya/Africa have the potential to be critical and responsible institutions. 
This means that a university can be a place where students’ potential is stretched to being 
responsible/answerable and critical as ways of educating potentially responsible citizenry in 
whatever singularity.  
Being human in becoming (Ubuntu potentially) can inform how research is conducted in 
African/Kenyan universities. That is, researchers in universities can recognise the values/ 
potentialities of co-belonging to enhance research that potentially can counter African 
problems, in which case both the community and the university lecturers form part of the 
research – not as subordinates but as co-researchers who potentially can address societal 
problems – a democratic practice in becoming. One aspect that in-becoming humans can 
contribute to is deliberating on how to counter the violence and imbalances in society that 
arise as a result of ethnocentrism.  
Universities potentially can be responsible to shape themselves towards becoming academic 
communities, with integral scholarship that can imagine and become innovative in building a 
coming community of Africans/Kenyans who can think, speak and act without rash 
judgement. Such thinking about the coming university community can help universities to 
rectify their narrow focus on universities and focus instead on stimulating their in-becoming.  
7.5. Recommendations for University Education in Kenya 
At the beginning of this study I examined how and why the notion of liberal democratic 
citizenship is central to higher education in Kenya in the country’s attempt to fight tensions 
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and imbalances resulting from ethnic politics and polarisation. I recommend the following: A 
university as becoming community should be conceptualised in terms of advancing speech 
and thought and withholding rash judgement. 
The university curriculum should be reconsidered as one which is in becoming as opposed to 
actualised notions that must be realised. This is because the notion of a coming community 
opposes preconceived notions of a curriculum and a university. Furthermore, it is because 
predetermined outcomes in education limit and actualise curricula, create borders to 
criticality and creativity and restrict deliberations on actuality, rather than create potentialities 
for advancement. This way of thinking about a university curriculum frees it from 
presupposition, and potentially can lead to innovations in the education system to transform 
its everyday problems. 
The university as a place for becoming human is a place to co-belong, in which the autonomy 
and participation of every individual counts. It is not a place where agreement is a defining 
factor, but a place for independent thinking, where responsibility is defined by being in 
constant critique as a way of becoming innovative. Relationality is crucial to deliberative 
spaces where students can be open to speak their minds without fearing others’ criticism, and 
also to co-belong. 
I recommend that further studies on university education in Kenya should focus on the 
following: 
First, in order to gain an understanding of university education is Kenya, researchers should 
gain knowledge about the philosophical foundations that inform Kenyan universities. 
Knowing how university education is conceptualised can help researchers, teachers and 
students to unravel the problems faced by the university.  
Second, further empirical and pragmatic research can be conducted on how the 
reconceptualised view of DCE can help inform and disrupt universities to potentially address 
ethnic violence.   
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Third, research is needed on how DCE in becoming can serve as an epistemology for 
thinking about university education in terms of leadership, curriculum, pedagogy and policy 
making. 
Further philosophical study is needed to understand DCE in becoming in relation to the role 
of ethnicity in university education in Kenya. 
A study on how DCE in becoming can help Kenyan citizens deal with the increasing violence 
and fear of terrorism would also be meaningful. 
Violence and ethnic discrimination are concerns not only in Kenya, but in the world at large. 
The 2007 post-election violence put Kenya in the international news, and posed various 
challenges to Kenyan society. For these reasons and more, as posed in this research, 
education researchers should continuously search for educative solutions to current and 
recurring societal problems. 
7.6. Summary 
This chapter has provided a synopsis of the research process and findings and the 
contribution of this research to Kenyan higher education, and has made recommendations for 
further research. 
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